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INTRODUCTION
Throughout

the.

ninateenth century wany Americans imagined that

heathen temples and
East Asia was a land of cruel varlords, opium dens,
Now and then businessmen dreasned of vast

masses of unwashed coolies.

bold plans to convert
and untapped m-arkets, and missionaries conceived

Asians to Christienity

.

Travelling journalists found Asia a source for

mysteries of the East for
strange and exotic tales which perpetuated the
the reading public.

Asians living in the United States could do little

to alter the negative stereotypes.

Working long hours for meager wages,

labor.
they wore considered a menace to American

Moreover, they retained

their pigtails and congregated
their Oriental customs, refused to cut off
filthy ChiaaCowns
in what /iniericans believed to be evil and

America's popular image of the Orient

by the 1890's.

Ihea in the early

surnr.ar

ren'.ainec1

largely unchanged

of 1894 China and Japan declared

kingdom of Korea.
war, r.«ssxng their amrles in the small

became intensely interested.

Americans

"Whatever be the issue of the present

is likely that A...ericans will
conflict," one conte.nporary observed, "it
next six n,onths than they have ever
know .-.ore of Chinese Asia during the

cared to iearu before."^

and articles
They studied hastily-written books

economics.
on Asian history, politics, art and

nating analyses of the "Oriental mind."

Ti.ey

Ihey looked into fascisearched their maps for

accounts
mentioned in stirring newspaper
Seoul, Chemulpo and other cities
in December 1894 that
The
XS^k Tril^e noted
of the early fighting.

Mi

generation.
for the first time In a
"in the year just closing Asia has.

2

It alone is sufficient to

been the scene of the world's chief interest.
^3

roake 1894

an ever-memorable year."

important domestic
American interest was remarkable in view of the

concerns.

between strikers
A terrible depression, accented by battles
Aniericans feared the

years.
and soldiers, seemed likely to endure for

socialism and Populism; but they
B,enaces they perceived in immigration,
by the trusts.
were angry too over an economy monopolized

over gold

Arguments

while discontented
silver money daily grew more intense,

groups agitated for reforms.

President
One llassachosetts Democrat warned

new forces threatened to underGrover Cleveland in July 1894 that theae

might bring about a violent revolution.
=,ine the two-party system and
••Populisra. Coxeyism.

he explained, and
and Debism are all of a piece."

system."^
they proposed to destroy the An^erican

Ihese dcnestic crises

Richard Hofstadter, may have
and frustrations, according to historian
of Americans to foreign affairs
been important in turning the attention

excitins diversion from the conduring the 1890's, as a welcome and
5

plexities of trying

tiraes.

however, could scarcely be
Cleveland's second administration,

foreign policy.
called dramatic in its conduct of

It had instigated

being
Nicaragua, but by 1894 it v..
.inor interventions in Bra.il and
spirit of the
contrast to the adventurous
called "cowardly" through its
State
Harrison and hie Secretary of
preceding administration. Benj«.ln
.

James G, Blaine had kept the Aiiiericau

for several years.

^chUz

Harrison's war scar,

-with

over foreign affairs
PN-cited c.ex
exciteci
Italy ha. h.rdly subsided

Valparaiso threatened
An.erican sailors in
two
of
.urder
the
when
in 1891
to lead to war with Chile.

living in F.waii
A rebellion by Americans

3

promised for

a

time to result in American annexation of the islands.

Yet, despite Harrison's efforts, Congress postponed passage of his

annexation bill; it was still pending when Cleveland entered the
House in

Il^.rch

\Tnite

1893.

Cleveland's victoi^ in 1892

V7as

due partly to his long-f tanking

reputation for honesty and morality in government.
defeated battling for an honest principle than to
6

fuge," he told his follo:7ers.

"It is better to be
v/in

by covjardly eubter-

Cleveland campaigned by criticising the

corruption and belligerency of the Republicans, promising not only
financial and civil service reform^ but also the return to a less

aggressive and less dangerous foreign policy-

Cleveland consistently

assured An-^ericans that his foreign policies would be based on "conscience,
justice, peace, and neutrality," while "rejecting any share in foreign
7

broils and ambitions upon other continents."

Cleveland's choice for Secretary of State, Walter Quintin Gresham,
fully concurred with the President's foreign policy objectives.

An

Indiana Revpublican, Judge Greshasi had grown increasingly unhappy with
the corruption in his party.

In 1892, he abandoned the Republicans and

his
supported Cleveland, realising that in all probability he had ended

political career.

When the President-elect asked him to become Secretary

would be critiof State, Gresham hesitated, fearing that his appointment

cized as a political deal.

But Cleveland assured Gresham that because

sincerity and
of his "sturdy regard for political duty" and his "supreme

nation as
disinterestedness," he would contribute a vital service to his
the head of the State Department.

Gresham accepted and travelled to

in him.
Washington with a fcr\'ent intent to justify Cleveland's faith

Though a novice in foreign affairs, Greshatn applied his background

and knowledge of
policies.

lav;

and domestic politics to the formulation of foreign

He believed that in international relations there was right

and wrong, good and evil; some policies were legal, others illegal,

diplomat was

be^it

A

served by his unswerving allegiance to principle.

In

1894 he wrote a close Indiana friend that his foreign policies would

oppose expaitsion into the Prxific, as well as the creation of a large
army and navy.

policy which
interests.

Never, for instance, v?ould Greshasi condone a foreign

aiiiied

to enhance the deals and intrigues of business

Amarican

ccrnnierce

Must proceed according to the v/orkings

of honest laissex-f aire economics.

A high tariff fostered

a nurabcr

of evlle and must be lowered or abolished to ensure friendly relations

between the United States and all other nations.

9

The pending legislation concerning the annexation of Hawaii

presented Cleveland and Gresham with their first najor foreign policy
decision.

Ihe President, prompted by Gresham, urged the Senate to delay

action until his special corrmissioner

,

James H. Blount, could complete

an investigation of the recent Hawaiian revolution.

Blount discovered

Honolulu,
"irnproper" involvement on the part of the American minister in

and this confirmed Gresham'

s

suspicion that the revolution had been

engineez-ed by "iirjnoral" Aiaerican business interests in Hawaii.

Tne

and restore
Secretary of State advised Cleveland to abandon annexation

the legitiniate government to power.

Ihough restoration of the former

regime failed, the President dropped the annexation treaty.

Cleveland

for
jusrlfi-d hU. decision by blaming Harrison and the Republicans

initiating a virulent
having manufactured the Hawaiian problem, thereby

Viipat-tisan debate over the direction of American foreign policy vhich

lasted throughout Clevelaad's entire second

terra.

Influenced by the

need to provide a clear contrast with Republican foreign policy as well
as by their ovn backgrounds, Cleveland and Greshain adopted policies
V7hich,

through incessant enunciation, appeared non-aggressive, anti"

irr.perialist

,

straightforward and mindful of the rights of all nations.

As Sino-Japanese hostilities began in East Asia in 1894, the

prospGCt of titanic battles between battleship fleets and huge amies

was enough, in itself, to capture the interest of the American public.
Had Benjarain Harrison still been President, the audience might well

have e^ipoctcd heightened drama in the
with the

wiir.

llo

for^n of

some American connection

such policy, hov?ever, could be expected from the

current leadership; and no one was surprised when Cleveland and Gresham
announced a policy of "strict neutrality."

Having understood that their government would be strictly neutral,
Americans were startled in June of 1894 when they learned that United
and
States marines and naval personnel had landed at Chemulpo, Korea,

marched some thirty miles to the capital at Seoul.

A few months later

way to Peking.
the marines were in China, fully expecting to fight their
missions,
American warships crisscrossed the Gulf of Chihli on urgent

while gunboats defiantly steamed on China's rivers-

Americans fought

armies and accompanied
in belligerent warships, sold arms to belligerent

those armies as observers and reporters.
sides in spy

ca-=>es,

Cleveland's diplomats took

local
disputes over belligerent property, matters of

forced upon them by
politics, peace negotiations and other imbroglios

their government's energetic conception of neutrality.

Obviously there

.

6

could be no real neutrality, much

les:;

indifference toward the war.

With

so many Americans on the scene with so confysins an assortment of roles

to fulfill, the plr^y of circumstances alone was enough to produce

undesired involvements on one side or the other.
The history of America's response to the "Pigtail

been neglected.

V/ar"

has long

It is important because it sheds light on the question

of American economic interests in Asia and because consideration of the
strains of public opinion which it evoked can contribute to an under-

standing of general /^r.erican attitudeo in the 1890's.

More significantly,

dangerous
however, it provides insight into an embarrassing and even

early American involvement in Asia.

These entanglements in this far

diplomacy
distant war were unintended and unplanned, deriving from a
and ability;
vhich priced good intentions sbove professional experience

which often created
a tendency to act first and worry later; a Kathod
corr^idtments at some point

involved

prior to careful analysis of the issues

CHAPTER

I

THE KOREAN CRISIS OF 1894

Few Americans in 1894 could locate Korea on the map.
admitted that this
areas of the world.

ssTiall

Asian country vas one of the least knovri

Knovledge of the "Hermit Klngdosi" was acquired

largely through the press and
Carpenter.

They

fron^

columnists such as Frank George

Carpenter, given only a year to live in 1883, survived to

fonn his own news syndicate in 1888.

An

eiiiaciated

little nan attired

In over-sized suits and broad -brimmed hats v;hich slipped

do--m

over his

ears, he began a series of world travels, sending articles back to

fifteen leading newspapers.
In 1894 Carpenter toured China, Japan and Korea, becoming the
first American nevspaperman to view the Korean crisis.

He portrayed

"queer old Corea" as a land of oriental mystery, strange aln^ond-cyed

beauties and weird tortures.

Peering through his gold-rimiued glasses,

Carpenter examined Korean life in great detail.

He visited prisons,

explaining to American readers the "con^on practice" of "paddling,"

whereby a prisoner's skin was ripped from his body.
Korea's "squeezers" who made
people.

rail

He interviewed

lions by taxing an already ir^poverished

Carpenter travelled through the countryside and

potential wealth of the kingdom.

obs-r.rved

the

He wrote in his syndicated columns that

"the gold mines of Korea turn out from two to three million dollars*

worth of dust and nuggets every year, and practically nothing but placer

7

8

.

mining is done.
.

.

,

„1

Other American journalists, farther from the scene, discussed
Korea in more general terras.

Tney pictured '*semi**savagc'* Koreans as

being primitive as the "Thlinklits or the Quichias, or the Patagonians."
Americans read that Koreans were "queer people" and that Korea, ruled
by an effeminate king and a chain-smoking queen, was a "queer country."

Korea--in the view of VJilliam Randolph Hearst, who was editor of the
Francisco Examiner in 1894--"is as near to an absolute noaentity as
any aggregation of ten taillion people could possibly become without
flickering out of existence.

It is a colorless and feeble copy of

2

China."
Asnong the several hundred AsiiericaxiS in Korea in 1894 were repre-

sentatives of the

cnuill

trading finr/of Morse ^ Tovnisend, several

military and administrative advisers to the Korean king and perhaps two
3

hundred niissionarie£--ir.ostly Presbyterians and Methodists.

^
most
The

prominent American was diplomat-missionary Horace Newton Allen.

Shortly

after his arrival in Korea in 1884, Allen had won the confidence of the
royal family by saving the life of the Quaen's nephew, who had been

severely slashed by an assassin's sword.

Allen scon became entangled

in Korean factional struggles, assassinations and international

Ihe weak king relied on the A^^erican's advice and in 1887
4
legation.
Korean
a
establish
to
sent him to Washington
rivalries.

11-iis

Prei:byterian medical irissionary proinoted the United States

as Korea's special friend.

He had attempted to interest American

businessmen in Korea and had received the Harrison administration's
in
assurance that the United States would pursue an assertive policy

9

that kingdom.

Although critici^;ed by the Cleveland administration for

Keddling in Korean politics, /illen*s interpretation of American-Korean
relations generfdly satisfied most contemporaries familiar with Asian
politics.

Dr. H. N. Allen, Carpenter wrote, "will go dov?n into history

as one of the greatest of our diplomats-

He has done more good for

Corea than any man ever connected with the United States legation."

Allen based his view of Korean-American connections on the
assumption that the United States had opened the "Hermit Kingdom*' to
Ihe United States had, in fact, followed Japan*

foreigners.

s

path-

breaking treaty of 1876 with its own Treaty of Amity and

Corrnierce in

1882, which left cut mention of China's claim to Korea.

When the United

States sent a fully-accredited minister to Seoul in 1887, Allen assumed
that his country supported Korean independence.

Thus, the United States

had placed itself beside Japan as the upholder (symbolically, at least,
in the light of Airtsrica's weak power position in Asia) of Korean

independence.

Furthermore, the American treaty implied opposition to

China's traditional relationship with Korea, a tributary state to which

China had provided protection in return for virtual control ever Korean
politics.

It was possible,

that the United States would

therefore, for some journalists to predict
becotiie

involved in the struggle soon to
6

occur between China and Japan over Korea.
Contact between China and Japan on the Korean peninsula was deeply
rooted in the past, but the causes of the 1894 crisis resulted
several more

iiitrnediate

factors.

froni

The maturation and consolidation of

JaX^an's nodernisaticn program during the 1870'

s

and iSSO's had cata-

Asia.
pulted her into direct confrontation with China and Russia in East

10

Msny Japanese politicians favored a gradual and measured approach to
power, preferring the use of diplomacy to strengthen their economic

and political position in Korea and to revise their hated extra-

territorial treaties vlth VJestern powers.

Thus in 1884 when a Japanese-

backed Korean rebellion had failed, Japan had outmaneuvered the Chinese

protectors of the anti-Japanese faction through the Li-Ito Convention
signed at Tientsin the following year.

The Tientsin Convention not

only indemnified Japan for her property and personal losses in Korea

during the abortive insurrection, but indirectly acknowledged China's

recognition of Japan's equal status in Korea,

Then in

18'?1

Japanese policy in Korea faced a new threat vhcn

Russia announced it vould build a trans-Siberian railway.

This corapli-

cated Japan's gradualist policy and gave strength to militant opponents
of gains through diplomacy.

By 1894 advocates of

a

more vigorous

program forced several dissolutions of the Eouse of Representatives of
the Imperial Japanese Diet, and some observers predicted that the violent

debates could lead to revolution.

Others believed only a great foreign
8

adventure could bring the country together.
The murder of a pro-Japanese Korean refugee, Kim Ok-kyun, in-

tensified the Japanese political crisis.

Kim had found refuge in Tokyo

efter the abortive Eouet_e of 1884 and h^d become the rallying point for
Japan's designs in Korea.

In late March 1854 a supposed frieiid lured

Kim to a Japanese hotel in the foreign concession of Shanghai and

murdered

hir<c

Despite ill-advised intervention by Horace Allen, a

Chinese gunboat brought Kim's body back tc be "hung, drawn and quartered
and

the.

places."
head, feet and hands exposed to public view at different

.

11

Tiie

Chinese treated Kim's murderer as a patriotic hero and applauded

attempts by Korean agents to murder another political refugee in
Tokyo.

Japanese police blocked the latter plot, but the damage had

already been done.

9

While the Kim af^^air increased Japanese hatred of China and
strengthened the war party, the actual catalyst for conflict was an

insurrection by the fanatical Korean nationalist sect, the Tongbak^Tang
The Tonghaks were founded in 1860 by the Korean prophet, Ch'oe Che-u,

who preached

a

doctrine comprised of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism

called the "Eastern Learning," or Tonghak.

Although Ch'oe's execution

several years later drove the movement underground, his disciples kept
its spirit alive.

In 1893 it reappeared with political and national-

istic overtones to protest the corruption and burdensome taxation

perpetrated from Seoul.

Tae revitalized Tonghak blamed foreign influence,

particularly Christian and Japanese, for Korea's problems.

Tonghak

banners called for the reorganisation of Korean society on the "principle
of Confucian virtue,'' the elimination of the "Japanese barbarian" and
10
Seoul.
in
officials
and
nobles
corrupt
of
exterraination
the

The Korean king ignored Tonghak petitions and in the spring of
into
1894 the cult rebelled, dragging most of the southern provinces

the insurrection.

An American missionary in Korea wrote to

"I suppose there are no less than 50,000 men in

ChuUaDo

province) who have revolted and many of them are armed.

(a

"'^^

a friend,

southern
In May the

by the Chinese,
rebels threatened the capital, and the King, pressured
rebellion.
asked China for assistance in quelling the Tonghak

Japan,

Convention of 1885,
citing the joint-action provision of the Tientsin

12

also responded by sending cavalry, artillery and infantry into Korea.
Large bodies of Chinese and Japanese soldiers
Korea and refused to withdraw.

rov;

faced each other in

"It was the story of Tunis over again,"

observed W. A. P. Martin, the most prominent American scholar in China
and head of Tungwen University, "when French coming to fight Krourairs

seized the Bey and declared him independent of Turkey.

China was not

as apathetic as the Ottoman and both parties, perceiving the real issue,

pushed fonjard their troops as fast as their ships could carry them,
their ostensible object
ains

v;as

to annihilate the Tunghaks /.sic7s

their real

to settle at once and forever the question of Chinese supremacy."

12

The beleaguered Korean king looked for foreign assistance to
prevent a clash of the two Asian giants on his territory.
his old friend the United States.

He turned to

During the early stages of the Kim

and Tonghak affairs, with the exception of Allen's intervention, AiTiericans

had served merely as observers and reporters.

The American ministers to

Korea and Japan, respectively John H. B. Sill and

Ed'.;in

Dun^ with

^assistance from Horace Allen, had kept the State Department informed on

both crises.

Allen particularly hoped to use the Korean situation to

opan a new wedge for American influence in East Asia.
In 1894 it took six weeks or more for diplomatic dispatches to
travfC-1

from Seoul by stcaraer across the Pacific to San Francisco and

then on to Washington.

Of course one could use the cable-"either the

povthern line through Shanghai, Indie, Malta, Gibraltar, Lisbon and under
the Atlantic to New York; or the northern line across Russia, Europe,

13

London and then on to New York.

But this vas expensive and the

Department discouraged use of the cable except in emergencies.

Thus,

Araerican ministers faced with crucial decisions often acted first and

requested instructions later.

As the Tonghak rebellion spread in Korea, Sill urged American

missionaries to leave their scattered posts in the interior and seek
safety in Seoul.
Seoul's harbor.

He called for an American gunboat to visit Chemulpo,

The American Asiatic fleet consisted of one protected

cruiser, the Bal_^imore, then in Nagasaki, Japan; and the old Civil
gunboat, the Monocacy

The reiaaivider of the

,

considered unseaworthy by her officers and

sniall

Asiatic squadron

V7as

crev;.

guarding the seals in

the Bering Sea or rusting in the Mare Island Naval Shipyard.

begsed the Commander of the Asiatic fleet, Rear-Admiral Joseph
Skerrett, to send the Ba l timor e to Chemulpo.

VJar

Sill
S.

Skerrett wrote back that

these little disturbances in Korea usually burned theraselves cut and
that the local authorities could take care of the situation.

Skerrett,

considered by some a "travesty in the An/^erican/ Navy," refused to leave
his wife and daughter at Nagasaki for the sake of a few missionaries in
Korea.

Meanwhile, other pressures were being placed on the United States

government to send a warship to Korea.

Allen convinced the King that

the United States would be an ir'.partial arbiter of Korea's troubles and

on June

1

the Korean monarch wired his minister in Washington to request

that Secretary of State Gresham send an Anerican toan-of-war to Chemulpo.

GreshM asked Hilary Abner Herbert, Secretary

of the Navy, "whether a

VftsBcl may convenietttly be sent to that point for the protection of our

5

14

Legation and citizens of the United States residing there and to
express the hope of the Department that this course may be followed if

practicable."

14

The final decision rested with the President.

On June 2,

Grovcr Cleveland called in Actiiig Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo,

vho told him that the Bal ti more,, famous for having nearly started

a

var with Chile under the previous administration, was only forty-eight
hours away from CheTnulpo.

Cleveland delayed; he had promised in his

campaign to tone dov7n Harrison's foreign policies and he was already
plagued by strikes, tariff revision and doatestic unrest.

His Hav/aiian

policy was still under attack and Latin American problems threatened
to entangle the United States-

veil?

Should he become involved in Korea as

The President, called by his friend and biographer George F-

Parker "one of the strongest advocates

I

have ever known of the

missionary cause," knew that a number of American religious workers
resided in Korea.

Indeed, on that same day the Naw York Tribune

reported that the lives of "300 to 400" Americans were in danger.

Taking these factors into consideration, Cleveland decided to send the

Baltimore to Chemulpo,

1

As the 4,400-tcn flagship steamed out of Nagasaki, the King of
Korea forv/arded his request for Chinese soldiers to help suppress the
Tonghaks.

Between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign-drilled Chinese regulars,

part of powerful Chinese official Li Ilung-chang's private amy, were
dx57;2tched to China's alleged tributaryconsiul

According to the American

in Tientsin, site of Li's headquarters, China had promptly noti-

fied Japan, In compliance V7ith the Convention of 1885, thst it was

15

eending troops to assist Korea*^^
Tae Japar.ese govemment, increaGingly vilified by its political

opposition at home, decided to use this Chinese action as an excuse for
a concerted effort to wrest control of Korean politics away from China
and to block Russian expansion into Korea.

Mutsu Munemitsu, the

Japanese Foreign Minister, advised Japan's minister in Washington on
June

7

of his decision to deploy troops in Korea and this lucssage was

relayed to Gresham the next day.^'

During this interval the Balti more arrived in Cheinulpo,

For the

first few days Rear-Admiral Skerrett, Minister Sill and their staffs
Sill concluded that the rebellion had

discussed the Korean situation.

collapsed because of the "salutary Koral Effect" of the v;arship, but

he warned Skerrett that if this proved untrue he would ask for a
legation guard.

18
Soiaehov;

Sill's correspondence with the State De*

partment on this subject reached the press.

Tne

Nev-

York Tribune

assured its readers that it was Anierican intervention that had calmed
the rebellion.

The arrival of the Baltic-ore and the "spreading of the

etars and stripes over helpless people," the Tribune announced, had

"indirectly assisted the Government by the moral effect of the ship's

....

,.15

presence at a critical juncture."

Ihe rebellion, although not suppressed, was no longer the central

problem in the Korean imbroglio.

Inste.id,

the rebellion's offspring,

involvement of Giinese and Japanese soldiers, had become the main

ir.sue-

Tne Japanese had occupied the road to Seoul, fortified their positions
increased their legation guard.

their opportunity.

The North

Chj^iia

They seemed prepared to press
Kexald noted that 6,000 Japanese

16

troops had massed at Hiroshira«i and vondered: "Is insignificant Corea

destined to prove the pan for

tVie

that Is to set the world abla2e?*'

preparation of the flash of po%;der
20

A sense of foreboding enianated from the American legations in
Seoul and Tokyo,

Foreign Minister Mutsu tried to convince seasoned

diplomat Edwin Dun in Tokyo that Japanese troops were merely protecting

property and lives in Korea and vould not cnuse trouble.

Dun

Nevertheless,

Gresham on June 15 that "it is impossible to believe that

inforiiied

CO large a force is required in Korea for the protection of Japan's

legation, consv^latcs and subjects inasmuch as she already has in Korean

pdrts ten ships of war."
V7hat

21

Sill shared Dun's concern and wondered

Japan's ''ulterior purpose'* could ha in Korea.

The American

minister raised the qtiestion of granting asyluai to the Korean king and
clainied that Japan could not pull out of the country without "losing

face."

"Some irresponsible outx^ago coirunitted by a Chinaman on a

Japanese, or vice versa," Sill concluded, "might be the beginning of a
22

deplorable contest on Korean ground."
VJliile

American diplomats debated the future of Korea, Ch^ulpo

vas fast becoming an international rendezvous.

Japanese, Chinese,

British 5 Russian, German, French and Anierican ships steamed in and cut
of Seoul's anchorage.

The Japanese methodically unloaded war materiel--

troops, hors36, mountain artillery

flats at

the.

snouth of the

>

mortars and rice,

the wide mud

Man River made unloading difficult and

suppll^ir piled up on the beach.

But the efficient Japanese controlled

notes
everything and representati veo of other nations could only take
for their military reports.

17

The Japanese stated that they would not vithdraw their soldiers
until China joined Japan in a program of economic and adsr.inistrs.tive

Unwilling to share responsibility with the Japanese,

reform for Korea.

Gozo Tateno, the Japanese minister in

China rejected this proposal.

Washington, told First Undersecretary Edvjin F. Uhl that the "situation

may become very serious."
and new initiative

vjcs
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The Korean crisis had reached an irnpasse

needed.

The United States, first Western power to sign a treaty with
Korea, made an attempt to preserve peace in Korea.

Cleveland felt

obligated to offer /anerican good offices in the crisis.

On July 22 Uhl

United
cabled Sill that "in the view of the friendly interest of the

direction of
States in the welfare of Korea and its people, you are by
the President instructed to

v.vo.

vation of peaceful conditions.
for this message.

of the Department.

every possible effort for the preser-

"^^

Cleveland assumed sole responsibility

charge
Greshara was not in his office, leaving Uia in
And, as Cleveland later told Congress. "I felt

our good
constrained at the beginnins of the controversy to tender
Japaiiese demands for
offices to induce en sxiicable arrangement of the

administrative reforus in Korea."

The President added that he was

interests" and to
Kotivated by the desire to preserve "our cosr^nercial

With coEMBercial

insure the "safety of our citizcn.s" in Korea."
interests limited to one

mainly

frora his

sniall

firm. Cleveland's ..otives probably ste^ie

concern for the missionaries.

And his desire to "use

foreshadowed America's
every pos.^ible effort" in the cause of peace

overly-energetic neutrality in the months ahead.
faced a severe test.
The President's policy statement soon

On

18

June 24 Sill cabled Uhl that the Korean king had solicited American
intervention in asking for the removal of Japanese troops from his land
Sill, believing cooperation to be the only realistic policy in Asia,

had already joined with Great Britain, Russia and France, the
"Caucasian" representatives in Seoul
troop withdrawals.

Ttie

,

requesting mutual Sino-Japsaese

Minister also had prondsed the King asylum in

the American legation and had convinced Skerrett to delay departure of
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the Balt3.roore»

John Mahelm Berry Sill, former principal of the Michigan State

Komal School and an ordained minister, was devoted

to his President

and had accepted his duty as minister to Korea as a grave responsi-

bility.

Kc accepted Cleveland's instructions— to use every possible

effort to preserve peace and protect ABcricans---v/lthcut reservation.
vague Idea of
It Kiattered little to Sill that Cleveland had only a
diploniatic complexities in Korea.

Hie Russians were plotting to

in
strengthen their position in Korea and China; while the British,

market, were
order to maintain their trade supreiracy in the Asian

seeking to avert war.

The French and Germans ware exploitiP.g every

was casting
opportunity to increase their influence in Asia, and China

Kung-chang playing
about for allies, with unofficial Prime Minister Li

one power against the next.

Into this tangle of intrigue, Cleveland

interjected his vague, if high-minded, principles.
entangle the
Cleveland's Secretary of State was destined to

United States even more deeply in Asian politics.

Greshan^'s restraint

that he would avoid
during the Hawaiian annexation debate indicated

American involvesr.ent in Korea.

Yet.

toW

the end of June 18S4. he

grew intensely interested in Korean affairs.

On the 29tb he cabled Dun
At the sams tima the

in Tokyo to discover what Japan planned in Korea.

Secretary told a reporter that "the United States did not exercise any

protectorate over Corea, and that the most this Govermasnt could do in
28

any event would be to tender its offices to settle the difficulty.

During the next few days Greshara received British, Chinese and

Korean requests fov diplc:;atic intei-ventioa in

the;

The

Korean problem.

cn
Korean representative in Ifashington relayed a tclegrain from Seoul
of the United
July 5 which begged Gresham to "please ask the President

States to adjust the difficulty."
Itisn in a

entanglements.
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Greshaia wavered, fearing

private discussion with the Japanese minister,

risk
Gozo Tateno, Greshcm learned that Japan was v?illing to

v?ar

with

China over Korea.
Department,
Meetin3 with Tateno behind closed doors at the State
soldiers froa Korea,
Gresham asked why Japan voBld not withdraw its
that the troops were
rne Japanese minister gave the official answer

leave when domestic reforms
there to protect Japan's interests and would
Greshatn asked
Disclaiiaing any American intent to intervene,

were made.

if Japan would respect Korean independence.

Japan had no designr. on Korean territory.

The r.inister replied that
"I suppose. Kr. Minister,

Korea." Greshain Inquired,
your Governr^ent is watching China more than
"and that

yo..

the latter?"

forr.er than you arc with
are looking to war more with the

Tateno agreed.

"Tb.at is correct.

Quv situation at home

improve it by arouaing the patriotic
is critical, and war with China would

attaching them to the
sentin-ent of our people and more strongly
Gcverswient

„30
-

.
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Tateno's frank admij^sion of Japan's war plans shocked Gresham.

Torn between his reluctance to involve the United States and his belief
in the justice of Korea 'c request, the Secretary determined to do his

best for the helpless kingdom.

On July

7

Gresham instructed Dun to

communicate the following message to the Japanese government:
The goverament cf the United States has heard with
sincere regret that although the insurrection has been
sv^ppresi^ed and peace prevails in Korea, Japan refuses to
withdra-v? her troops and demands that radical changes be made
in the domestic administration of Korea.
This demand is more remarkable in view of the fact that
China favors the simul taneouG withdrawal of both the Japanese
and Chinece troops. Cherishing sincere friendship for both
Japan and Korea, the United States indulge the hope that
Koreans independence and sovereignty v;ill be respected. You
are instructed to say to the Government at Tokyo that the
President will be painfully disappointed ehould Japan visit
upon her feeble and defenceless neighbor the horrors of an
unjust war.
ProiTipted

by moral indignation,

Greshr.rn

of preserving Korean independence*

ignored a more practical means

The United States could have

coope-^ated vjith Western powers in Seoul, as it was doing in China, in

the issuance of a joint note to Japan.

Fearing involvement, Gresham

had turned dcvn requests for cooperation; now Tateno's revelation forced

him to pursue a policy which
entanglements

>

in its own way, could bring about
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Somehow the substance of Gresham* s cablegram reached the press.

Possibly William W- Rockhill, Third Assistant Secretary of State, who
was critical of Gresham^s uncertain Asian policy and who consorted with
top Republican opponents of the Secretary, was responsible for the

leakage.

In any event, ca Jv.ly 18 Hear^t*s San Fran cisco Exsiaincr

reported that Gresham had made a '*gr£ve diplomatic blunder" by sending

21

the note to Japan.

The Examiner also suggested that Gresham's

friendship with the Chinese minister in V/ashington had improperly
Influenced the Secretary of State.

Whitelav? Reid's New York Tri bune,

the leading Republican Party newspaper, attacked Gresham, calling him
a "meddler" and a "willing dupe" of the Chinese minister in alienating

Japan, America's friend and the most progressive country in Asia.

"It

is plain that if Secretary Gresham has without any provocation abruptly

taken sides with Russia and China he has coirunitted an act v?hich can only

be adequately described by saying that he has made an ass of himself in
the State Department," added the K^rtford Post.

Emporia, Kansas, Daily

Ga:i:ett_e

Tne little four-page

stopped attacks on the Populists long

enough to claim that all of Gresham's acts were blunders and no one
33

should be surprised that he had committed another one.

More moderate press reactions were also critical of Gresham.

The

Philadel phia Inquirer claimed that if authentic, the dispatch was "a
allow
violation of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, for if we do not
expect them to
other people to interfere in American affairs, we cannot

interest."
allow us to interfere in theirs, where we have no direct

while admitting
The independent S^^Mjiafi^ ILSEH^l^^ (Massachusetts),
still found fault with
that the attacks on the Secretary were political,

Gresham's policy,

"Our interests are not likely to suffer if Japan

fight to see which
should gobble Corea or if Japan and China should

should have the plum."

In contrast, the Boston Globe maintained that
34

arbitration.
Gresham should try even harder to avert war through
the outburst against
Sensitive to press criticism and confused over
in his apartment at the
a policy he considered just, Crer.ham remained

.
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Arlington House and pondered the results of his note.
received

nsv/s

Later, when he

that the British couguI and his wife had been molested by

Japaiicse soldiers in Seoul and that the Araarican minister had received
a diplomatic "sneer" in reply to his protests, the Secretary passed the

message on to Cleveland without comment but praised Dun for having
refused to present to Japan the protests Sill had uttered in conjunction
35

with Russia, France and Great Britain.
Despite embarrassment and confusion concerning the Korean probleai,
Cleveland refused to revise his earlier instructions to Sill.

This

strengthened the minister's resolve to use every possible effort to

preserve peace, including the employment of American armed forces.

This

of
appeared out of the question with the only available force a handful

marines on board the Baltimo re.

Yet Sill pressed Benjamin Franklin Day,

of sending
the new captain of the American warship, with the desirability
ciarines to Seoul

opposed sending
Day, a career officer promoted through the ranks,

his

nien

into the heat and disease of the Korean countryside.

He not

disliked missionaries.
only wanted to avoid incidents but also thoroughly
and Chinese, there would
He wrote Sill, "In event of war between Japanese

Americans provided they
seem to be no reason for apprehending danger to
attend to their own affairs."

A Japanese attack on the royal palace in

opportunity to request a
Seoul on July 22 provided Sill with another

legation guard.
the

fleeing refugees,
With the streets of Seoul filled with

mnister asked for

a contingent of fifly men.

Ke informed Greshan.

necessitated the emplo>-:nent of an
that the policy of "strict neutrality"

Japanese force would be
American guard since the use of an available

^
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regarded as an unfriendly act by China.
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Unable

Day acquiesced and agreed to dispatch a legation guard.

to locate, a pilot for his steam-launches, Captain of Marines George F.

Elliott elected to march his men overland the thirty-one miles to Seoul
rather than risk navigating the unkiiown Han River to the cspited
7 p.m.

At

.

on the evening of July 23, American military personnel, each

arraad v;ith forty rounds of amvaunition,

Korean territory'.

r<ian

began an el even -hour march through

A Japanese guide assisted the fifty Americans along
The

narrow footpaths, over deep sand and through Kuddy rice fields.
hurnid night and the heavy air exhausted Elliott's msn.

They reached the

legation vjithout incident, hov7Qver, and were joined the following day
,

by thirty- three additional men vho arrived by stean- launch.
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Though Sill had his legation guard, his instructions to preserve

vith
strict neutrality brought the minister into further disagreement

Captain Day.

Sill claimed that the naval officer had disregarded

bring up his
Aiaerican neutrality when he employed a Japanssa guide to
troops.

Japanese at
Even worse, the earnest diplomat informed Day, the

horse into our Legation
the head of the American column "boldly rode his

crowds" present that the
gate," creating the impression among the "great

United States favored Japan.

"This act added intensity to a growing anti

Ai»erican feeling," Sill concluded.

Day replied bitterly, "I don't care

in riding his horse
what nationality he is," and "for his bad manners

through the Legation gate

I atn in

no way responsible, nor do

I

regard

any other consequence
the fact that he did so a matter of political or

whatever
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and
Washington's instructions, hindered by delayed communications

Korean situation, were already
e vague and oversimplified view of the
Asia.
creating problems for American representatives in

The following

government sought to
months would bring further complications as the

maintain its special conception of neutrality.

CHAPTER

II

THE UNDECLARED KAR

Except for scattered press reports, the trouble in Korea had
received little public attention in the United States during June
early July.

^.nd

Greshain's warning to Japan had generated some adverse

publicity but this vas largely conditioned by earlier anti-administrstion
criticism of Cleveland's policies in Hawaii,

l^e deplo^Tiient of the

BsTtirnore in Korean waters and the landing of narines on Kore^in territory

elicited a number of

coir-ments,

due to the belief that the Korean

rebellion had collapsed as soon as the Ainerican v?arship had appeared on
the scene.

Yet, despite tremendous Sino- Japanese troop concentration??

in Korea, few Ajr.ericans actually expected a major

For

exaiirple,

an:-cious

to fight

v?ar.

the Kew Yoyli TriJ^une found "neither China nor Japan
1

about Corea."

Dispatches arriving from the American legation in Peking during
anticipated
the spring of 1894 provided no indication that trouble was

in East Asia.

The regular r.inister. Charles Denby, vas on leave in the

and his last
United States recovering from a kidney stone operation

Department that
dispatch from China on March 16 had assured the State

"the approaching sumr.ar will be quiet," since China

birthday celebrations for the Empress Dowager.^
by Cleveland in 1885 was
e.

a

wa.^

busy preparing

Th-ou-h his appointrnent

political reward, Colonel Denby had become

Ainerican interests in
reliable and hard-working representative of

25

26

China.

He understood the Chinese people better than most vesterners

and for eight years the State Department had relied heavily on this

"old China hand" for information.

VJhcn

his friend Walter Qaintin

Gresham became Secretary of State in 1893, Denby's influence further
increfised.

As Greshara vrote to his minister in England (Thoraas Francis

Bayard), "I wish all the States in the Union were full of such men."

But the years had softened the minister.

Secure in his post, he

had permitted affairs to slide, relying more and more on his secretary,
Fleniing Duncan Cheshire, and on his son, Charles Jr.

The senior Denby

left his son in charge of the Peking legation during his absence,

hoping to groom the young man as a future miniGter to China.

younger Denby certainly posses.^sd

the.

The

potential to serve as minister.

For years this Princeton-educated scholar had studied the Chinese
language and institutions.

On the other hand, he was stubborn and proud,

and, despite his inexperience, often refused to listen to advice from

his senior colleagues.

Now, as crisis approached, this "callow youth"

vas in charge of American interests in China and he hesitated to report

on problems which might reveal his inexperience.

4

The Korean rebellion had served to focus the attention of

Washington on Asia and now the Department, worthing that young Denby
was not providing full information, requested fuller reports from other

diplomatic repreGcntatives in Asia.

Consular agents replied that war

betvGcn China and Japan, with possible European intervention, might
occur at any time-

On July 22 Sherid.nn

P.

Read wrote the Department

from Tientsin that the Chinese Emperor was "hot for war."

The consul

warned that an Asian conflict would endanger American property and lives
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in China and suggested that a gunboat be seat to Tientsin.
follo:-;ing

day Consul -General Tiiomas

that "war appears inevitable."

R.

Jernlgan cabled

The

frora

Shanghai

Indeed, Jernigan observed, the Chinese

threatened to close treaty ports to all shipping*

Sill added that

although only "unauthenticated accounts" of land engagctnevits had
reached his legation, he knew "for a fact" that large Japanese forces
had inarched south from Seoul to engage the Chinese-

vas the last to report that conditions in China

Charles Denby Jr,
longer tranquil.

v?ere no

Suggesting that the Chinese government had been humiliated by Japan's
earsy

occupation of Seoul, he informed Gresham that "the Emperor and

conservative statesmen are eager for v;ar»"^
Fighting between Japan and China had already begun around Seoul.
Wliile aware of

var ruaiors, even

tho.^e

Americans in the

Icii^ediate

vicinity were uncertain as to the extent of hostilities.

Captain Day,

still hoping to withdrav; his men frora the Korean capital, reported that

the Japanese had secured control of the area; but because of the inter-

ruption of telegraphic consnunications he did not know of any declaration
of war by either China or Japan-

Meanwhile Marine Captain Elliott,

closer to Chinese and Japanese troop concentrations than any other
American, also groped for information.

"Ihere is

a

rumor that war has

actually and formally been declared between Japan and China," Elliott
noted on July 28, and "if this is true, our governir.ent will of coitrse
6

be in possession of the official information."
But the governnsent had no information, official or othen;ise.
The Ch.inese and Japanese embassies in Washington could provide nothing
concrete, while the

oi-ly

nG-.v's

reaching the American governsient during
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this interval of undeclared var came by delayed cables from

Aitisrican

diplomatic and naval agents in Asia or from press releases originating
in Shanghai and transiaitted through the British-controlled cable.

Tnis

problem of comraunications fostered uncertainty in Washington and
encusabered any official Aiiiarican response to the crisis.

Secretary of State Gresham, still resentful over the criticism

of his note to Japan, waited impatiently for news.

Anxious to fonnulate

a policy, he could not do so until he understood the nature of the Sino-

Japanese confrontation.

Rad var been declared?

If so, the United States

of course v;ould resaain neutral, as it had in the Korean- Japanese affair
a month earlier.

selling

anr.s

But what should the Aniarican attitude be

t.Ci'.jard

to the belligerents in a state of undeclared war?

Kow

long should the United States wait before offering its good offices to

mediate differences?

Would the hostilities threaten American interests

in Asia, particul^^.rly the lives of missionaries?

Should the United

States send additional military forces into the area?

Badly in need of guidance for his Asian policies, Greshasi
telegraphed Charles Dcnby, then convalescing
at the Cadillac Hotel in Detroit.

return to Peking.

froia

his recent operation

The Secretary urged Colonel Denby to

Aware of his old friend's pride and confidence in

son will doubtless
his son, Gresham assured the senior Denby that: "Y6ur

could," but the
look after our interests in China about as veil as you
if you vere
President had "indicated that he thought it vould be veil

there."

en^barrassments and
Both Gresham and Cleveland hoped to avoid

coordinate the American
preferred that their trusted adviser return to
7

diplomatic efforts in Asia.
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Though deteroilned to reraain neutral in the Sino- Japanese crisis,

Washington could not legally prevent the sale of var material to either
China or Japan until
Japaxi V7ere

v/ar

had been declared.

using the period of undeclared

\^ar

In fact, both China and
to purchase arms,

nition and supplies in the United States and in Europe.

ainirra-

Chinese

representatives could be sold anything, so long as it was lethal, and
New England

arras

raanufacturers reportedly did a brisk business.

In

their indiscrirainate orders, pigtailed buyers seemed unaware that the

bullets had to fit the gun.
aririy

vas made in

Ncv;

"Most of the rnodern equipment of the Chinese

England," one Boston newspaper erroneously assumed,

"and guns and cartridges can be landed in China or Japan luore quickly

from New York

tha'a frora

any countr}? in Europe."

Steamers in San

on the East coast, tried to beat the declaration

Francisco, as well

of v;ar by hastily loading var supplies from the United States to be
8

shipped to Asia.

The state of undeclared var created other problems for the United
States govera^iient.

The traditional dictum of freedom of the seas in

were
time of pe^^ce vas challenged when Greshaca learned that the Japanese
searching all vessels arriving in Korean ports.

Before the Secretaty

could study this issue, he received a telegram from Charles Denby Jr.

clarifying earlier reports that both China and Japan had requested
and archives
An^erican £ccd offices for the protection of their subjects
in the other's country.

Several days later this request was confin^cd

the
by Yans y", the Chinese minister in Washington, when he informed

State Departvaent that:

^HlilHIl^

of the Chinese
For the protection of the lives and property
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subjects in Japan the Chinese Governniant begs the United
States Government to allow that the United States Legation
and the Consulates at Japan my protect the Chinese in the
raid couritry during the absence of the Representative;^ of ^
the Chinese Govermaent at the time of var, if there be any.
The formulation of an Asian policy was complicated by the constant

reminder that the United States possessed only two ships in Asisn
Pressure counted to send

waters, the Baltimore and the Honocacy «

additional v/arships.

The

llew

calling the currently

Ot^eans Pic

nebulous hostilities the "wsr in the Far West," considered Asia to be
an extension of the United States
the

ne;-;

frontier.

i\nd

American gunboats to be forts on

"The United States has

vcaay

citizens resident in

China and Japan whose lives and property are likely to be imperiled by
the va-c," warned the Pica:SLIl§»
to

h.'^ivo

"Pror.ipt

steps should therefore be taken

sufficient forces of warships at the scene of the fighting as

speedily as possible."

Other nevjspapers predicted that anti-foreign

the
riots, which were certain to occur throughout China as a result of

fighting, would require the presence of American gunboats to restore
order-

10

Rumors persisted that

attacked in south China.

tv.^o

-women missionaries had already been

Both Gresham and Cleveland, according to

speculation in the press, considered any attack upon a woman as an
especially heinous act.

,

"A woman in trouble," Mrs. Gresham reuismbered

and "my hutjband would certainly side, with her against the pover, greed
and lust of num."

Americans now wondered whether the "cowardly"

would stand back and alio;? Christian voncn to be

ad!);iiixstration

slaughtered by the heathen Chinese.
Gresham'

s

to
first action was not to defend Americans in Asia but
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protect Chinese and Japanese interests.
telegrams to Charles Deiiby Jr.

find

On July 26 he sent cipher

Edvin Dun, instructing esch to

''act

£6 custodian" and "afford friendly offices for /.the/ protection /pf^/

Chinese

Mnd

Japanese/ subjects in Japan

Mnd

in China/; either directly

or through Consuls acting under your instructions but you vill not
represent China /and Japan/ diplomatically."

Although writi.ng his

friend Yang Yu that he "took pleasure in instructing" the ministers to

afford miJtual protection, Greshstn's instructions raised some difficult
questions.

Wouldn't the Amarican role place the United States in an

untenable position when the first conflict of interests occurred?
Would not the first incident, v?hcther in China or Japan, force the
abmidonsient of strict neutrality?

Gresham overlooked such questions

and furtheraore his instructions assumed that a state of war existed

between China and Japan when in fact it did not.

Even the Secretary

acknowledged this when ha asked Dun on July 29, "Has Japan declared
war, or

coiar?3onced

war?

While the State Department groped for a policy appropriate to an
undeclared war, the Asian crisis generated an increased number of news
Detailed maps

stories and ever larger headlines in the United States.

of Korea, China and Japan accompanied lead articles, helping "inany people

brush up their rusty knowledge of Asiatic geography."
Cheiiailpo

Illustrations of

harbor and belligerent: warships suppleniented the

laaps.

Prints

of Li Hung-chang, strangely resembling an cmclatcd Grever Cleveland;
and the Ernperor of Japan, with his medals, epaulettes and European-styled
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Cartoons, vhich

uniforra, appeared on the pages of A.merican newspapers.

included ape-like representations of Chinese and Japanese soldiers

pulling each other's long, braided pigtails, reflected a popular

viex^

14

of the corabatants.

By the last veek of July articles and editorials vere investiinwardness of
gating what the San Francisco, Examner called "the true

the Corean trouble."

The Examiner concluded that "the fundamental causes

Japan, and the
are the crowding of Western ways upon the Orient through

despotism,
resentment of change by that ancient, austere and dignified

China."

Ihe pro- Japanese Kew Orleans Picaxuns claimed that China's

in
opposition to a Japanese uiodernigation program prevented proaress

Korea and caused the current trouble between the

t\.'o

countries.

Ithe

Asia, told its
Kew York Tirras, v?hile vary of Japanese ambitions in
a better friend
readers that "there is reason to suppose that Japan is

there would ba less
of the Coroans than China, and that, on the whole,

Japanese protectorInterference with their home affairs under a virtual

ate."

developed during the
The Kew York Herald, continuing a notion

Japan to shov herself
Korean affair, argued that "the time has come for

worthy of her civilization and of her ambitions

....

She is in Korea

retlreiBent therefrom
today for the benefit of the whole world, and her

to sink back to
would be tar.taraount to allowing the Kerait Kingdom

Chinese barbarism.

"^^

Asian crisis, newspapers
Convinced of public f.iscination for the
discussed it with unconcealed anticipation.

In a view typical of the

inunigration was especially
He«t Coast, where excitement over Chinese

that the United States
intense, the San Francisco Examiner predicted
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would support vibrant, exciting Japan in a war vith China since "she
while Chir.a is a
is the most progressive among the Oriental nations,
lethargic roass of repellent burbarism."

Hie approaching war shared

of several
space with the Pullman strike and Eugene V. Debs in the pages

The £hicaf^ Tri_^in9, for example, argued that an

inidwestem dailies.

and wheat,
Asian catastrophe wotild lead to the consumption of more grain

thus establishing "dollar wheat." in the Midwest.

The Chicago Inter-

carrying
Ocean believed that war in Asia vould stimulate the American
troubled Ainsrican
trade, while providing higher wages and more work for

involve
But the paper concluded that war, which vould probably

labor.

ultimately hurt the
Europe, would also greatly impoverish the world and
16

United States.

A

nuffiber

were
of Eastern newspapers agreed that hostilities

the two countries.
imminent and eagerly analysed the military forces of

sympathies are doubtless
Ihe Atlanta Constitution claitisd that ".American

people— the
with the island; the Japanese are a bright, progressive
Americans, so called, of Asia."

In the northeast the Boston Globe

Frank
prominently displayed the columns of war correspondent

G.

Carpenter

in Asia because
and urged its readers to pay attention to events

"not hesitate to adopt
bloodthirsty China, the enemy of progress, would

horrible weapons.
anything that might be invented" in the way of

China

with her teeraing population,
"could bring a gigantic ainny into the field"

be ovcrinin by a great
the Globe predicte-J. and "Europe may some day
17

Chinese inundation."

cultural analyser, of
The rising interest in Asia also prcnipted

the coH.b..tants.

'Ihe

civilisations.
loeaning of the Chinese and Japanese

34

relation to
discussed In tha context of the yestern vorld and America's

East Asia,

V7as

The rhetoric of race consciousness

debated at length.

late nineteenth
and Social Darwinism, so popular in the world of the

"The Japanese arc the real

century, appeared in a number of articles,

Chinese," one writer enigmatically claimed in July 1894.
represent the best eleraents of the Mongol race"
rivals

of;

the best of the Caucasians."

...

"Tney

and "arc close

Another observer argued that

antagonistic."
"the Chinese and the Anglo-Saxon are thoroughly

who had adopted Japan
Lafcadio llearn. an American writer and teacher
had undergone a process of
as his own countr>', susgosted that Japan
"race bram.
"Occid^ntf^lization" without upsetting its Oriental

„18

the Orient," the
In their popular image as the "Yankees of

Japanese grew steadily taller and paler.

Fe^ninist Helen H. Gardener

"hundreds of low and worthless
noted that the United States naturalised
"white" as the Japanese.
from European countries." vho vere not as

education and representaIndeed Japan had adopted Western technology,
acknowledged, studied Napoleon,
tive government and. as one source

American history and the English language.

Consequently few Araericans

it claimed that Japan should
disagreed vith the New York Tribune when

Western Europe, rather than
be "ranked with America and the nations of

vith Asiatic countries.
of civilisation and progress,
Equating Japan vith An>erican idealr,

emphasized Japan's strv^ggle for
social reformers and intellectuals

justice in the fa^^ily of nations.

tha
Japan, they argued, had passed

entitled to take an equal place
tests of Western civilisation and vas

beside other advanced nations.

in the
"Ihis little oasis of progress
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Flov/er. reformist editor of the
Far East," airaounced Benjamin Orange

Arena.

...

"s^^^"" ^ villingness

to adopt vhc-.tever the Western

better or more helpful than
civilization could offer %^hich was higher,
that v'hich they possessed."

Therefore.

Flo-..er

concluded, the United

its unequal treaties with Japan
States vas raorally obligated to revise

in 1858.
signed in Japan's "pre^civil i..ed" stage

Flower compared

vith the ante-bellum abolitionist
Japan's struggle for treaty revision
that treaty revision would
crusade against slavery, and he proclaivaed

political groups to triurnph,
permit the enlightened and progressive

evolutionary progress to higher
thus fulfilling Japan's natural
20

civilization.
supplemanted this favorable view.
Efforts by Japanese-Americans

Japanese-Americans seemsd to display that
Ever)n.he>:e one looked.
could
pride which the American people
fitridoBt style of patriotism and

understand.

United States raised
Young Japanese throughout the

to
and a fervent intent to return
brigades "arn.ed with Arr^^rican rifles"
fund-raising can^paigns prospered,
Asia and fight the Chinese. Japanese
ccn^unity
Frcncisco alone. Tae. Japanese
with C.10.000 collected in San

contribute to the
of students too poor to
composed
though
Boston,
i«
that
patriotic .eal and confidence
"appropriate"
displayed
war fund,
were admirably
in Nev York City aUo
Japan would win the war. Japanese
In so.e
at the clu.,sy Chinese.
confident as they mocked and laughed
boycott of
Japanese cooperated in a
parts o.e the count.T Americans and
21

Chinese Icumdrics.
T«««*^ there were
praising Japan
.

For every

vnriiiclc

.

tvjo

condcruaing China,

im-»^ro£re33ive
^ ..^v/.*unprogre.oi e and on the verge
corrupt,
despotic,
as
usually portraye<S

36

of revolution.

Althoush some admitted that the Chinefse people had a

correspondent
rich cultural history, most writers in 1894 accepted
Hobrevjs of the
Juliav^ Pvalph's view of the Chiisese as the Kagroes and

Drawing on a fanciful version of black Ajnaricans as "Sambos,"

Orient.

"One sang an endless comic

Ralph GlEilfirly described the Chinese.
song

.

.

.

and all laughed as long as they were awake, when they vere

hsppy folk
not wrestling or frolickins, or bandying repartee with the

on passing vessels and on the shore."

22

reports of Chir.eseRalph's observations were reinforced by press

praying to their "Joss
Air,ericans huddled in their filthy Chinatovms,
"L'ongolian chants" to the
gods," burnirjg incense and singiug strange

beat of "tonitoms."

Unlike the Japanese, Cbix^ese-AEsricans seenied

had heard reports about
ignorant of the trouble in Asia, and if they

admirable ividif f erence to the
it they expressed a startling and hardly
fate of their countxT-

deteixiined
Further, the backward Chinese seeined

of their country to Western
to resist progress, proved by the closing

education and co^^erce.

would
Americans hoped that a Japanese victory

4
learn frcn it.
to
and
world
modern
the
accept
to
force China

23

that it could be impartial
The anti^-Chinese Boston Globe proved

in its disdain for oriental nations.

Its editor argued that a fight

a "war over nothing,"
between Japan and China over Korea would be

interfere in Korea.
particularly since Japan had no right to

"Japan's

Boston paper concluded, "would
best claim to superior civilization." the

be to have n>inded her own business."

Pro^nptsd n^ainly by a fear that

by war. the GlobeLs
potentially-dangerous China would be aroused

pro^Japanese sentiment that
criticism of Japan was lost in the

s'.;ept
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days of the undeclared
the United States during the last

war/

press devoted extensive
During the Utter part of July the

strength of
coverage to the relative military

Chin., and Japan.

On

awesome, for every province had its
paper the Chinese army appeared

large

artr.y.

a mile-long
Western observers late in July matched

u^oving north
of dog»trottiiig Chinese infantry-

were filled vith soldier-laden boats.
Chinese

ar..y

to-v.ard

Korea.

o-,m

colu.-nn

Rivers

One Ane^-ican reported that "a

nothing nore truly than a
in notion can be likened to

everything in its way.
flight of locusts," ravaging

According to

Chinese
in the exotic never ceased.
interest
vhose
Carpenter,
Frank G.
rr.ake them
and ground tiger bones to
soldiers ate bi^ck dog's flesh
25

bloodthirsty and brave.

Africans mar/elled

ass^ed

resource.,
at China's v.,3t size and

ttey

400,000.000 people would overv.m
that China's population of

the 40.000.000 Japanese.

China had
"In th. matter of brute str.nstl.,"

Renubiican
the Japanese, the Sainstield
over
adv.ntase
tremendous
a
If the Chinese proved
Ysrt TJae. predleted that
.o.^ented. T„e

£a

superior
could co„eentrate •i«..=nsely
they
Japan
de£e.,t
to
deter.,lned
Furtheragainst their s«aier ene„y.
.oney"
and
numbers
resources of
"China has .11
Chrffilcle. concluded.
Finar^Ul
and
.ore. the Css^SSi^
connection vlth Corea."
fro.» a direct land
result
»hich
advantages
the
factor alone
decided undardos, and this
a
h.
would
agreed,
.ost
Japan,

,.26

the Japanese side.
created considerable sympathy for
would prov.
and i..ensity of China
diversity
the
I« actu..Uty.
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one of the major weaknesses of the Chinese war effort.

was jealous of its own

arciy

Each province

and ofte^i refused to send troops to help

the Peking government fight what many considered its own private war

against Japan.

Without a standardised system of armament, Chinese

soldiers often lacked proper cartridges for their rifles, if indeed
they had been furnished with rifles.

Many of the Chinese warriors

marching north carried bovs and arrows and gaily decorated lances.

Chinese conscripts were inadequately clothed and fed, their officers
pocketing payrolls and privately selling army provisions.
officers had purchased

cor;!ralssions

>k)st of the

and the e-ntire military system

-euffered from a traditional kickback system called the "squeeze."

Tae

corruption which permeated the entire fabric of Chinese administration,
Julian Ralph observed, made the Chinese mlitary as corrupt as the
"TamsTiauy

plan."
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Ihe Japanese army, in comparison, was a model of efficiency.

In 1879 General Ulysses

S.

Grant, on a visit to Asia, had predicted that

of them
the Japanese army was so well trained and armed that 10,000

could march against all odds back and forth across China.

28

Westerners

carefully-organized
praised the uniform system of conscription and

£ctive and reserve units.

VJith

European-style uniforms and armed with

the training
Japanese-made, repeating Murata rifles, soldiers reflected

and discipline of their We.^tern instructors.

Japanese officers-having

and command, possessing
nemorissed the most modern textbooks on tactics

system and
Western artillei-y and supported by an excellent supply
29

battle conditions.
hospital corps-impatiently ayaited the test of

works of Captain
In a generation which avidly studied the

39

Alfred Thayer llahan, debated the merits of a big-battleship navy,

arraor

plate thicknesses and gun-bore sizes, A^ericany paid particular

attention to analyses of the Asian navies.
number of foreign-built ,

aritiored

warships.

Both countries owned a

China was represented by

two fonner German battleships and assorted smaller vessels, vhile

Japan had a number of new, British-built cruisers and torpedo

boat?5.

Americans especially looked forward to the comparative performances of
several Annapolis graduates, includins one rear«adiniral in the Japanese
navy.

30

Tlis

public did not have to wait long for the first naval en-

ESgeinent.

On July 23 the 1350-ton transport Kowshinp^ loaded the

of her contins^i"^^

Chinese troops bound for Korea.

la^^t

The Kc^fshing.

belonged to the Indo-China Steamship Navigation Company, controlled by
the British fina of Jardine, Matheson and Conpany.

Since var had not

been declared, China sent troop transports to Korea under foreis^i
flags, in this case the British flag.

The

Ko-.7shing,,

along with several

the Gulf
other troopships and a gunboat escort, left the Taku forts on
of Chihli on July 23.

/^oard were 1,200 Chinese regulars, several

foreign advisers and a dozen pieces of field artillety.

On the evening

the Kovshiris.
of the 25th, in sight of the islands off the Korean coast,

afterwards,
encountered three Japanese armored cruisers, and, soon

three

rr.ore

end ordered
men-of-war, one of which fired two warning shots

the transport to stop.

Japanese officers boarded the Kovghin- and

captain to foUxr^ the Japr,ncse

ir..nn-of-^ar.

conm-.anded

the British

The Chinese soldiers on

and crew if he followed
board, however, threatened to kill the captain

40

The British officer refused to obey, and the

thece instructions.

Japanese officers returned to their own vessel, vhich then fired a
torpedo and opened up with all her heavy guns.
and sank

stem

The Kowshing exploded

first about forty miles from Chemulpo.

VJhen the

Chinese and their European advisers and crew abandoned ship, the

Japanese varship moved ainong the survivors and sprayed them with

machine gun fire.

Several dozen Chinese and a few Europeans, including

tell the story or
Geraian mercenary Constantin von Hanneken, escaped to
31
tlie

Kowshing affair.
one
Although the initial American response to the sinking was

did not blame
of shock at the terrible slaughter, most coi-mentators

the Japanese.

"Hairsplitting aside," argued the MSi IO£iS

I^^i^iiiS^'

against
"the Ko-jshins was a Chinese ship engaged in actual warfare

fire on it as the
Japan, and the Japanese ship had as good right to

Kearsarge had to fire on the Alaba ma."

Furthemore, when the Japanese

did not know thst
minister to England explained that Japanese warships

GloVe quipped, "she
the Ko^^shing was an English vessel, the Boston
32

certainly didn't have a particularly English name."
international
A defense of the Japanese by an eminent British
the tendency to side
legal expert, Tnomas Erskine Holland, reinforced

with the Japanese.

had
Holland, the Philadelphia M£ord reported,

international law when it destroyed
declared Japan innocent of violating

the Kowshino.

argued that the
According to the Record. Holland had

expedition" directed against
transport comprised part of a "hostile
undeclared, warfare.
Japan during a period of actual, even if

"Having

the sinking ship," the
released the neutrals who were saved from

Al

every obligation imposed
Record explained, "the Japanese have fulfilled

upon them by international law."
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that the western
The SEringfiel^ ££Eii^li£S2. re minded Americans
the open seas.
nations had perpetrated far worse crimes on

Ihe

United States warship
Regublican cited the British attack on the

Ch^ESake

that "nothing Japan
in 1807 as a prima e^si^ple, concluding

violation of international
has done could equal that in outrageous
law."^^

to official stateinents and
The Japanese paid careful attention

the Urdtcd States.
press treatments of their country in

They were

observed, but coverage of the
pleased by most of what they had

^J^^

Japanese policymakers that a
affair made them uneasy and convinced
needed to n>aintain American
concerted propaganda effort would be
paid
Secret Service fund already had
syB^athy for Japan. Tne Japanese
Howard Rouse, editor of the
A:.erican writers, including Edward
Tirnes.

to publish

mterial favorable

to Japan.^^

^

l^yo
^^tack

necessitated a much larger inferwar
of
declaration
legal
a
prior to

maticnal effort.
policy
Washington, explaining Japanese
rne Japanese minister in
by "firesaid that Japan was not led
to the American press on July 27.
on fears
careful statesmen. Flaying
eaters" or "foolish people" but by
"it would
the minister argued that
States,
United
the
in
of radicalism
by
attitude at the present time
be just as fair to judge Japan's
an estimate
as it would be to for.
listening only to Japan's jingoes,

42

Coxey and
of American statesmen from the examples afforded by Gen.
Mr. Debs."^^

Several days later the Japanese government released a

lengthy statement explaining that Japan was veil within her treaty
rights in acting in Korea.

Meanwhile Japanese consular agents inter-

Japan
viewed by the press stressed the theme of a progressive

reforming back!>7ard and uncivilized Korea.
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States did not
The most extensive use of propaganda in the United

occur until the arrival of the

ne.V7

Japanese minister, Shinchiro Kurino,

undeclared var the
the follov?ing month, but during the period of
create a favorable
Japanese vere testing their techniques and trying to

declaration of
Initial impression of Japan before making a formal

V7ar.

the while by preconIn this they seem to have succeeded, aided all

China and Japan.
ceived notions already held by Americans concerning
in New York City declared:
As the Chancellor of the Japanese consulate

what
We are grateful to the American papers for
weight of the
they sa^' about us and for the great moral
to have been
public opinion of this country, which se-jns
entirely on the side of Japan; and whatever
thrown almost
strengthen
be the outco.-ne of the struggle it will only
West and^
Far
the
of
the bonds between the great Republic
of tne Orient.
her "Yankee brother," as you call Japan,

the first concrete evidence
The sinking of the Kov^Mjn£ provided
.

of the action remained sketchy
of fighting in Asia, even though reports

and confused.
the situation.

the attack would clarify
It was generally believed that
that it would mean
Charles Denby Jr. informed Gresham

China and Japan. ^'
an "immediate" declaration of war between
of uncertainty appeared to be over.

The weeks
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American
The period of undeclared war had established an initial

response to the Sino-Japanese War.
neutrality.

Officially it was one of strict

That the administration's conception of a neutral's role

a number of statements
was active, rather than passive, could be seen in

acceptance of the "good
and decisions, the most important of which was

offices" responsibility.

anything but neutral,

The response of press opinion, however, was

the belligerents had been pre- judged, the

stereotypes created and the right and wrong decided.

ganda merely reinforced an established condition.

Japanese propa-

CHAPTER III
UlTEASY IJSUTPv^ITY

China

r^nd

Japan declared war on Aug-ast 1, 1894.

Under inter*

national law a state of war required American neutrality if the

administration was convinced that each belligerent had "just" cause
for war.

Consequently the two oriental pot7ers endeavored to justify

their policies to the United States government.

Japanese officials,

trained in the subtleties of western diplomacy, assured Washington
that their nation would fight China "consistently with the law of

nations."

August

1

Maval Attache Naoki Miyaoka explained to Gresham on

that China had forced Japan into the declaration of

refusing to cooperate

V7ith

V7ar

by

her in instituting a reform program for

bacVrward and anarchic Korea.

Stressing Japan's moral role in the crisis,

he informed the Secretary that China's request for Anglo-American
1

mediation was a "ruse" to strengthen its military forces in Korea.
China countered with a view of its own.

Though Chinese

spokesmen in the United States reraained silent, fearing punishment from
Peking if they said the vrong thing, the Chinese Foreign Office
(Tsungli Yamen) released a detailed statement of its Korean policy to

Charles Denby Jr.

At the same time, a

for);2or Chine-^e

minister to the

letter to
United States, Chang Yen-hoon, outlined China's defense in a

hin old friend, Thorns Francis Bayard, now the Ainerican minister to
England.

the
These documents insisted that China could not, under
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customs and laws of its tributary relation to Korea, enter
of internal reform with Japan.

program

e.

Chang noted that when Bayard had been

status in
Secretary of State, he had ecknowledged Korea's tributary
1887.

Chang argued further that Japan had invaded Korea while China

had been invited in to suppress the Tonghak rebels.

His concluding

suggesting that
argument appealed to American moral sensitivities by
during a time of
Japan's unprovoked and savage attack on the Kowshing.
2

law.
peace constituted a flagrant violation of international

Asian situation in
The declarations of war failed to clarify the
the United States.

Cocmjunications

,

unreliable at best, broke dcwn

conipletely.

the war
The Chinese delayed cable Kessages coiicernir.s

and

Anglc/'o^rsrican
telegraph companies C'estern Urdon, the

/u.!?.ricm.

Telegraph Company. Direct U.S. Cable

Coir.pany, Coiranercial

Cable Caiapany

suspended their Asian
and the Great Northern Company) temporarily

service.

largely on delayed
For news, the United States depended

unreliable reports einamting
dispatches delivered by steamer or on
3
froiu

London.
that, with the declaration
The Cleveland administration insisted

observe the neutrality laws."
of war, it would even "more strictly
and out of date.
Yet neutrality laws were complex, iir-precise

In

on Arnerican citir,ens wore
Augu.t 1894 the only published restrictions

based upon a law

..ade in 1860

prohibiting enlistment in the

arx-uer.

of

friendly to the United States
belligerents to n.ake war against countries
friendly by the State Department)
(both J.pan and China were considered
service.
or to fit out anned vessels for belligerent

prevented belligerents from buying

arn,s

Nothing, however,

in the United States and
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4

shipping them in their

own.

vessels.

American speculators, busiuessmon and expansionists threatened
impartial United States.
to underraine the image of a friendly and

Claiming that the United States was locked in

a

struggle for "possession

annexationists urged
of the world" with China and Japan, Hawaiian

Sino-Japansse War by
American businessmen to take advantage of the
talent" of the
adopting the "untiring zeal /Ind7 eplendid commercial

Jews to achieve economic ascendancy in Asia.^

Predicting that the

Asia in a costly and
present crisis vould entangle Europe as vail as
the United States repeal
bloody var, other imperialists demanded that
to take belligerent ships under
its neutrality lav;s and allow /Americans

the American flag.

ExaminSX
William Randolph Hearst's San Frs2cisco

shipbuilding finos to exploit the
implored California iDunitions and
war.

Iron Works to build fast
Hearst's newspaper advised the Union

circumventing the neutrality
torpedo boats and cruisers for Japan,

by contracting warships for
laws of the "law-abiding Ad.ainistration"
selling them to Japan.
Sa^oa and then, once they were at sea,
though less sanguine than Hearst,
Some expansionist businessmen,

East Asia to American capital.
anticipated that the war would open
Asian market, American manufacturers
Expressing revived interest in the
in
of new trade opportunities
them
inform
to
Department
urged the State

China. Japan and Korea.'

CcHpercial m^d
At the same time. Kew York's

would
this "real eastern war"
Fii-nci-i Chronicle predicted that
Virginia
and China. A leading
stimulate American trade with Korea

manufacturing spokesman, the Richncnd

S^,

doubted that the present

that
export trade but concluded
American
benefit
greatly
var would
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"if Russia should interfere and England should resent
to the point of

hostilities, the hard times in the United States would
quickly

disappear."

Focusing on the current controversy over silver and
gold

money in the United States, the Hew York Tribune added that
at least
the war would raise the price of silver and "not only
help both our

ovm Treasury and that of the Ividian Government to unload
part of the
enorraous quantity cf silver tvaiion which they have
acctunulated, but

may also render it possible to work at a profit our silver mines
in
the VJest that are now idle."

Lahor spokesiaen speculated that, while the war might increase
esuployinent in the

world's arsenals, it eventually would cause increased

public debt, taxation
toes

my

find

human suffering.

"Ko one can tell v/hose

be traraped on before it ends," the Un ited llin^ IJorkor's

Journal cOE::nented.

9

ihe Journal^ of the Knights of Lebor hoped that the

Sirio-Japanese War would reveal European governments as "awful cowards,"

prompting their people to rise against
Afiierican

labor epokesmen

generally agreed that all

v;ars

v?ho

10
thexa.

commented on the war in 1894

exploited the workingnian and caused

widespread suffering; yet they often proved themselves vulnerable to
the rhetoric of expansicnists--that this particular war would benefit
the United States by ci-eating jobs, higher wages, an end to uneiflplo>^ient
and depression and a wcrld-wide demand for Ajrierican products.
Eiore,

Further-

as the FInights of Labor publication noted, the Asian war might

eliminate con^petition from cheap oriental labor because "all the
patriotic Japs and Chiuaraan /si£/" would "go there now and be killed
for glory and relief of America.

"^^
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Others criticized assumptions that the war would materially

benefit the United States.

Tae Staunton Weekly

editorialized that the Asian war helped only

tlews

wa;:

(Virginia)

profiteers and actually

hindered the v/orld's economy by dislocating commerce, destroying
property and creating hardships in Asia which
the United States.

V70uld detrimentally affect

The Boston Globe claimed that the United States

had a duty to stop the war because it had contributed to the hostilities
through its "reckless" sale of
no more than "children."

Japanese and Chinese, who were

arras to

The American Peace Society demanded that the
12

goverEisent prevent American weapons from reaching Asia.

Meanwhile, the entrepreneurs were busy.

Ships loaded with flour,

for the hostile
beans, pork, beef, fruit and leather goods destined
arsiies departed from San Francisco.

Ihe steamer

with 200 tons of pig lead consigned to Japan.

Mo

de Janeiro sailed

The Armour Packing

for the sale of
Company in Kansas City negotiated with the belligerents

Anker Bouillon Capsule
500,000 pounds of canned corn beef, while the
contract with Japanese
Manufacturing Company of Jersey City signed a
capsules of beef.
officials to supply the army with one million

At the

of the Remington gun
same time Hartley & Graham, the New York agents

ammunition to the
works, reportedly sold several million rounds of

Japanese EOvemn-.ent.

Charles R. Flint
The New York brokerage firm of

of the Chilean cruiser
& Co. allegedly negotiated Japanese purchase

Philadelphia con3idered latest
Esmeralda, while Cramps Shipbuilding of

offers for

a cr^.iser,

United States Navy.

the Minneapqli_s

.

which had been destined for the

companies raised their
A:nerican marine insurance

"brisk business."
r^tes on "war risk" goods and carried on a

Tea and

4^

rice iJierchants in Kew York and Chicago pfospered.

As one businessman

noted, "all lines of trade report an increased business, which is
..13

attributed to the Oriental VJar."

Expecting Asserican enforcement of neutrality laws and a Japanese

blockade of the China coast, California gun-runners outfitted ewift

merchantmsn designed to slip by patrolling cruisers.
purchased the coastal stearaers
from aiainlersd China to Formosa.

Srnitjl

An Axaarican

^nd Cass, to shuttle munitions

Applications from assorted military

VJashington-men, adventurers and cranks flooded the Japanese legation in

enplainins that
so many, in fact, that ths legation released a circular
organization.
no volunteers would be needed by the Japanese siilitary

countevparts
Undeterred, ex-Confederate soldiers vied with their Union
to offer service to Japan.

In Cleveland, Ohio, several issmbers of the

local National Guard

a "Japanese Loyal Legion" and received

forffi-d

form for service
seventy signatures -^hen they circulated an enlistment

In the Japanese army.

allegedly
In California a "mysterious vhite man,"

Department recriiiter,
carrying the credentials of an official Japanese War
repeatii^g rifles,
promoted an elite regiment, equipped with the latest

by prospects of
clothed in their own special uniforms and enticed

looting various mndarins' palaces.

The San Fr^JLcisco

EKamner

Captain Dick
revealed the recruiter to be a famous "f rontiersnan,"
Falconsberg.
Nowacki of Pennsylvania
On the East Coast, coke striker Valentine
and unen^.ploycd
offered to enlist five thousand of his iepoverished
fellcv;. as soldiers for Japan,

Vlhan a

cashier of the Second National

bank's money and fled
Bank of Altoona. Pennsylvania, absconded with the
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to Japan, a Hew York newspaper coirraented on his "intention of helping

out the island people financially in their present crisis*"^^

Among breaches of neutrality by individuals, the most sensational

case originated with the scheme of a New England inventor to build en
"infernal machine" for China.

The late Victorian imagination thrived

on tales of sinister devices and awful engines of destruction.

It

was an age in which M. Eugene Turpin's "engine of war" thrilled Paris
General Clarke's secret "electrical fish-shaped torpedo" amazed
Aiaericans and rumors of deadly balloon plots caused Londoners to shudder.

John Wilde, a Providence,

Fdiodc Island,

chemist and nautical inventor,

had concocted a mysterious weapon which he claimed would destroy entire
fleets without the loss of a single attacking ship.

Ignored by the

United States Kavy, the fifty- two-year-old V7ilde brooded in his dark

waterfront laboratory and planned to
"terrible secret.

shov^

the world the power of his

"^^

Wilde interested George Howie (alias George Cameron)--form£r
deiaolitions expert aboard the dynamite cruiser Nictheroy during the

Brazilian civil war and presently a torpedo tester for the Hotchkiss
Ordnance Company

— in

his ideas.

When news of possible Sino-Japanese

hostilities in Korea reached Providence in early July of 1B94, Wilde

wrote the Japanese minister to Washington, Goeo Tateno, offering his
invention to Japan.

Wilde assured Tateno that he possessed "secret

Information which if known by your Government would enable them to

destroy the whole Chinese fleet and enable the^ to capture any forts

or water battery without the loss of a man or a ship."
government apparently was not interested in Wilde

s

The Japanese

plans.
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The inventor turned next for help to the senior Fhode Island

On August 27 Aldrich requested that the

senator, Nelson W. Aldrich.

Chinese minister listen to Wilde vho '^desires to confer with you in
regard to

jjome

natter v;hich he will present."

18

Chang Fang Mo,

II

Yang Yu's secretary and first interpreter, interviewed Wilde and

llovyie.

Ho, %^ho chilled himself C, F. Moore in the United States, vore a viz to

hide his pigtail and passed in many circles as an

.A^.erican.

As

Fleming Duncan Cheshire, the interpreter for the American legation in

Peking vrote to Rockhill, "the chap in

/.the/

Chinese Legation vho

styles himself C. F, Moore must be an ass; he is no ntore styled Moore
in Chinese

I am,

th-r^n

but anything will pass in the states so let him

call biraaelf Hoove or

ai^.y

ether d--d

interest but v^anted to check

vu'.th

nat?.e

he plesscs/'
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Moore expressed

former Secretary of State John VJatson

Foster before accepting Uildc's plan.

On September

5,

Foster inquired

of the Brazilian Minister Salvador Mandonca whether V/ilde or Howie

actually had been involved in the Brazilian civil war.

Mendcnca assured

him that an American had been eiaployed by Brazil but had never tested
his terrible v;eapon.

20

On Septeraber 13 Moore accepted VJilde's proposal and agreed to
finance his trip to China.

money for the fare.
I get

there before

Re.nk,

^loijior

Uv^fortunately he could not raise enough

Wilde urged him to try harder, promising that "if
the. ;?ar

is over through your endeavors,

and Wealth for you."

21

it will mean

Moore replied vnihappily that even

the Chinese minister doubted the utility of the scheme and would not

assist Wilde.
Well,

I

The inventor wrote back: "They laugh at you do they

will try

ray

.

.

best to raise the woney and if I can we will go to

.

?

52

China

.

.

.

Japan

.

.

.

vill show

V3

destroy the Japanese fleet

v/ill

•

.

.

carry the

then \m will see if your Minister vill laugh

hini,

and not only him,

b"*.it

V7ar to

....

We

the vhole vjorld, that it is no

22

laughing ciatter.""

Somehow either Moore or Wilde raised the necessary funds for

passage to China.

On October 16, accompanied by Howie, they left

San Francisco bound for Tientsin on the steadier Gaelic

suspected that Japanese agents were shadov;ing

thesu

,

Tney strongly

and that Uovie's

indiscreet boasts of an ominous "ciachine-de-guerre" had been overheard

by a fellow passenger, the Japanese consul -general to Mexico.

upon arrival in Yokohania on November

2,

Therefore,

the trio clandestinely slipped

their ship and boarded the French steamer 5Z^2Z» floored at the same
The ntse

v^harf.

v;as

not Kucce!:;sful

.

VThen the S^^dno^ stOT^ped at Kobe,

Japanese marines boarded the ship and arrested the three.

Ihe Japanese

clairaed that a contract, complete with tetins of sale as well as an

ironclad guarantee to destroy the Japanese fleet, was found in Moore's
pocket.

A copy of this evidence, fonjarded to the

Ar^ierican

minister

in Tokyo by the Jap.t:nese Foreign Office, indicated that the Chinese had
agreed to pay Wilde one million dollars in gold and a percentage of

every ship they destroyed in exchange for revealing his plan.
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Publicly ter^ned another Mason and Slidell case by the New York Tijmes,
the so-called "S^ldngx affair" threatened to involve the United States
in ^ controversy with Japan,
thn^

prisoners?

Would the United States demand return of

Gresham refused to entangle the government,

iiis

true ting

Dun only to "insist that he C^ilde) shall receive proper treatment" as
a prisoner of war-^^

The Japanese politely reciprocated by releasing
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Wilde and Howie on their
to stay aiiay from China.

p5^<^i^*ise

not to take up

t^xcxs

against Japan and

Moore was hustled away to a Japanese prison.

Though Kov7le and Wilde later broke their pledge and helped the Chinese

plant mines at Weihaiv7ei, leading to Howie's recapture, a potentially
serious issue over neutrality

hv^d

been avoided.

25

The United States government tried to prevent incidents such as

the VJilde Case.

Federal officers hunted the elusive Dick Falconsberg

in California, while the consul -general at Shanghai refused to let the

Cass and Spitji carry arms to Forraosa under the American flag,

llie

government also planned legal action against the Colt Arms Factory of
Hartford, Connecticut, at the request of the Japanese minister vho

objected to the sale of ten million small-bore rifle cartridges to
China.

It was necessary too for the State Department to pointedly

Heraljd
refuse to encourage a relief project sponsored by the ChristJ.an

fall into the hands
to feed starvins Koreans for fear that the food vould
to a
of one or another of the invading armies and therefore lead
.

.

neutrality violation.

26

way endanger
Determined that iiidividual Americans must not in any
cautionary' inthe neutral policy of their goverraient, Greshaa sent

sti^icticns to diplomatic posts throughout Asia.

In his note to Dun

"issue all manner
on August 30. the Secretary ordered the minister to
from enlisting in
of writs to prevent the citizens of the United States
said countries to mnke
the military or naval service of either of the

States are at peace,"
var upon any foreign power with whom the United
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Concerning this particular threat to neutrality, Gresham could act
most decisively.

He told Dun to "carry out this pov^er by a resort

to such force belonging to the United Stater, as may at the time be

within reach.'*
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Compared to the need to restrain American individuals, Japanese
and Chinese threats to American neutral rights, especially freedom of

the seas, offered the administration a more co?aplex problem.

Although

European powers had sometimes successfully challenged the American
interpretation of neutral rights, Asian defiance of these venerated
doctrines was a different raatter, creating consternaticn and even anner
in the State Department.

Japan had labored quietly for treaty revision

during the past few years, but now China threatened to upset the system
of Western trestles hy closing the treaty ports cf Amoy, Canton, Kingpo,

Chinkiang,

Foochov-/,

Shanghai, Hankov and Tientsin,

China warned that

it would blockade harbors, remove buoys and channel markers and shut

down the coastal lighthouses.
that they

V7ei*e

Chinese officials allowed it to be known

considering the searching of ships and the seiizure of

suspected contraband cargoes.

On their part, the Japanese seemad

prepared to blockade China's treaty ports and already had planted submarine torpedoes at entrances to their own harbors*

Noting the growing

danger to foreign commerce and reporting that pirates now attacked

merchant vessels at

v;ill

(since Chinese cruisers, fesring Japanese attack,

refused to venture into the open sea), British merabers of the Chinese

customs service later admitted that "things seemed bleak in AugustGreat Britain, in fact, had asked the United St.ntes to cooperate

with Britain, Italy and Geraany to preserve the neutrality of the treaty
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ports by the use of naval force.

Sir wlulian Pauncefote, the British

minister in Washington, discussed the possibility of American co29

operation in several private meetings with Greshara.

Tlie

resulting

dilcEima (one interpretation of neutrality at odds with aviother) drew

a characteristic response.

Guided by the large, overall principle he

had helped establish in regard to the war the Secretary of State assured

reporters that the United States v/ould never participate in armed inter-

vention in Asia and would maintain "strict impartiality" toward China,

Japan and Korea.
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Once again confidential State Department business was leaked to
newspapers.

Ironically, Gresham was attacked as another "Machiavelli"

or "Talleyrand," for having covered up allegedly sinister and deceitful

meetings with Fauncefote.

One pcjper claiimed that Gresham had never

inspired public confidence in the good faith of the State Department.

Another accused the Cleveland administration of making entangling
alliances with European powers to keep the treaty ports open, thus

betraying the basic dicta of the Founding Fathers as well as the
31

Monroe Doc trine

On August 10, Chinese authorities at Shanghai announced that
American merchant vessels would be searched.

Charles Deuby Jr. at once

inquired whether the United States would "concede" to this dc-nand.
younger Denb;
Consulting his legation's volumes on international law, the

merchant
granted that China might have the right to exai^ine American
could
ships "in the territorial waters of China," but doubted that it
ej^ercise this right on the high seas.

He informed Gresham that no

vessel of the
Oriental power had ever been permitted to search a public
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United States and urged that this right should not now be admitted.
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Grcshara hoped that he v?ould nev2r have to make the sort of

decision suggested by the acting minister in Peking.

He advised young

Denby on August 15 that if China searched Asnerican merchant vessels
on the high seas, "you will immediately report the fact for in-

structions, but you are not expected to encourage the assertion of that
right

VJliere

United States Mavy vessels v;ere concerned, Gresham

could speak raore firmly.

V/hile belligerents might be permitted to

ascertain the neutral character of American ships, "the search of

tnen-

of-war can not be permitted," nor could the rnovement of American ships

be revealed to the Chinese.
optii?.istic

Tne Secretary of State fon;arded an

circular to all diplomatic and naval personnel in Asia:

"As naither China nor Japan has made knovn an intention to exercise the

belligerent right of visitation and search on the high seas, it is
hoped that neutral coirjnerce

snay

escape the inconvenience and obt^truction

vhich the exercise of that right must necessarily entail."
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Possessing few large warships capable of long-range operations,
the United States could not resint violations of American neutrality.

Advocates of a larger navy asserted that China's actions should stimulate Congressional appropriations for additions to the fleet "beyond a
few torpedo boats, which while excellent in their way are of no service

on foreign stations."

Noting that "we have sent several tubs into

South American V7aters, but they never accomplished anything," others

remarked that the current Asian situation offered the opportunity to

display the American navy.
of "big navy" people when it

Tlie

Atlanta Cc*nstituticn echoed the views

corfiniented
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We no'v? have the best navy that we have had in a
generation, and it is time to make our power felt in
foreign waters. Our cruisers and battleships are needed
in the ports of China, and any delay in the matter nay
cost us the lives of inany Aniericnn missionaries. Ve need
The British snovld be
a more vigorous foreign policy.
kicked out of Central Ariierica, checVied in Venezuela, and
in China and Japa'a our naval supremacy should be rande
manifest at once.
^4
Give old glory a chance again!
The Spring field Republican cautioned against this latest outburst by
naval enthusiasts: "Tliey say they are needed there to protect American

interests, but wouldn't they in reality be likely to get us into more

trouble than they could avert?

Luckily wa havc^n't a large fleet to

spare just now for purely spectacular purposes."
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Nevertheless, events in Asia v;ere persuading Greshaoi that a

larger fleet might be necessary to preserve Anerican neutrality.

The

Japanese navy bombarded the Chinese xnilitary base at Weihaiwei on

August 10, accelerating rtmiors of an imminent attack so^iewherc on the

China coast.

The Chinese sank rock-filled junks in Tientsin harbor,

constructed a wooden barrier across the Peiho channel and reraoved

navigation lights from the approaches to the Taku forts.

Expecting

invasion, thousands of refugees filled roads to the interior.

Panic

roamed the
dominated even the Hanchn governnient, and bandit armies
fear of
countr>'side, attacking Chinese and foreigners without

,36

reprisals.

disdain.
Americans viewed China's self-defense measures with

caused
Some feared maritime incidents or resented inconveniences
AT^erican stean^ers loaded with case oil or tea.

It was increasingly

lay in the
apparent, however, that the greatest danger to Araericans
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chaof; that

would probably result from an attack.

American diplomatic

agents in Peking and Tientsin warned the State Department that a
Lawless

Japanese attack woiild turn the Chinese against all foreigners.

Chinese infantry already had insulted American missionaries and the

younger Denby anticipated mob violence.

"Much anxiety is felt

air.ong

rainister
the foreigners at Tientsin for their own safety," the acting

related.

"If the Japanese land and defeat the Chinese, the routed

."
soldiers will, it is feared, attack the settle^nent

37

Consul Sheridan

on their own
Read advised: "Should the Chinese soldiers be defeated

committing
soil it is understood that they will scour the country,
thread
outrages of every sort, and it is apparent that the slender

would in
which sustains the obedience of the masses to the Viceroy,
supreme."
that event be snapped and pandcnioniura would reign
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targets of
American missionaries expected to be the primar>-

Chinese reaction to

v

Japanese attack.

In 1894, missionaries—

principally Presbyterians, Methodists and

me.Tibers of

the American Board

the largest single
of Corr^niissioners of Foreign Missions-constituted

group of Americans in Asia.

Scattered throughout Japan, China and

chapels, schools and
Korea, little bands of missionaries established
personal property as wellhospitals, often accumulating substantial
39

including $50,000 vorth in the area of Seoul.

Tne majority of

native langu-sge and lived
missionaries labored long hours, learned the
disea.es which had decimated
with the people. They had to cope vith the
throughout the nineteenth century,
countless n^isslonary fa^nilie. in Asia
of the people and officials.
as well as the distrust and hostility

Anti-mssionao^ riots had plagued China

in particular, and missionaries
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mobs.
often faced death at the hands of anti-foreign
that
Church organizations in the United States apprehended

now that var had
American missionaries confronted even graver dangers

been declared between China and Japan.

Ihe

ttUnta Constitution

recently had been razed
reported that an Aiaerican Presbyterian church

Methodist Bishop Alpheus
by an anti-missionary mob, and Southern

V7.

fear for the safety of
Wilson varned that "there is much reason to

now stationed in China and Corea."
the missionaries both men and women,

At the

savne

letter from Hankow,
time the K^i ^ork Tribune published a

hostilities had "revived all the
China, claiming that the outbreak of
that the Chinese were insulting
native fanaticism of the Chinese" and
40
foreigners and threatening violence.

early August, the executive
Meeting in Kashville, Tennessee, in

co^uttee

Southern Presbyterian Church
of foreign missions for the

should take all necessary
stated that the United States government
Resolved
fifty missionaries in Chin..
steps for the protection of their

committee dispatched the Reverend
to present its case in person, the
conference with Gresham and the
Dr. J. W. Bachman to a Washington
of the
of the Board of Missions

Japanese charg^ d'affaires.

Leaders

Washington
York followed Bach:.an to
Northern Presbyterian Church in New
Concurrently
the Secretary of State.
and arranged their own meeting with
people
mission sent a list ol their
the Board of the Southern Methodist
in China to the State Department.

received
The Department in fact

friends
groups and individuals having
missionary
from
letters
numerous

and relatives in Asian missions.
no
American missionaries faced
that
Inquirers
assured
Cre.ham
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iin^.ediate

danger and would be protected.

Yet privately he expressed

be afforded "by the agents of
doubt that "effective protection" could
hostilities."
this GoverLiment on the scene of

Despite a popular claim

and no apologies and reparations
that "if our Missionaries are killed

bombarding on its own account,"
made, this government will do some
States could do nothing at this
Gresha^m perceived that the United

juncture to help the missionaries.

The brutal assault on and
n^issionary

Jarr«.s

Aiaerican concern.
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ir.urder of a

Scotch Presbyterian

intensified
Wylie by Manchu soldiers on August IC
Tl.e

Chinese govermr.ent promptly issued an

missionaries.
proclamation designed to protect the

Iir^perial

But Li Hung-chang

officials extensively circulated,
cautioned that this edict, which
agitated for foreign gunboats,
would be ineffective if the missionaries

commented on the war. because such
publicly
they
if
or
guards
legation
believing
hatred.'' Nevertheless,
actions would intensify anti-foreign
missionaries
affect their work.
that the war would profoundly
Board
Charles A. Stanley, an American
refused to rer^in silent. Rev.
his brethren
that ..ylie's .urder placed
claimed
Tientsin,
.t
missionary
of danger in
of uncertainty, anxiety,
time
a
is
"It
danger.
in great
on cur sure
"and we can only fall back
wrote,
Stanley
see localities."
But he quickly
is our trust."
Refuge-^the Lord reigneth. in thee
may
now~^British . French. German-and
gunboats
three
have
"we
added,
n
uv9e6 Read to request a
^ ^
Qf-^nlpv uigea
Stanley
Russian,'
and
U.S.
more,
have, tvo
another mi-ssionary
w-^^lTTT^n ^
warning. Meanwhile.
Hung-chang's
Li
despite
gunboat,
hope it
more gunboats here; I
have
to
are
ve
rumored
is
announces,a. "It

Wican

-

"oldand the Monocacx. that
Bal^ll-re
the
only
is true,- because
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fashioned sicle-vhceler" which looked like a "New York ferry boat,"

afforded protection.
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The mission stations in Ilorth China reported the movement of

huge araies, and as the fighting spread they feared reprisals from
villagers vho looked upon the missionaries as part of a vast foreign

kingdom arrayed against China.

Believing that the war provided evidence

of God's work to open China to Christianity, the missionaries openly

commented on China's cori-uption and weakness.

Rev. Willis C. Noble,

an Aisertcan medical missionary at Paotingfu, near Peking, predicted
that the war will have a "decided rmd lasting benefit to the ccuntry"

by breaking up "the intense conservatism of the Gov/_emriient/ and people
ai^d

the hatred and suspicion of all that is foreign."

Some missionaries

publicly prayed fcr China's defeat while others hinted that the United
crusade after
States government should prepare to support the missionary
.

the collapse of Chinese conservatism.
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rumors of
Reports of the missionaries' plight combined with

public's
American intervention on their behalf helped stimulate the

appetite for war news.

Yet there was little reliable information

column after
available during early August, and newspapers filled

coUam with

editorial analysis.

"remote" Asian war.

Vney warned that this was not a

"European
Americans could not disregard it because

in the Orient may
interests /vere7 so involved in Asia that a war

upset the enuilibriun, of
precipitate a European war. and this would so
even on this side of
x^ations that its effects would be plainly felt
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the Atlantic/'
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Few doubted that Eui-opean powers would intervene in the w^r,
and not a

fev;

editorials anticipated that such interference v;ould save

brave and skillful little Japan (which most Americans hoped would
"lick China into a cocked hat") from being swaraed under by three or
four million Chinese.

Even reports from /onerican military experts

that the "homogeneous and warlike" Japanese were "much superior to

their Chinese cousins" failed to dissuade

soine

American newspapers

playing on fears of China's ultiraate triumph.

froin

"It is hard to believe

that 40,000,000 psople can lick 400,000,000," the A tlanta Cor^l^tu^i^^

observed,

r.nd

"the chances are that the Chinese will overrun Japan

unless the European powers interfere."

The UsSSlS Advertiser explained,

"It will shortly develop that China can

coirjf^and

advantageous

pc£.ii?:icns

army spreads
and execute frightful slaughter, once her laultitudinous

out on the land field."
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Other Americans coimnented on China's vast resources.

Dr.

W.

navy, told
Luscher of Kansas City, a former surgeon in the Chinese

years, and from
interviewers that "China can afford to wage war for
into Corea as a child would
"the millions of her people can pour troops

pour sand in a rat hole

populated districts."

.

.

.

without missing them from the densely

that "the
Ihe Springfield ReguMican asserted

off ail her inhabitants,
Japanese cannot hope to whip China by killing

Chinese should be killed
for. according to a statistician, if 1000
finish the.n."
every day it would require 1500 years to

Labor r.aintained that "owing to the

itr.-nonse

T>ie

Knights of

resources of China it is

and over.;helm Japanese
thought she will pour her hordes into Korea
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troops

." 48

More optimJ.stic Americans placed their faith in the ultimate
triumph of Japan, which represented the values of western civilization.

The Pnilnclelphia Press predicted that progressive Japan would make
"short work" of China.

The former cotrmander of the cruiser BaltitEore,

Captain W. R. Bridgraan, confidently believed that unless China undertook
V7ar

preparations on a "gioantic scale," Japan's splendid army and navy

would v;hip her.

In this war theory there was no place for hopes that

European powers might intervene.

As the l^ui:Sville Couri^r::JourTLai

pig-tailed
supposed, Japan's fighting ability "promises hot work for his
abstained from
enemies," as long as "some of the big European bullies"

involvemant.

T!ie

progressive view also challenged the

China's Kasses would in'judato Japan.

arguir-ent that

"If the Japs continue to in^prove

is not known whether
in marksmanship," the Richmond State quipped, "it

supply or not."
China's 400,000,000 will suffice to keep up the target

decadent did not
Typical American views of China as corrupt and

minister and connaanderusually include Li Kung-chang, unofficial prime
in-chief of China's northern defenses.

Li had emerged as one of the most

century China.
powerful Chinese leaders in late nineteenth

He had

posts while building up his
placed fan,ily and friends in key goverm^ant

own private

anr.y

Province.
and navy as Governor of Chihli

Yet Li

used his power to protect
r^T.ained loyal to the Manchu dynasty and

throne as well as his own interests.

China in 1872 and by

foru^.er

the.

Popularized by Grant's visit to

Russell
American mnister to China John

became the only Chinese
Young's laudatory articles, Li Kung-chang

leader recognizable to the Atnerican public.

"Li Hung Chang is a n,an of
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liberal views, measured by the conservative Chinese standard,

Sheridan Read observed, and he "is regarded as distinctly pro-foreign.
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During August 1894 Americans were calling Li the Gladstone or

Bismarck of China, the greatest of his race and the only leader willing
to adopt western technology and education,

Li appeared to be the one

man capable of uniting China in a war effort against Japan, since Li,
like Bismarck, vps thought to possess the ability to mold diverse
groups of provinces and cities into a national entity.

But when Li's

and
enemies urged the Emperor to deprive him of his "Yellow Jacket

Peacock Feather," signs of Imperiel favor and confidence, (ostensibly
Chinese
for permitting Japan's seizure of Seoul and the defeat of
would seal its
troops), there were many Americans who noted that China
^
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attitudes.
own fate by turning its back on a man with Western

confirm
Stories dealing with Chinese-Americans continued to
and the incentive
earlier opinions that the Chinese lacked patriotisni

to fight.

appeared uninformed
Most Chinese interviewed in American cities

or indifferent about the Sino-Japanese conflict,

vnien asked what

the

an "intelligent
war laeant to Atlanta's Chinese population, Sam Sing,

"no makee diffence,
Atlanta Chinai^an." allegedly told the Constitution,
no go war, En^ler
Mellican Chinaman allee samee washee. makce monee,
in Lanta, workee,
China say come fight muchee, me no go tall, stay

wcshee, no,

n,e

no go war."

ITiis

Boston,
type of coverage, repeated in

fon^ the image of a
few York City, Chicago and San Franci.co helped

people sadly deficient in national pride,

down to defeat.

a flaw

which would drag China

Chinamen in Boston's
As the Boston Globe reported.

fan tan, and make money"
Chinatown would "remain here to wash, play
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during the war.

Residents of New York City's Chinatown, the Tribun e

stated with amusement, were content with "Low Flung," a new god

meant to insure Chinese victory, which had been erected atop a building
at the corner of Mott and Pell Streets.
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On the other hand, when interviewed about their opinions of the
war, local Japanese were admirably patriotic and well-informed.

Ihey

founded a Japanese Patriotic League in Brookl^m to read dispatches,

discuss the war and collect contributions for Japan's war effort.
Ihey established similar groups in Chicago, San Francisco, Tacoma,
Boston, Mew Haven, Baltimore and Atlantic City.

Japanese residents of

Portland, Oregon, organized a Kutual Protective Association which

pledged absolute loyalty to Japan.

Alv;ays v^illing to discuss the war

with An^ericans, the Japanese in the United States stressed Japan's
progress, democracy and reforming zeal and they predicted that by

adopting American technology they could conquer barbaric, un-

Christian China.
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One Aiuerican who disputed simplistic views of the war was

Ambrose Bierce, political pundit, journalist and later author cf the
Devil 's DicH-^narj^.

Bierce contended that few Americans had endeavored

to understand the causes of the war, much less the Japanese and Chinese

peoples.

"All that we knew or cared to know was that our Chinatowns

were filthy— alir.ost as filthy as the East side of New York, that the
Chinese workingman in America is a heathen and works for low wages"
and "that the Japanese make pretty bric-a-brac--which we

Chinese tradesmen."

nsay

buy from

He suggested that Americans study Japan and China

before passing judgment on the combatants-
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6&

Partly to gather more accurate nevs but primarily to increase
sales with sensational stories, major publishers debated sending spscial

correspondents, at great cost, to the war

zoner*.

Harper's Weekly and

Harper's HaRazine hired Julian Ralph, already planning a trip to China
and already equipped with uncomplimentary views of Asia,

Ralph wrote

Secretary of War Daniel S* Lament that he needed letters of introduction
"so that

I

may see some water fighting in the course of the grotesque

war that is going on in Corea

.

.

.

perhaps a letter from you, stating

that I am your friend, and of repute in 'ny own countree* might be very

valuable,"
I

a?n

Ralph suggested that

Laiiiont

keep the whole thing quiet "as

keeping it dark so as not to excite the other publishers into

sending men to share my 'glory' with me/'

Lamont ccsrplied with Ralph's

request, also enclosing letters from Gresham and Assistant Secretary

of Kavy William Kc-Adoo,

"Well, if I ain't fixed for my trip nobody

ever was," Ralph joked, and he hoped that reports from "cross-eyed

T
and quaint" China might "advertise /hil/ wares.
/-
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and
Richard Harding Davis, just starting his career as journalist
for the
author, also expressed interest in following the Japanese army

purpose of writing a history of the war.

He urged Lamont to write a

letter to the Japanese Secretary of War, "saying that

I

am all sorts of

to the staff of some
a fine person and one who he should at once attach

side, of the
general in the field if he wants his side, the Japanese

war written up with grace and accuracy combined."

Davis even phoned

credentials.
Mrs. Cleveland to thank her husband for procuring
you say farewell for

m-^

"Will

for his fine
to the President and thank him

which made it possible
Cabinet, three of whom came through with letters
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for

lae

to go."

SoEehow Davis' plains fell through, but a nuiibsr of

other special correspond ants vould follow Ralph and play important
roles in shaping American reactions.
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While strident pro-Japanase publicity continued to threaten

American neutrality, the Cleveland administration searched for a var
policy which might preserve neutrality v;hile protecting American
Interests.

Any effort along such lines vould remain unilateral.

'Gie

President, responding in part to growing criticism of British inter-

vention in Latin America, was determined not to alter his country's
non-entangling alliances tradition.

Ke turned down all Britieh

of the
requests for cooperation in Asia and ordered the strengthening

Asiatic squadron.

Responding to missionary pleas for a gunboat at

Hilary Afcner
Tientsin, the administration ordered Secretary of the Kavy

Herbert to send the first available

V7ar

vessel to that port as a

Tne Kavy Department also prepared to suppleaent
57
,
Sea patrol.
Bering
the
from
gunboats
with
Konocacy,
tlie EaltiBiore and the

"precautionary measure."

coaled and
The captains of the gunboats Concord and Petrel

gatling guns, vhile
equipped their steam whale boats vith mounts for

stowing below a

nur-.ber

of Lee Magazine Rifles and Colt revolvers.

the crews of the
Fully expecting land duty on the Asian continent,

infantry.
ehips steaming toward China drilled daily as

Meanvhila

U. Coffin of the
the Secretary of the Navy ordered Captain George

second-class cruiser Charleston to
sail iirnnediately.

con>plete.

repairs at Mare Ir.icnd and

along with the V.o
Tais 3730-ton protected cruiser,
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gunboats, would join the Baltimore and Honocacy in

tlie

war zone

Herbert assigned command of the reinforced Asiatic squadron to
Admiral Charles C. Carpenter, a "bull of a man" with a thick wavy beard
and tsiustache.

Carpenter had conm-jnded the USS Hartford in 1884 when he

had suffered the first in a series of nervous breakdowns which would

eventually lead to his suicide in a Massachusetts sanitarium several
years after the Sino-Japanese War.

In August of 1894, at any rate.

Carpenter was considered capable of

cor.imanding a fleet in a critical

area
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At the

saaie

time Gresham prodded the elder Der.by-"£till resting

delay."
at his hosie in Evansville, Indiana--to "go to Peking without

August 28,
Noting that a steamer would leave San Francisco for China on
on board.
Gresham strongly suggested that th- minister ought to be

Japan mny
"Haturally enough we fear that the war between China and
strongly agreed
embarrass us," the Secretary admitted, and the President
senior Denby in
that the current crisis required the presence of the

Peking

60
the maintenance
Denby 's experience was considered essential to

of stresses and
of strict neutrality, already subject to a variety

strains.

for the Japanese.
Tne press continued to promote sympathy

of instructions.
Faulty cosFuunications invited misinterpretations
Asian, caused constant conster
Neutrality violations by both Americans and
protection.
nation, and missionary groups clamored for

Could the United

threats to
States remain indifferent to neutrality violations,

nissionarie. and acts of atrocity?

Gresham
Not in the legalistic view of

strictly enforced, by
and Cleveland, vho felt that neutrality must be
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means which included the strengthening of the Asiatic fleet.

Having

accepted a neutral policy, the government could ignore none of the

responsibilities suggested by that policy.

One of these responsi-

bilities, to be fulfilled regardless of the consequences, was the

function of "good offices,"

CHAPTER
HIE

OPJ)E/.L

IV

OF GOOD OFFICES

When the United States agreed to extend its good offices to
China and Japan in order to protect the subjects and property of each
in the country of the other, the Cleveland administx-ation believed

that this was required by any honest and responsible policy of
neutrr.lity.

Cleveland and Gresham envisaged good offices as a

duty to be offered by an impartial friend of
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ikjoral

varring countries.

Yet complications arising from this well-meaning policy soon created

unforeseen problems.
In 1894 the

terra

"good offices," as defined by most international

legal experts, signified the offer of "unofficial" and "impartial"

advice by a third party to two disputants, sometimes as a first step
toward raediation but more coiaiBonly as a means of maintaining useful
comir.unications into and out of nations at war-

The United States,

vhile traditionally advocating the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, had offered its good offices sparingly during the nineteenth
century, limiting

countries.
specified

then:

primarily to disputes among Latin American

Yet, the Ai^.erican treaty with Korea of May 22, 1882,
thc':'t

"if other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with

either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being
informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus

showing their friendly feelings."

In such a case, much more was implied
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than

narrow and technical diplomatic function.^

a

Despite opposition to the implementation of the Korean treaty,

Gresham had established a precedent by using good offices in an

atteiript

to alleviate the tensions between Japan and China on the Korean pen-

insula.

Shortly aften^ard, the State Department began to consider yet

another extension of the good offices concept*

Should this function

nov include the protection of Japanese property and subjects in China
and the same for China in Japan?

During the last V7eek of June 1894,

the Japanese government had requested Dun to inquire whether the United

States would "use its good offices to protect Japanese archives and

subjects in China."

2

withdrew its minister

Gresham cabled Dun that if the Japanese government
frora

Peking and requested American good offices,

"the request would receive the President's friendly consideration, but
it would not be granted v7ithout the assent of China."

3

During preliminary discussions American officials voiced little

concern over the idea that the meaning of goad offices might be extended
to protect belligerent interests.

Such an interpretation would go

beyond the role of impartial intermediary, suggesting instead possible
instances of intervention, even if accomplished under the broad intent
of impartiality.

International law recognized that the term could be

use
"somewhat elastic" but its definition had never really included the
of good offices to protect property and parsons of warring powers.

Yet, Charles Denby Jr. assured the State Department that international

law provided for expansion of the service and Washington failed to
4

qu es t i o n th i s cone ep t .
in late July,
Preparing for expected Sino-JapanBse hostilities
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the State Department instructed American agents in China and Japan to
reprer»ent unofficially and upon request belligerent interests in their

respective countries.

Confused by these instructions, consular repre-

sentatives requested further definition of their duties under good
offices.

Young Denby distributed a circular to consuls on July 31 in

vhich he explained that American diplomatic representatives in Asia
would protect Japanese in case of war without diplomatically representing
The acting minister added that the consuls might become

Japan.

custodians of Japanese consulates and archives but could not fly the

American flag over Japanese property nor act as Japanese consular
agents,

Ihe State Departrient failed to help young Denby clarify these

instructions, only adding to the puxclenient by noting that the "raising
the flag of the United States over buildings ov7ned or occupied in China

by the Japanese Goverriment would be perfectly proper and according to

precedent."^
The Japanese charge d'affaires and his entire legation staff

vacated Peking on August
interests in China.

1

leaving the Americans in charge of Japan's

Informing the Tsungli Yamen of the Atnerican

Office to
responsibility, young Denby requested the Chinese Foreign
protect
issue "stringent orders" to local authorities designed to
6

ports.
Japanese subjects travelling from the interior to the treaty
to
Good offices, almost from their inception, contributed

representatives
misunderstanding and tension between American diplcniatic
and the Chinese.

On August

2

Consul Sheridan P. Read, in accordance

wife and children
with his instructions, escorted the Japanese consul's
through hostile and shouting Chinese

i^obs

to a waiting British stearoer
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then coaling at a wharf in Tientsin.
ruffians boarded the ship, hunting

Later Chinese soldiers and

dov?n

and forcibly rerrioving every

Japanese passenger, including i?omen and children.

Read at once inter-

vened, demanding that Li Hung-chang reprimand the soldiers and permit
the Japanese to return to Japan.

Li complied, apologizing profusely,

but the incident reinforced Chinese assumptions that the Americano were
somehow allied with Japan.

Meanwhile Consul -General H^omas

R.

Jernigan at Shanghai announced

that the Department's instructions "so disquieted Americans that I

was pressed to conirnunicate with you (Uhl)

.

.

.

submitting that the

course of the United States tov^ards China and Japan be absolutely neutral
in the interest of American interests in both countries."

Jernigan

further indicated that good offices Loight be construed as favorable to

Japan and "would tend to transfer to American residents in China the
intense animosity ot the Chinese for Japanese and especially endanger
the lives of American missionaries in the interior of this Empire."

g

Although generally less critical than the Chinese situation, good
offices in Japan also caused difficulty,

N.

W* Ilclvor,

consul-general at Kanagawa, reported that when

soire

the American

Chinese were stoned

by a Japanese mob, he assumed protection of some five hundred persons

making their way to the docks to board the China-bound Oceanic

9
.

The

Chinese in Japan complicated matters by insisting that the Americans
now held diplomatic as well as legal jurisdiction over them, which of
coiirse the State Department denied.

Coed offices clouded the line where

Americaia authority ended and Japanese jurisdiction began.

The Japanese

reser^tcd Chinese claims that only the United States had authority over
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their subjects in Japan, announcing by Imperial Ordinance that

"Chinese subjects in Japan shall be wholly subject to the jurisdiction
of the Japanese courts. "^^

Mclvor assured Japan that the United States

"had net sided with anybody," but acted as "a friend of good order and

civilization" in Asia, which mollified Japanese officials,

Up to this point the Cleveland administration had suffered only

minor embarrassraents from its broad application of good offices*

It

was not prepared, hov;ever, for the question of Japanese spies in China.

For years the Japanese intelligence services had infiltrated China
agents disguised ac students, merchants and even religious men.
supplied the Japanese

aririy

v;ith

They

with detailed maps of the countryside and

sketches and descriptions of major fortifications and arsenals.

The

Chinese obtained some knowledge of this network and with the declaration
of war announced severe punishment for any Japanese captured as a

military spy.

llie

Chinese suspected almost every Japanese, and this,

combined with American assuinption of the protection of Japanese in
China, led to a volatile situation.

Charles Denby Jr. tried to avoid

a confrontation by urging the Chinese "to proceed with moderation and
to be influenced rather by motives of humanity than by bitterness toward

Japan" and to deport rather than execute suspected spies.
With the outbreak of hostilities, Japanese citizens in China
flocked to the treaty ports in preparation for their flight to Japan.

At Shanghai Jernigan promised members of the Jap^^nese community that
they would be safe under his protection if they reiiiained in China.

The
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first test of Jernigan's promise occurred on August 10 when two

Japsnese students accused of spying sought protection in the American

consulate under the auspices of good offices.

Shanghai sweltered in an

extraordinary heat wave which had kept the mercury at over one hundred
degrees for more than a week.

The heat bothered Jernigan but not nearly

as much as the need to implement a policy, the pitfalls of which he

had already recognized.

Although the consul-general wanted to avoid

involvement, he refused to hand the Japanese over to Chinese authori^,

ties.

13

The Chinese Foreign Office instructed its minister in IJashington
If

to protest Jernigan's decision.

Yang Yu informed Gresham

th^^t

China

demanded the

irru-aediste

possession.

Taken completely by surprise, the Secretary of State cabled

surrender of the two Japanese in Jernigan's

young Danby to "report iirtmediately and fully" on the Chinese complaint.

Gresham added that legally "our legation and consulates in China are
not authorized to hold Japanese accused of crime against the demand of

Chinese authorities."

14

In reply the acting minister defended Jernigan, explaining that
the two Japanese wearing Chinese clothes had been arrested by the French
consul in the French concession in the International Settlement.

Ihe

Japanese had requested asylum in the American compound under the good
offices provisions until the case could be investigated.

Jernigan had

granted this fully in line with his interpretation of the State

Department's instructions to protect all Japanese in China.

Doubting

the rights of China in the case, Chsrles Denby Jr. advised Gresham that

important principles were involved and that the Secretary should not
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act precipitately.^^

The spy case enmeshed Gresham in the controversy

between the western interpretation of treaty rights (extraterritoriality)
and China's legal claims.

Moreover, when Jernigan and the younger D^nby

asserted that surrender of the two alleged spies, whom they claimed to
be only poor students, meant terrible torture and decapitation of

"innocent victims" by the barbaric Chinese, Gresham confronted a moral
as well as a le^^A dilemma.
It

Meanwhile Chinese minister Yang Yu reminded Gresham that,

despite their interview of August 18, American representatives had not
surrendered the spies to the pi'oper authorities*

Lacking inforraation,

the Secretary deferred action until he received further v7ord from China.

Kc castigated young Denby for having failed to dispatch
of the case to Washington.

a full

report

16

The acting fainister waited until August 26 to cable Gresham that
the Japanese had been arrested in the foreign settlement and therefore

must be tried by foreign consuls, in this case the American consul acting
for Japan.

Stressing that Jernigan had called the alleged spies "mare

school-boys, peacefully and openly living at Shanghai," Charles Denby Jr.
requested instructions for the consul-general to try the case in a mixed

court of both foreigners and Chinese officials.^^

The same day young

Denby further defied the State Department in a case" involving another
accused spy at Ningpo.

John Fowler, American consul at Ningpo and a

cloue Boston friend of leading anti-administration spokesman Henry Cabot
I-odge, had

conplained to the acting minister that the Chinese had seized

a Japanese priest and without evidence had sentenced him to death for

spying.

Fowler denounced the Chinese action, asking the Peking legation

77

for instructions.

positive

.

.

.

Charles Denby Jr. replied: "Gresham's orders

consuls cannot protect Japanese secured of crime

•

•

.

you may use friendly offices to secure trial; if refused no alternative."

He then added his ovm corollary to Gresham's instructions,

stating that if a Japanese accused of crime desired refuge, the Atiierican
legation in Peking considered it "lawful" to retain him until the

Chinese presented reasonable proof of guilt.

18

Learning of the younger Denby 's insubordination, the Secretary
of State tried to spell out a view of good offices acceptable to the

United States government.
You and Consul General at Shanghai seem to misapprehend
nature of protection authoriKed. Lending good offices does
not invest Japanese vith extraterritoriality nor should
legation or consulates be made asyluni for Japanese v;ho violate
local laws or conjiiiit belligerent acts. Protection to be
exercised unofficially and consistently with neutrality.
Consul General should not have received two Japanese and is
not authorized to hold them. Your susgestion that our
Consuls act as arbitrators not entertained.

Pressured by the Chinese, agitated by recalcitrant subalterns and

compromised by his own instructions, Gresham relied on his legal preparation rather than his inadequate diplomatic background.

He forvarded

another coimuunication to the acting minister insisting that "you need to
be instrv^cted as to the nature of your duties" in regard to the care of

Japanese subjects under good offices.

The Secretary stressed the

unofficial aspect of good offices, explaining that it vas unconstitutional for an American diploinatic representative to act officially for
the subjects of another nation,

Furthennore, Gresham reniinded young

Denby that since the Japanese could not be considered citizens of the
Uxiitcd States, they

were not subject to the laws of that country.
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Finally, the Secretary asserted that it

v;as

inconsistent with the law3

of neutrality to show special favor, such as Jerragan's action

comprised, for either side.

In closing the former Indiana judge assured

Colonel Denby's son that precedents for the use of good offices existed,

citing as

exazriples

the American offer to Mexico in 1867, in the Franco-

Prussian War of 1870 and for years on behalf of Swiss Republic's
citizens in Caina.

20

Abstract legal principles did not interest the stubborn acting
minis tex' as much as the humanitarian question of
vas firmly convinced,

v^ere not spies.

tvjo

Japanese who, he

He begged Gresham to delay this

"unconditional surx-ender to /the/ Chinese Government" until his father
arrived back
clear."

21

ix\

Peking.

GreshEm replied curtly, "My instructions 29th

Realizing that he could resist no longer, Charles Denby Jr.

instructed Jernigan on Septejnber

Chinese authorities.

1

to turn the two students over to

Ke expended his anger by sending to Gresham an

elaborate and condescending explanation of vrestern law in China.
The forraer Princeton scholar stated that the foreign concession
in Shanghai contained a multiple legal code and that "mixed courts"

with a Chinese magistrate and a foreign assessor tried criminal cases
in the international

coirjiiunity .

Kc hinted that Gresham' s action

threatened to undermine the treaty systeni and set a dangerous precedent
for the future viability of western extraterritoriality in China.

Jernigan underrnined this interpi-etation

,

22

however, when he admitted that

the foreign con-jnunity, and not his conception of American legal

obligations, had forced him to ask for a mixed court.

While the Shanghai affair was consuming most of the State
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Department energy, good offices v;ere causing trouble for Americans in
On September

other parts of China,

3,

Jacob T. Child, the American

consul at Hankow, reported that his marshal had resorted to force

vhile protecting Japanese in that treaty port.

Child had ordered

his officer to escort a Japanese businessman to a steamer bound for

Shanghai; however, when a mob of about two thousand Chinese blocked

the path, the Americans had used a "display of rifles" to ensure his
passage.

The Chinese accused Child of acting "as an accessary

to the escape of a spy," calling the American "dishonorable/*

/.sic/
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Several days later at Tientsin, Consul Read became involved in
the controversy over the ctipture of an alleged Japanese spy named

Ishikawa Yoichi.

Read had suspected Ishika^^a of clandestine activity

even before the declaration of war and advised the Japanese to take him
to Japan when they abandoned Tientsin.

Certain that Ishikav/a had

departed. Read had assured Li Hung-chang that Tientsin harbored no

Much to the consul's embarrassment,

undesirable Japanese.

Ishikax-?a

Yoichi was captured in September as he emerged from the home of the
chief secretary' of the Director of the Ordnance Department of Chinese
customs-

Though Read believed that Ishikawa was a spy, the Japanese

claimed that he was not and fully expected Read to use good offices to

obtain his release.

Read had hardly begun to protest when the Chinese

from
decapitated Ishikawa, thus freeing at least one American official
25

the good offices dilejonia.
Mean-w'hile, Tliird

Assistant Secretary William W. Rockhill, absent

Japanese
from Washington when Greahara ordered the surrender of the two
attempted to
students, returned in early September and unsuccessfully
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convince the Secretary to view the case "realistically" rather than on

purely "abstract" legal grounds.

At about the same time the press

began to comment on the spy case.

Newspapers deplorod Gresham's action,

claiming that the spies had already been beheaded.

For example, the

eans Picayune called Gresham*s instruction "a cowardly act,"

^Sii

noting that "the pledge of the United States to protect Japanese
subjects in China is a mockery, and should be at once withdrawn, so
that Japan may be able to secure the good offices of some other pov^er."

Public discussion of the spy
dejection.

cf:se
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sdded to Ihomas Jemigan's

He felt betrayed and tormented.

As a friend of Assistant

Secretary Rockhill vrote from China, the consul-general had "the

Japanese spies on the brain & can talk of nothing else; & not

v;ith r^iuch

dignity he inspires or v/rites himself articles belauding his own actions
e.nd

belittling that of the State Dspt."

28

On September 21 Jernigan

presented the Department with a lengthy manuscript justifying his actions

He explained that, while never acting officially, he had retained the
Japanese because of the "then excited state of the Chinese mind" which
would have "meant death to the young men within twenty four hours."
Jeraigan repeated his assertion that the foreign

comjrainity in the

international settlement at Shanghai had requested that the consulgeneral hold a trial by mixed court.

He added that" the Department's

action threatened American lives in a similar situation if the United
States ever waged war on China.

Then corrjnenting on Yang Yu's influence

on the Secretary of State, Jernigan noted that "mistakes may have been
Biade

.

-

.

but the suspicious nature of the Chinese mind may well be

properly rebuked when attenipting to offer its attributes as the standard
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by which to judge an officer of the United States."
Jernigan

Closing his brief,

suiriiaarized

Viewed from a legal standpoint, the ca&e presented
no difficulty, but I had been instructed to protect
Japanese interests and here V7as a case that appeared,
not to lav7, but to hvimanity, I was not asked to intervene
legally, officially, but as a man having the confidence of
both China and Japan, and desirous of being just to both and
at least humane to the imperilled subjects of the one whose
interest I had been published as being the representative
at thisS port, ^

Jernigan in^plied that the State Department misunderstood conditions in
He became convinced that Greshara's instructions not only

China.

condemned the Japanese to death and endangered other Japanese in China,

but also destroyed the consul-general's dignity and effectiveness as a
representative of the United States.
The Chinese minister In Washington, meanwhile, assured Gresham
that his Govern^nent would not punish the students until Colonel Denby

returned to his ministerial post in Peking.

He visited Gresham several

times, insisting that "reports in the American papers to the effect that

the two alleged spies had been beheaded by the Chinese Government were

untrue."

Even Jernigan admitted this.

In a cablegram of October 9,

sent to "be3ie newspaper reports" about the death of the two spies,

Jernigan intintated that the two were alive and well.

On October 22,

however, Jernigan reported that the two accused students had been
tortured and decapitated in conformity
ISie
^Je^lilj^

v;ith

Chinese law.
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controversy had subsided by the end of November, when IIavper!s_

correspondent Julian Ralph resurrected it.

sational copy, Ralph interviewed the

tozrm.entcd

Exaggerating many of the consul-general's

Locking for sen-

Thomas Jernigan.

coi-nments,

Ralph hurried an
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article to Harper
V7ith

clairAlng thi^t the Jr.pane&e spies had been "tortured

horrible ingenuity and devil ishness, every day with a

brutality, for seven days,"

iinrplying

nev?

that American helplessness in

Asia hsd condemned them to this horrible death.

He alleged further,

embellishing on Jernigan's suspicions, that the "oily rogue" of a

Chinese minister in Washington had blinded the Secretary of State to
reality and inade him believe that the Japanese V70uld be treated

humanely ."^^
Reprinted throughout the United States, Ralph's article ignored
all evidence to the contrary in claiming that Gresham himself had acted

Ralph

to condemn the two students to a most barbaric and brutal desth.

even asserted that the United States Senate had decided to investigate
Yet,

Gi^csham's conduct of the affair "solely upon ny vjritten vord,"

Roosevelt
on the very day that Ralph's revelations appeared, Theodore
official
suggested to Keury Cabot Lodge that he ought to des^and all the

correspondence concerning the spy case for a Senrite investigation.
this brutal
Roosevelt told Lodge on December 1, "It seems to me that

surrender of
stupidity and cowardice of Greshaiu in the matter of the

prompt action
the two Japanese calls for the niost decided and
If possible I vish he could be iir^peached."

....

Roosevelt's wrath was based

manliner^s but for
upon his idea that Gresham had failed a test of

the Cleveland
Lodge it was a political opportunity to castigate
32

the Republican Party.
administration and increase his own stature in

On Decei^ber

3,

the
Lodge requested that the Senate be shown

two Japanese "If not
correspondence relative to the delivery of the
"^^
incompatible with the public interest.

Greshai. resisted pressure
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to turn the docuraents over.

He urged John T* Morgan of

administration's spokesman on the Foreign Relations

Aisfcaiuaj

Coiirmittee,

the

to bring

a Republican member of the coiranittee (Gresham suggested Senator John

Shetman of Ohio) to his office to read the correspondence In private
and then report back to the ConsTiittee.

Gresham warned Morgan, considered

by some an um/illing defender of Cleveland's policy, that:
Publication at this time of the correspondence taight
The Chinese Minister tells me tncX he is
be haraf ul
daily expecting his copy of the treaty betv/eea Chlr^a and the
United States for exchange of ratifications, and the treaty
between this governtnent and Japan v^s only sent to the
Senate yesterday. There are some things in the correspcnderice
the publication of v;hich might irritate China, perhaps offend
her. 34
.

The Secretary of State penned an identical letter to Senator Sher?nan
and evidently convinced the two lawmakers that they should try to curb

Lodge's Senate criticis3ii of the administration.
The question of releasing the spy case

December 5th.

docuniei^ts

was debated oa

Shem^an suggested that the whole jnatter be referred to

the CojBmittee on Foreign Relations rather than dumped on the Senate.
This afforded Lodge an opportunity to criticize the State Departnisnt.
the two
•The llassachusetts Senator iir.plied that the failure to protect
htuoanity
Japanese "is an act of the greatest possible discredit to the

of the United States and to the huiijanity of all civilised men."

Citing

Ralph's article as his evidence, Lodge assumed that the Japanese,
most hideous
relying on Atiierican good offices, were turned over to "the

torture that it is possible to conceive."
c^;planntion is duo to the

Like

Sherxiian,

A.;r.erican

The Senator stated that "an

people for such an Incident.

sent
Senator Morgan also asked that the affair b^
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to the Foreign Relations Conmiittee since "war is flagrant betv7een Japan

and China, and the least interference on the part of the Senate of the

United States which might be considered as favoring the one side or
the other of those belligerents would be an unfortunate circumstance

at this particular time."

Pressed to explain why he thought the

resolution should go to the committee, Morgan defended the administration

Kc contended that imputations of guilt against the President, the
Secretary of State or American diplomatic agents in China ought to be
most carefully considered before being publicly debated on the floor
of Congress.

Lodge insisted that his resolution had simply called for tha
facts of the case and he could not understand why it would influence

American relations with China and Japan.

Then the Republican Senator

revealejd a deeper motive for wanting to bring the issue before the

Senate:

have done a good deal of unproductive, if not mischievous,
Ei.eddling in that war already, bt-ginning by warning Japan
from interfering with Korea, when the war was between China
and Japan and not between Japan and Korea. From that time
©rs we have been meddling in one way or another, and I think
Mr. President, that it seems an extraordinary objection to
Exake new to an inquiry as to facts to be told that we may
render our relations uncomfortable with either China or
I propose this inquiry because I think on the
.
Japan •
facts ss stated to the people of the United States we are
pxit in an attitude which is simply hundliating and disgraceful. If it be true that we gave up these men to torture
and to death without a single inquiry after we had an understanding with the Chinese Government that we should give
©afe conduct to just such citizens in order to get theni out
©f that country, then a heavy burden of misdoing rests on
somebody* ^
J'B

.

.

.

Despite Lodge's pleas,

Sherrr.an's

motion to defer the question to the

cosimittee passed and the Senate recessed for the holidays.
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During this interval Gresham wrote to the senior Denby, who
at last had arrived in Peking: "The v?holc correspondence will go to

Congress when it assembles after the holidays and some of your son's
despatches may and doubtless will be seized upon by the Republicans in
their effort to damage the State Department."

He complained that all

of this trouble could have been averted had Jernigan acted promptly

on his Instructions.

In closing Gresham told Denby, "I do not expect

any real trouble to come from the matter, however, and hope you will
37

not let it annoy you."

Even so, the spy case continued to annoy Gresham, weakening his
health, and increasing his irascibility.

The Secretary turned on

Yang Yu for what he believed was the Chinese minister's betrayal of
trust xn having promised that the Chinese would wait for Denby 's return

before pimishing the two Japanese.

Gresham wrote Yang, "I regret to

eay that there is reason to believe that the men were executed before
the return of Colonel Denby to Pekin, and therefore, in derogation of

the volxmtary promise which you assured me your Governiiient had made."

The Chinese minister replied that his government had never promised

anything but only to take the matter under consideration and that

Gresham had misunderstood the conversation.

"It was established by

proof that /the two students? had furnished information to their
messages
Government by means of ciphers in which seventy six telegraphic
troops and
in all were sent by them, giving reports of the movement of

of military matters."

Hence, Yang concluded, the Chinese government

justice.
could not wait for the American minister's return to dispense
Gresfersn

but Yang Yu
pressed the issue in further correspondence
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refused to debate it, assuring Greshani that their differences were

merely

a

regrettable misunderstanding.

38

Incensed by the epithet that "the blood of these tortured and

murdered Japs is on his head," as well as by F^alph's accusations,
Greshara tried to win a more favorable press.

He compiled an unsigned

defense for the New Y ork Evening Post, and that paper's editor agreed
that, while the execution of the

tvjo

Japanej^e was unfortunate, "it

seems that the outcry lately raised against Secretary Gresbsra for not

preventing it is as disproportionate to the occasion as it is groundless
Ihe ^JSyl^J^S. ^SHSiSi also defended Gresham,

and sensational."

expliiining that while "it may be regrettable that we cannot prevent

such crimes," evers "Japan admitted /th^t/ it is not within our legal

rights to do so."
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The controversy raged through January 1895.
of the documents, combined with Greshara"

s

Public disclosure

oim testimony before the

Senate on January 16, convinced papers such as the New York World^ that
the Secretary of State had "made a blunder vThich

crime

...

seeir^s

to be almost a

his surrender of the two Japanese students to be tortured

and put to death by the Chinese at Shanghai appears to have been wholly

unjustified."

The World maintained that even Charles Denby believed

that the Japanese "boys" were "probably guiltless," raising serious

doubts es to whether Gresham had any evidence that they were spies.
l?'SL

l2lit

mind?"
Bierely wondered: "Is Gresham in his right

to
Ironically, Denby himself in a confidential dispatch sent

Gresham on December

31

(though not received by the State Department

of the
until March 1) supplied evidence that at least one

trvo

victims
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had been part of an elaborate spy network in China.

Denby gathered

information about the training and procedure of Japanese espionage
agents and noted that at one time there vere as many as thirty spies
in Shanghai alone.

"I have it on the best authority," the minister said,

"that one of the alleged Japanese spies vho was arrested at Shanghai,

and over whose fate so many tears have been shed, was one of these

detailed officers."

Denby disclosed that every village in the projected

war zone had been infiltrated by Japanese agents disguised as
storekeepers, raonks, laborers, merchants and students.

"Ihis infor^

mation, I think you will agree v;ith me, tends greatly to

sliov

that a

vast amount of undeserved sympathy has been wasted on Japjmcse spies,
Even Jernigan admitted that one

both in our own country and in this."
of the Japanese students was a spy.

He told Assistant Secretary Uhl

that, had he been allowed to try the case, he would "probably have
41

committed one and liberated the other."

While these revelations eased some minds, they could not affect
the central problei:is raised by the case.

The State Department had

created a broad general policy without first giving thought to its
practical impleraentation.

Forced to send precise directions to its

agents in Asia, it learned too late that this task was impossible.
ttie

United States continued to employ its good offices to register

belligerents
Japanese in China and Chinese citizens in Japan, to urge the
eventually
not CO attack enemy merchant ships and lighthouse tenders and
to open channels of ccmn'.unication for peace negotiations.

None of

these functions, however, embarrassed the United States so much as

promises based upon the vague assumption that good offices meant

protection of subjects of one country residing in enemy territory.
Prompted by a sense of principle, the administration had made a

kind of promise which could have one of
prorflise

tv:o

results; to keep the

would certainly destroy American neuti^ality and might even

lead to dangerous involvement, v;hile not to keep it would result in

humiliation.

The administration endured the latter, a burden which

weighed most heavily upon the shoulders of the Secretary of State*
His friends considered it an important cause for the rapid deterioration
of his health, leading to the Secretary's death in the spring of 1895-

CHAPTERV
THE BATTLES AT PING YANG AND YALU

After reports of the Kowshing affair in late July, Americans
had anticipated early news of pitched battles betvjeen huge armies
interspersed vjith reports of colossal naval engagements.

Instead

they received rumors of minor skiTrmishes between Chinese and Japanese
foragers.

China and Japan had utilized the first month of the war

to strengthen their positions in Korea.
earthv';orks around

The Chinese had built massive

the northern garrison town of Ping Yang, while at

Chemulpo squadrons of Japanese transports unloaded troops and supplies.

Minister Sill and his legation secretary, Horace Allen, both agreed
that conditions in Korea were unusually calm.

Lacking exciting news, Americans continued to speculate upon
the scope of coming battles,

the terrible barbarities which were

certain to result, Chinese court rivalries and other oriental intrigues

On one day China was said to have purchased the Chilean

na^'y,

while on

armistice.
the next the Asian rivals were described as discussing an

inordinate
The smallest event, so long as it was concrete, received

attention.

An example occurred on September 14, when the State

of Boston,
Department decided to send Lieutenant Michael J. O'Brien

and Cavalry
an instructor of military art at Fort Leavenworth Infantry

School, to travel with the Japanese aimy.

Hie Richn^.d StaL^ predicted

Japanese general.
"If our army officer, attached to the staff of the
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should be taken prisoner, the Chinese government would behead
and apologize to the United States government later."

hira

first

2

American observers in Asia believed that the month of silcnca
suggested preparations for a major battle somev7herc in northern Korea.

Admiral Charles C. Carpenter, studying the steady debarkation of

Japanese infantry, cavalry and artillery at CheTnulpo, related to
Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert that a battle appeared imminent.
Concurrently, Allen ascertained that as many as 108,000 Chinese troops

were now facing two Japanese army corps of pe^rhaps 70,000 men at the
3

city of Ping Yang.
The aiicient walled stronghold of Ping Yang dominated the road

through northern Korea to Manchuria.

During August the Chinese

reinforced the massive walls with loopholcd and moated earthworks,

garrisoned by picked soldiers reportedly armed with American Winchester
rifles and supported by Krupp and Catling guns.

Tne six Chinese

generals flying their banners at Ping Yang were confident that their
lines of infantry, artillery and select llanchurian cavalry, brandishing

fifteen foot lances, would check the invading "dwarf -men" (iiOjJ^n)
from Japan.

Chinese officers cavorted with Ping Yang*s supple dancing

girls, V7hile their soldiers broke into Korean homes and made themselves
4
comfortable with the city's wives and daughters.

Japanese General Oshima, at the head of a coluran of highlyhills.
trained infantry, watched Chinese revelry from the surrounding
the
Taking advantage of the situation, Oshima's soldiers attacked

Chinese
southern outer forts and after heavy fighting drove cut the

defenders.

force and
Three additional Japanese units joined Cshima's
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systematically began to assault Ping Yang in bayonet charges covered

by devastating rifle and artillery fire.

At first the Manchu army

inflicted heavy casualties with the repeating rifles, but soon the

Japanese learned to hug the ground and let the Chinese fire furiously
and ineffectively until they ran out of atnnunition.

Ihen Oshinia's

men charged, and often the defenders threv down their empty rifles and
fled into the countryside.

The only Ajnerican correspondent at Ping

Yang, dapper James Creelman of the

Nev;

York World

,

reported the

intensity of the battle:
Blood, blood everywhere- «on the walls, in the rippling
river, on the green hillsides, in the flowering valleys.
Blood trickling over gravestones, blood dashed against
the vails of the ancient temples, blood on the rocks,
blood on the roof-tops-'evers^-^here the cold gleam of
steel in the swirling cannon mist and sheeted flame *
.

^
«

.

The reporter also noted the torrential rains which inundated the

battlefield during most of the twenty-two hour contest for Ping Yang
and turned the fields into a quagmire of mud and mangled men and horses.

The Japanese repulsed £uicid3l charges by the ^^3nchurian cavalry, then

penetrated the inner defenses of the city.

The Chinese garrison

retreated, allegedly cutting off the heads and hands of dead and wounded

Japanese as they retired.

The Japanese victory at Ping Yang was complete

and Chinese armies fled from Korea.
Tlic

first news of the battle reached the United States through

and then
dispatches transmitted to London from Shanghai and Tientsin

sent on to New York,

China
Ihe dispatch of September 15 announced that

had turned back the Japanese attack at Ping Yang,

^^lis

was refuted the

Tokyo, claiming
next day by a report from the Central News Agency in
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that the Japanese had gained the victory*

The Atlanta Constitution ,

for one, accepted the Japanese version, noting that "Jackson's defeat

of the British at New Orleans fell far short of this showing
Septerrl>er 18

American newspapers were in general agreement that the

Chinese had been "utterly routed" at Ping Yang*

Inaccurate initial

accounts of the battle were blamed on the Reuters
"foists"

riev?s

By

nev/s

sci-vice which

cooked in London legations off on the American press.

Newspapers began to rely upon the United Press Service which provided
Central News Agency dispatches from Tokyo, thus assuring a pro«Japanesc
press treatment

6

America's major newspapers--including the A tlan ta Cons t i tut ion

Baltimore Araerican, Boston Herald, New York Tribune, New York
Standard Ujlion,

£hijL§5^£lpM5. llHHiE.^'

end others'-pr^iised Japan's great victory,

Sa^n

Francij:co

"Ping Yang

v;as

V.|£rld_,

Ex-.rniTig.r

not a matter

of luck," the Boston Herald explained, "but the result of scientific

preparation and calculation

•

.

.

inspired with an intelligence equal

to that exhibited by many Europesn governments."

After surveying the

week's press treatment of Ping Yang, Public Opinion magazine concluded
that Japan "has won for herself what has heretofore been persistently

denied her, a degree of admiration and respect that insure her hereafter
an equsl place among the civilized powers of the world."

The Army and

Navy Hegister, while praising Japan's "superior strategy," warned that

China might quickly replenish her losses and that this Japanese victory
could merely prolong the war and force China to resist change.

7

Some Americans questioned the facile tendency to equate military

prowess with superior civilization.

Pveporting that after the victory
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"the atmosphere /in Japan/ is electric vith spirit of war
is mad with enthusiasm
Jarnes Creelrnan

.

.

.

•

.

.

the army

the Government is drunk with egotism,"

suggested that Ping Yang augured a spirit of unhealthy

militarism in Asia and hinted that Japan would one day become a threat
to the Western pov/ers.

The Eoston Globe noted that "having shown her

power as a scientific murderer, Japan has earned the right to be counted
among the civilized nations of the world."

missionary in Kyoto,
commented:

"'j?hese

v:ho

Dwight W. Learned, an American

observed closely Ping Yang's influence on Japan,

victories naturally stimulate Japanese self-confidence

and the feeling seems to be rapidly grov?ing that it is Japan's mission
to lead all Asia, and after regenerating China to stimulate aid to India

for independence."

Despite these prophetic warnings, the meraory of

Ping Yang faded as news of another monumental battle reached the United
States.

g

While

the battle for Ping Yang raged, units of the Chinese and

Japanese navies gathered in the Yellow Sea.

In July and August both

the specialized and general press in /unerica had commented on the naval

strength of the two combatants, predicting that a Sino-Japanese war

might be the testing ground for modern warships.

Noting that Annapolis

had graduated two Japanese naval officers each year since 1872 and that
"the Japanese officers are faithful students of Captain Mahan, the
Araerican naval historian," a number of obsei-vers viewed the Japanese

navy C3 an American protege and waited for the titanic encounter that

would prove its superiority.

As Captain Benjamin Franklin Day of the
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Baltimore stated, "the Annapolis men among them (the Japanese navy)
are the smartest sailors and have the most important commands."

The

coming test betv^ecn the navies of China and Japan would be the
"greatest naval war" since the American Civil War.

encounter vould also provide technical information.

The predicted
"The navies of

China and Japan contain specimens of about all the various types of
ships V'hich have been evolved in the last generation and a great deal
of light will doubtless be thrown upon their relative utility."

9

The Japanese fleet cruising near Ping Yang in early September

1894 included a "flying squadron" of British-built cruisers Yoshlno
Takachiho> N5niv7a and Akitsushima

.

,

already battle-tested in the brief

encounter with Chinese warships and transports on July 25,

The 4150-

ton steel cruiser X£5Mii2.» reputed to be the fastest ship in the world

when tested in 1893, was armed with an assortment of quick-firing guns
and five fixed torpedo tubes.

The other three cruisers all displaced

over 3,000 tons and, although not capable of the Yos hino'

s

tv/enty- three

knots, could maintain a steady eighteen or nineteen knots under full

These unarmored steel cruisers shared basically the same light-

steam.

calibre, quick-firing attributes of the Yoshino and together they

comprised a tough and mobile group designed to intercept and destroy

convoys

On September

17a

larger Japanese squadron under Vice-Admiral

Ito, an imposing figure with his heavy epaulettes and cabre-scarred

face, joined the "flying squadron" at Kaiyang Island near the mouth

of the Yalu River.
Hp.shidate,

Ito's group contained the HatsushiLia, Itsuku shima ,

Chiy^a, Fu^o.

Kiyei., Akagi and Sniky o.

The first three
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were coastal defense ships built by the French betv/een 1889-1891.
Slower than the cruisers but each displacing 4,277 tons, ^rmed with
thirty~tv?o ton Canet guns in opan-topped barbettes with tvelve-inch

armor plate and further equipped with a large number of small, quickfiring guns, the Matpu shima, Itsukushima and Hashidate provided the

backbone of the fleet.

Tney were reinforced by the armored 2450 -ton

British-built cruiser Chiyod a and the ancient, bark-rigged Fu?o, a
former British iron-armored cor\'ctte*

The obsolete armored cruiser

Hiyei , the dispatch gunboat Akagji and the cumbersome, armed merchant
^^^P Saikyq brought up the rcar.^^

Early on the morning of the 17th the Japanese fleet npotted the
smoke of a large group of ships approaching from the east.

This was

the Chinese Peiyang squadron under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-ch*ang,
a former Anhvrei army general.
Geriiian-buil

t

The Chinese fleet boasted two 7430-tcn

battleships, the Chen Yuan and the Ting Yuan, reputed to

be more powerful than the Maine or Texas of the United States Navy*

A

f ourtcen-inch armor belt and four twelve-inch Krupp cannons protected

the Yuan sister ships.

Ten German and British-constructed cruisers
ft

II

If

accompanied the battleships.

The Lai-Yuan, Ping -Yuan and the Chin.<>-Yuan

all displaced over 2,800 tons and, though slower than their Japanese

opponents, carried heavier armor.

battleships and armored cruisers

Assorted vessels supported the

— including

the two Armstrong ram

cruisers, Ch'ao Yung^ and Yan^^ Wei, the 2300-ton unarmored cruisers

Chih-Yuan and Chinp Yuan, the gunboat Kuang^
SiiS^S. ZyiS.

Shl3.*

2355-ton steel cruiser Chi- Yuan .-

torpedo cruiser

China possessed

a number of other steel warships in the southern-based Nanyang, Fukien
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and Kwantung squadrons, but the lack of central contmand, combined

v?ith

provincial jealousy, had prevented their concentration in northern
vaters.

Nevertheless the Chinese squadron which steamed toward the

Korean coast appeared more than the equal of the Japanese fleet.

Aboard were several foreign advisers, including an American Annapolis*
trained naval mercenary, Philo Norton McGiffin, to offset the Japanese

Annapolis graduates.
The fleets closed, the smaller Chinese warships strung out line

abreast on either side of the

tx*70

battleships, forming a loose wedge*

This formation offered the battleships

reduced their laanauverability .

Tnaximura firepov/er

but greatly

Western advisers later clairaed that

this formation had been ordered by the cowardly captain of the Ting^

Yuan to protect his own ship in the center-

Ihe Japanese sprinted

forward in single-file formation or line ahead, the four cr-uisers of
the '^flying squadron" suddenly veering off and attacking the Chinese

flank while the main squadron crossed in front of, then around, the

Chinese formation.

Tne Kwang- Pirx^^ and the Ping-Yuan slipped away

either to divert part of the Japanese fleet or, as some later claimed,
in cowardly retreat.

12

The Japanese concentrated on the main group, singling out the
slower, weaker vessels for destruction, sinking the Ch'ao Yung and

Yang Wei before attacking the battleships*

The engagejnent fragmented

into smaller group battles, the Chinese also first attacking the

weakest Japanese ships,
^Ai^eS,

Tne Ting. Yuan poured heavy fire into the

then turned on the Saikyo, destroying the latter's steering gear

and starting a fire*

The Lai Yuan led the attack on the small Aka^-i,
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ripping away masts and riddling its funnel.

Japanese vessels slipped

av;ay,

found themselves bct^.reen

tv?o

and suddenly

Somehow the damaged
tlie

Chinese battleships

lines of Japanese cnaisers.

For six

hours the opposing groups exchanged fire, hurling projectiles at each
II

other until the Chen Yuan alone had sustained over four hundred hits*
McGiffin, adviser on that battleship, reported that the Japanese
"rapid firing cannon" of four, five and six- inches pumped shot after
shot into the Chinese vessels and "riddled the Chinese Superstructures

with them; disabling unprotected guns, and driving their crews away,
besides setting on fire boats and all £th^/ wood work in unprotected
parts of the ship/'

Japanese shells, houever, could not penetrate the

fourteen-inch annor belt of the battleships, and as dusk settled around
the sniOke"Obscured battle area the Japanese v?ithdrev7, fearing that

Chinese torpedo boats lurking on the fringes of the conflict would move
in and attack their criiisers.^^
Tiie

Japanese had sunk the weak cruisers Ch'ao

Yung^, XSIIS. KSi'

Chih-Yuan and King Yuan without the loss of a single vessel.

German
II

mercenary Constantin von Kanneken, in charge of guns on the Ting Yuan,
later blamed corrupt officials and inferior technicians for having
supplied the battleships with armor-piercing shells instead of the more

effective bursting anjiiunition.

"It's as clear as daylight that if the

Chiner.e had had the right thing in their big guns,

they would have
14

punished the Japs very severely, and perhaps

vron

the battle*"

The

reninants o£ the deraoralieed Chinese fleet limped into Port Arthur for

repairs.

'S'lie

liiain

fleet still existed; but Japan now effectively

controlled the sea routes to China and northern Korea without which she
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could not have carried on land operations during the next few months.

The State Department learned by ciphered telegr^ira on September 19

that a naval battle had occurred off the inouth of the Yalu River*

Charles Denby Jr. informed Greshara that the Chinese had lost at least
five vessels and the Japanese three.

gunboat Konocacy

,

Coiranander Robert E.

Impey of the

then at Tientsin, repeated Dev-by's report, giving the

names of the Chinese ships believed lost.

At the same time the Japanes

legation in Seoul first insisted that Japan had destroyed eleven

Chinese varshipSj then later lov/ered the estimate to seven while noting
that the Hatsushina, Hiyei and Akagj had suffered "soma damage."

By

September 21, cables transmitted from Tokyo had convinced the American
governiiient that Japan had not lost a single ship at Yalu.
Nev;s of

16

the "great naval battle" excited American naval experts

proceeded to study the effects of naval gunnery

end newspapermen

V7ho

on steel plate.

As the anti-war Nation complained, "they rather

exclaim with a sort of bastard scientific enthusiasm, 'By Jove' old
Krupp was right after all!'"

But the popular press and specialized

journals ignored E. L. Godkin's criticism and filled their columns with

analyses of the Yalu battle.

For example, the Scientific America n

called the battle "the most important naval engagement since the advent
of iron and steel in shipbuilding."

As the Engineeri ng News stated,

"Tests of guns and armor on a government proving ground are well enough
but this cannot compare with the tests of an actual battle" such as Yali

Newspapers echoed this theme.

The New Orleans Picayune predicted
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that Yalu would be "carefully studied" as "the first practical test

in actual warfare of many of the

modem appliances

for naval defense/'

Stating that Yalu proved cruisers and small fast gunboats

co^jld

defeat heavily-armored large battleships, the New York Tribune believed that the lesson of "Japan's Trafalgar" was "too obvious to
need further emphasis."

At the same time the Springfield Republican

editorialized that Yalu "enjoys the distinction of being the first sea

modem conditions

fight of any magnitude, under
guns and heavy armor

•

.

•

of steam, high-pov:er/^ed_/

and on this account alone it must possess

considerable historical importance, V7hatever it's l_sic/ political
results may be."

18

The popularity of the naval battle prompted several Americans

supposedly serving on Chinese v/arships to capitalize on the publicity.
Raymond H. Hornbrook, claim.ing to have been an engineer on the illfated Yang

Wei_,

sold his stories of the action for five dollars a column

to the San Francisco Ch ronicle and the New York Sun,

According to

Hornbrook (or at least as the San Francisco Examiner asserted, an
"inebriated reporter" who doctored Hornbrook's stories), the Yan^

^Tei

had not really been sunk but had single-handedly held off the entire

Japanese fleet and, once it had run cut of ammunition, had escaped the
swift Japanese cruisers.

The r*ecord speed of the Chinese warship,

Hornbrook claim.ed, had been achieved by adding "a fresh bottle of gin"
to each stoker.

The E xaminer

,

a rival of the Chronicle

paper cf "Hornbrooking" the public.

,

accused that

The Chroni cle had "manufactured"

the stories and "humbugged" its readers with "a cheap outlay."

19

In

fact, the Examiner doubted that Hornbrook ever had served on the Yan

Wej
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and subsequent investigations confirmed the suspicion.

Yalu also made a short-term hero out of the American adviser on
n

the Chen Yuan

,

Phllo Norton McGiffin.

presence at Yalu.

No one doubted KcGif fin's

He had served as a naval instructor for Li Hung-chang

since 1885 and when the Sino-Japanese War broke out had volunteered
for sea duty.

During the battle, McGiffin suffered

a concussion,

partial loss of sight and lacerations--and he had pictures to prove it.
Th^

Nev;

Orleans J^ipitSiS^ claimed that this "plucky ex-American naval

officer" vas really a hero, vith a Japanese rev/ard on his head for
The Century MagaEivie published his story and Richard Harding

$5000,

Davis later included him in his collection of great war heroes.

For

a

time, McGiffin lectured on naval strategy and was cited by experts as

an authority on the subject of modern naval warfare.

But when William

Ferdinand Tyler, a British adviser at the Yalu battle, revealed that
McGiffin, "queer before the fight," had contracted a "curious case of
partial brain affection" after the battle, becoming a "Yalu-maniac"
and telegraphing his exploits around the world, the public lost interest
in the hero.

McGiffin later shot himself with his

in a New York hospital.

service revolver

20

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan
worship.

ov;n

tnade far

better material for hero

Reporters rushed to Gravesend, England, where the Captain was

holding court aboard the cruiser Chicago.
naval expert explained the meaning of Yalu.

Here the world-rcnowncd
The Chinese fleet, he said,

had suffered from its duty to protect the troop convoys and consequently

operated too close to shore, enabling the Japanese to cut down its
Eianeuverabilitv.

"It was a big engagement for modern vessels but

I
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see nothing yet to lead me to suppose that the engagement will point
to the reconstruction or remodeling of V7ar vessels."

privately on

Comiaenting

Yalu battle to his friend in the Royal Engineers,

tlhe

Major Sir George Clarke, Mahan said that the Sino-Japanese naval
display reinforced his own theories that modern warfare could not be
conducted without a "fleet superior" to a "fleet in being."

22

For

Americans, Mahan was the greatest naval expert and since Japan had won
they concluded that the Japanese had followed Mahan* s teachings.

"Looking on the tactics and the results as a whole, they are flattering
to Ainericans, for the Japanese are pupils of Captain Mahan and the

Chinese are not

.

.

.

."
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Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert scrutinized battle
details more diligently than did Mahsn and

raost of the

others.

Herbert,

ex-Confederate war hero and ardent expansionist, hoped to use the
"lessons" of Y-alu to stimulate interest in Congress and in the public
for increased ^r^val appropriations.

Tnough his critics asserted that

he "did not toow the difference between a man-of-war and a wash-tub,"
Herbert actually had studied naval problems as chairman of the Senate
coiimixttee for^ naval appropriations and always had been sensitive to

the criticism that the American navy was second-rate.

Herbert

sjas
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collecting a scrapbook of news clippings concerning

naval action during the Sino-Japanese War.

Despite popular acclaim for

the £t?ift cruisers supposedly victorious at Yalu, the Secretary paid
particislar attention to one clipping from the New York World of

Septonber 2Bth.

war

s^Lachines.'*

"Ihe two Chinese battleships proved to be formidable
the World had noted.

"They stood the battering of
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heavy, quick-firing guns admirably

.

.

.

their upper structures were

severely damaged, but no shot penetrated to any vital part/'
naval officers supported this pro-battleship view.

Other

At the New York

meeting of naval architects and constructors held in November, RearAdrairal Richard W, Meade, Jr. specified that *'there was nothing

connected V7ith the Yalu fight which disproves the hitherto generally

accepted theory of the superiority of the battle-ship as a fighting
vessel."

Meade called for construction of more large battleships for

the United States Navy,
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Herbert received a copy of a private letter written by Philo

McGiffin to

a friend at the

Norfolk Hydrographic Office (Virginia)

on November 13 which stressed the need for battleships.

McGiffin, at

this time still regarded as an authority, wrote that he preferred

"battle-ships /ironclad^/ by all means for fighting."

He stressed the

efficiency of rapid-firing guns and observed that all vjoodwork should

be removed from warships because of the extreme fire hazard,

McGiffin

concluded that Chinese "official corruption and inefficiency," as well
as Japanese strategy and tenacity, had accounted for their victory,
.

not the superiority of cruisers over battleships.
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On December 12 Herbert received another letter, this one a
lengthy discussion of Yalu from the New York City police commissioner,

Theodore Roosevelt.

Roosevelt revealed to the Secretary of the Navy

that he had obtained a detailed description of the battle and damage to

ships from a friend whom he preferred not to name (actually Speck von

Sternburg, military attache in the German Legation at Peking).

Slipping

over to Port Arthur, Roosevelt's friend had examined the Chinese fleet
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immediately after the battle and reported that "they had received the
most terrific hammering, and if it had not been for their excellent
iron-clads, which did most of the fighting, under control of foreigners,
not a ship v?ould have returned."

The letter concluded that "the most

powerful cruisers cannot successfully fight ironclads

.
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Roosevelt's letter prompted Herbert to write an article about
Yalu, "The Fight off the Yalu River," which appeared in the November

edition of the North American RevieW

American press that future wars

'

vjould

Critical of suggestions in the

be fought by

sv^ift,

unarmored

cruisers rather than heavy battleships, the Secretary asked: "Is there

anything in the recent naval developments to justify the conclusion
that the days of the battle-ship are ended?"

After surveying the Yalu

battle, Herbert sunalsed that "certainly there is nothing in these
facts to induce the conclusion towards which so many writers seem to

have been straining, that instead of battle-ships we should rely on
cruisers as fighting-vessels."

In fact, Herbert suggested, battle-

ships should be improved and equipped with better armor.

Consequently

he urged Congress to authori:ie the construction of additional battleships, as well as torpedo boats and to replace older guns on existing

ships with rapid-fire six-inch batteries.

In closing Herbert warned

Americans that the Yalu battle carried a lesson "our country must heed.
Unless either China or Japan is to be wiped off the map as an independent
nation, the United States are to have west of them two nations each

both
steadily increasing its naval power, while our trade relations with
are rapidly becoming more intricate and more complicated."
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Cleveland and Gresham had often suffered severe criticism for
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their uncertain Asian policies, but Herbert's aggressive analysis of

Yalu drew one of the most virulent
official during the course of the

r.ttsck.?

made on a government

E. L.

V/ar.

Godkin's Natio n cUs-.

paraged Herbert's acticle, claiming that the "erstwhile inoffensive

Congressman" had undergone a "metamorphosis" into

bully of the sea."

a

"bloodthirsty

The Nation charged:

In the last Nort h Arra rican Reyievj he has an article on
the lessork3 of the Yalu seafight, in which there is not
a vord of syiTipathy for victims or survivors, not a line
in deprecation of our ov7n country ever being dra^m into
war, but only and every*7here anxiety about making our
battleships bigger and more deadly. Is it any vonder
that when the head of the department takes such a tone,
a subordinate shovild drav7 a fancy picture of a *'hell
of death and destruction," and print it in a popular
magazine as th|gkind of thing naval officers think about,
day and night?

Yalu, in fact, accelerated the administration's desire to

strengthen its navy in Asian waters.

While Gresham and Cleveland had

wanted a larger fleet to protect American neutrality, Herbert sought

more ships to study naval warfare and gather infomiation firsthand.
IhB Secretary of the Navy pushed for additions to the Asiatic fleet

while sending detailed instructions to Admiral

C. C.

Navy Department policy and strategy during the war.

Carpenter concemin
Herbert cabled the

coa::niander-in-chief of the American Asiatic squadron on September 24th

that the Navy Department desired the stationing of permanent warships

at Kewchwang and at Chingkieng.

"It is the wish of this Department

that a ship shall be kept at each of the ports mentioned and that the

vessels of your squadron shall be so distributed that every protection
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may be given to American citizens and particularly to the missionaries."

30

The Secretary ordered Carpenter to cooperate with other

naval pov?ers to protect foreigners at the treaty ports.

Tnen he

reminded the Admiral that one of his primary missions was to gather
inf oririation

action,"

,

especially "careful reports desired on ships injured in

Herbert vested Carpenter

vrith all

necessary powers to send

intelligence officers to the eneray fleets as veil as permission to sail
as close as possible to sites of hostilities.

Ihe Department, Herbert

added, would try to assist by sending additional ships, four of which--

X2j(^^^>

l^h^t'leston,

join the Asiatic squadron.
you in

co^irnand of a

Machias and Detroit--were already slated to
"The arrival of these vessels will place

large squadron, from which the Department expects

energetic and efficient work."
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Ping Yang and Yalu further excited public interest in the Sino-

Japanese conflict,

vrnile the two battles fulfilled the expectations of

technical observers, and while Yalu reinforced the arguments of

battleship advocates, the engagements were even more useful to sensational journalists.

Japan's overwhelming victories fulfilled the

heroic role forecast for her.

She had applied western technology and

a particularly American style of strategy in her initial triumphs.

Washington's policy of strict neutrality must have seemed unbelievable
to those who observed the highly-partisan enthusiasm of the teerican

public in its discttsjslon of Japan's successes.

CHAPTER

VI

BARBARISM VERSUS CIVILIZATION

Japan's victories at Ping Yang and Yalu crystallized earlier

pro«Japanese sentiment in the United States even if this mood threw
into question the country's self-defined role as impartial arbiter in

Asia,

Vicarious pride

v/as

provided by the obvious superiority of

Japanese technological and military development.

Commentators appeared

comfortable in their assumptions that western civilization had triumphed
on the Korean battlefields.

"It can hardly be said that the news

v/as

a surprise, for all the advantages of an advanced and progressive

civiliziation were oa the side of the smaller pov;er," the Coairuercial^

Chronicle commented, "and is it not fair to add that seldom has any
nation, in a war not purely patriotic or for self-preservation, been

more entitled to the world's sympathy and encouragement?"

The only

way that Americans could ever sympathize with China, the New Orleans
Picayune added, would be if the Chinese removed their "troublesome

pigtails."

"If they want to lick the Japs, they must let down their

back hair, have it cut, and wade into war without a hitch.

"^

In the weeks after Yalu discussion of the war, both at the

popular and scholarly levels, focused on an evaluation of Asian cultures
in the context of American conceptions of historical development,

progress and Social Darvvinism.

China and Japan provided a laboratory

civilization.
for the testing of attitudes concerning the meaning of
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Americai^s explained the fact that 40 million people were

defeating 400 million by contrasting the fundamental characteristics
of China and Japan.

"China, in fact, cannot be regarded as a nation

in the same sense as are the nations of the West," senior China

diplomat Charles Denby explained, "because of its provincial diversity
and lack of nrtional awareness."

2
Tlie

regrettable deficiencies in

nationalism aad patriotism, asserted military historian and Harvard
lecturer Theodore Ayrault Dodge,- stenmed from China's organic evolution

According to Dodge, "the body of China

not hoinogeneously sentient

\7as

as if the nervous system of the mass was so subdivided that a lesion
to one part did not reach the nervous center of the whole structure,"

China's bulk alone could not

V7in a V7ar

against organized and unified

Japan, Dodge noted, any more than the "Persian hosts" could defeat the

Greeks
Tne theme of Chinese venality also pervaded American analyses of
the var*

effort •

Official corruption hindered an effective and concerted war

Treccherous officials, particularly the Empress Dowager's

chief eunuch, Li Lien-ying, reportedly siphoned off funds allocated
for prosecution of the war; while indifferent Chinese citizens turned

their backs on their country's struggle.

"Piles of shells mzde of mud

have been exhibited as the real article," Denby informed Gresham.
"Provisions have proved worthless, high priced guns useless, regimental
lists of men have been fictitious; commanding officers have embezzeled

military funds; men have gone without psy."

Chinese warships even

passed inspection armed with huge cannon balls of black-painted clay.

Forced coolie labor cut wood for harbor defense booms as contractors
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charged the government for regular wage labor.
Social Darwini sts in the United States explained China's lack
of national awareness, as

V7ell

as its inherent corruption, in terras of

the biological "inertness" of the Mongol race.

The Chinese were not

exactly a diseased race, Tlieodore Dodge declared; indeed many Chinese
lads were rugged men "who would be marked down for football-players in

any American college."

But even if he looked robust, the "Chinaman is

filthy in mind, body, and estate."

The lethargic and slovenly Chiiaaman

could best serve the V7orld, according to this theory, as a "mere human

animal" because his "nervous structure is less fine than the Ar>^an*s."
Paradoxically, these sub-hitman traits v?ere sometimes spoken of as

military assets.

The Chinese could "endure unblcnched the pain of a

surgical operation which would seriously compromise the reactionary

power of most white men."

Theodore Roosevelt, then police commissioner

in New York City, shared this evaluation of Chinese racial attributes.

He received sketches of Chinese infantry, clearly resembling monkeys

with long pigtails, from his friend in Peking, Speck von Sternburg.
The latter, noting that Roosevelt's police force had tested its
revolvers on cori^ses to measure the effects of gunshot wounds,
walked
explained that he had examined pistol wounds of Chinese who had
320 miles over the Liaotung Peninsula and had survived.

"E-H-tat

German
fighting material you could make out of those chaps!" the
official told Roosevelt.

The future President fully concurred.^

and
Lucius H. Foote, the first American Envoy Extraordinary

interpretation of the
Minister Plenipotentiary to Korea, added his ovm

Chinese condition.

"personal
A "cumbersome bureaucracy" motivated by
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aggrandizement" dominated China's "densely ignorant" population,

breeding an atmosphere cf distrust and national apathy.

Chjna, Foote

stated, "has always been an enigma among nations, exclusive, anomalous

and grotesque, she seems to be a petrified relic of the past."

6

A discussion of China's "overplus of superstition" supplemented
the Social Darwinian analysis of the Chinese stereotype.

Chinese

soldiers were portrayed in the United States as evincing "more faith in
their war god and their green dragon than

...

in pov^der and lead" and

they reportedly carried umbrellas, fans and ceremonial chickens into

battle instead of modern rifles.

Chinese villagers, many Americans

believed, refused to dig wells for sanitary conditions in their towns

because they feared that holes v?ould sink the land.

At the same time,

journals such as the C atholic World proved "beyond dispute" that

infanticide and other horrible practices existed on a large scale in
China.

7

llie

Chinese were barbarous as well as

bacfa-zard.

Commenting on

China's offer of rewards for Japanese heads, the Brookly n Standard

Union asserted, "a people that can be guilty of such revolting acts
deserves no sympathy from civilized nations."

Moreover, surrounded by

"effeminate luxuries" as well as an "army of from eight to ten thousand
nation
eunuchs," the Chinese emperor appeared too dissipated to lead his

capable
against anyone; yet at the same time, Americans believed he was
foreign
of '»savage depravity," forcing his subjects, as well as
to the foot
dignitaries, to seek interviews by crawling "like reptiles

cf the throne."

president of
Many probably agreed with Samuel Gorapers,

people held
the American Federation of Labor, that while the American
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"no antipathy" tov/ard Chinese because of their nationality, they were

nevertheless "a people which have allowed civilization to pass them
untouched and uninfluenced, a people who allow themselves to be

barbarously tyrannized over in their own country."

g

Discussion of China's internal imperfections was enough to

stigmatize her wartime image, yet her influence on the rest of Asia
becaiae the subject of even greater condenination*

Durham VfUite Stevens

(the American secretary employed by the Japanese embassy in Washington,

yet claiming to be an impartial observer) insisted that China
threatened to destroy "the genius of enteri)rise and progress" in East

Asia.
froin

Corruption and insurrections in Korea, he apprised, resulted
China's iiEposition of its repressive "system" on the helpless

kingdom.
In all of Korea's domestic dissexisions the hand
of China can be traced. Her influence is secret, but
none the less patent. She shirks responsibility to
other nations, but hesitates at no means--cajoIery
bribery, rrienace--to dominate Korea. Whatever object
her policy may have, its plain result has been to
paralyse progress, and to leave the country weak and
defenceless, a ready victim of foreign aggression.
in Peking,
Rov?ard Martin, a former secretary in the American legation

supported Steven's argument.

Americans had a special interest in the

had helped
outcome of the war in Korea, Martin suggested, because they

open the country to western contact.

Therefore, the United States

a Chinese
should oppose China's repressive presence in Korea since

Oriental
victory would mean "the forcing back of the Koreans to

sentiment and
sluggishness, superstition, ignorance, and anti-foreign

w^thods."

Japanese "Progress"
The Korean war, Martin concluded, pitted

Ill

against Chinese "Extermination."^^
Seeking dramatic contrasts, Americans developed the theme of a

progressive and modernized Japan opening Asia to commerce and
Christianity.

According to this concept, the Japanese, though admittedly

a part of the Mongol race, had adapted gracefully to the modern V7orld,

assimilating western civilization and adopting western technology.

The

Japanese supposedly exemplified Chiistian virtue by their "honest
helpfulness, unending amiability, loyalty to the powers that be, filial

piety in its highest expression, law-abiding {Steadiness, and keen sense
of honor."

The Japanese had learned to respect law even more than the

Aiiglo-Saxons, and were, as Lucius H. Foote insisted, "their equals in

courage and tenacity."

As for the reported superior physical qualities

of the individual Chinaman, a typical view was enunciated by the

expatriate American editor of the Kobe Chronicle, Lafcadio Heam, who
predicted that as Japan progressed, the "Japanese Physique" would also
in a
grow larger, thus eventually offsetting the only Chinese advantage

comparison of the two peoples.

Even more flattering to Japan was the

the Japanese
more widely-held idea that, despite their diminutive size,
of endurance,"
already possessed superior courage and "exceptional power

world."
producing an "infantry able to march to the end of the
of neutrality,
Though soinewhat more restrained due to the policy

discovered means of
even officials of the United States government

praising Japan.
"more, liberal

Tlie

for
President found quite laudable Japan's desire

domestic affairs,
Intercourse, couplete autonomy in her

and full equality in the family of nations."

Grover Cleveland told

Er.pire of today is no
Congress in December of 1894 that "the Japanese
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longer the Japan of the past and our relations with this progressive

nation should not be less broad and liberal than those with other
powers."

Secretary' of State Gresham also sympathized with Japan.

admitted to

Dun that he had alv7ays considered Japan the "most

EdT^3.n

civilised countiry in Asia."
in the present

He

V7ar,

TJiough he would uphold Aiaerican neutrality

Greshara revealed his personal views of the conflict

to Senator wTohn Morgan of Alabajt^a.

"Japan has stepped out into the

light of a better day and she regards the United States as her best
friend."

He hinted that the United States must preserve this friendship

Meanvjhlle, the administration's agent in Nagasaki, W,

Abercrombie,

assured Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Uhl that "history furnishes
no example of such wonderful and rapid progress" than the advancement
of Japan since Commodore Perry opened it to western progress.

12

A short step from unqualified praise of the Japanese was their
correlation with Americans.

As the New York Tribune editorialised,

"the Japanese have for years called themselves 'the Yankees of the
Orient,' and their style of fighting rather goes to support their claim
to the title

•

.

.

their vrarfare against China is going ahead in an

iEEnensely practical businesslike way, and the results of it are

peculiarly American in character."

RuGK)rs that Japan's royal prince

was searching for a wife prorrpted suggestions that, if he could not
find a Match with some European princess

an admirable Empress of Japan.

>

an

Arti.erlcan

woman would

"While the Japanese are dark skinned

the
there is no race prejudice against them in other countries,"
it^J:3Ilt^

Liake

received in
Constitution reroarked, "and they are cordially
„13

barred."
circles where a Chinaman or an East Indian would be
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Japan's "excellent and praisev7orthy" conduct of the war up to
this point had done nothing to detract from her reputation in the

United States*

"The Japanese here are vmder perfect control," Araerican

missionary George Heber Jones revealed from his post at Chemulpo, "for
over tvo nicnths

v:e

have had

thejn

about us by the thousands, but

not seen a drunken soldier at any time*"

I

have

This evoked particular

comment since American legation guards in Seoid allegedly remained

perpetually drunk, carousing and pestering Koreans,
also inspired favorable opinions.

Japanese cormiaanders

Field Marshal Count Aritomo Yamagata

"is a soldier, like Moltke," the New York Heraljd reported; stable,

brilliant and capable of controlling Japan's fiery younger officers.

On the other hand, Americans scorned China's lack of capable military
leadership.

Even the old hero Li Kung-chang had fallen into disrepute.

"Hie much lauded Li Hung Chang is one of the biggest boodlers in

existence," charged American Board missionary

VJiiliara

Scott Ament.

Denby wrote Gresham that "the reputation of Li Rung Chang has been
shown to be based on pretence

....

He is responsible for this

„14

war."

Called China's greatest statesman not many months earlier, Li
had becG^ie an object of ridicule in the American press.

The Boston

Glqbe^ claimed that Li had outlived his usefulness to China and had been

overestimated by the world in the first place.

Wliile

Americans

extolled the virtues of Japanese leaders and soldiers, Li furnished
the subject of several popular ditties:
Li Rung Chang he belly sick,
Alle saniee he get lick;
Chinese n^akee muchee racket,
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Li Hung lost he yelle jacket.
LI Hung he get licked again
On the sea by monkey men;
Alle sainee chilleo weather,
Li Hung lose he peacock feather.
Next time Li Hung he get lick,
Better vatch out belly quick;
There'll be a pretty how-dy do,
And Chang will lose his pigtail, too!

At the same

tirae

the

N£.w

Orleans Picayune pictured its daily "frog"

vjeather forecaster as Li Hung-chang, complete with fan and opium

pipe, followed by poetry alluding to Li's disgrace and China's defeats:

am a Frog Brownie and Heathen Chinee,
And I've hopped all the way from my home o'er the sea.
For the vjorst of your weather is naught to compare
With Che cyclones the Jap pigs are stirring up there.
They've ruined our vessels and slaughtered our troops.
And can:\ot be scared by our hurabugs and V7hoops.
They gobble our money, and frighten our crones.
And I fear they vjill steal all our ancestors' bones
I

Exponents of the barbarism versus civilization theories contended
that the United Stated should not be neutral in this Asian contest

because the war was

a

Japanese crusade introducing Asia to the modern

world, particularly to American ideas and technology.

William Elliot

Grif f is"'f ormer missionary to Japan, teacher, author of the NIkado'
^Tiigire,

and considered one of America's foremost experts on Japan--

procla.imed that the Sino-Japanese War "is one chapter in that eternal

struggle of progress which has been V7ritten with graves of Absolutism,

Divine Right, Slavery, the Holy Roman Empire, Patriarchal Barbarism, the
Inquisition, Theocracy, etc., in the long perspective of its past

triumphs,"

Japan fought for stability and the preservation of peace
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in the Orients Griff if? asserted, and the war v7ould open Korea and China
to western civilization.

"Let us hope that true Americanism and the

work of our nation will be that of the Great Pacific

Power,'' the

missionary stated.

Another Asian expert told readers of the Overland Monthly that
Jap^in should be permitted to reorganize Asia "under the new order of

things" without interference from outside powers.

Japan promised to

cultivate "liberal" elements in Asia and to set Korea on the path to
"culture in its

tn.ie

Others discovered the "hand of God" in

sense."

Japan's victories over China in Korea, breaking down

Chinese resistance to Christianity and civilization.

tVte

walls of

Students of the

war delighted in the prospect of China's ultimate collapse.

They

suggested that the Chinese, unfit to have a govenrnent of their ovm,

would benefit from Japanese domination and reforms.

Some seriously

doubted whether China should even be preserved in its present shape,

although they hesitated to advocate the partition of China by the

European "beasts of prey."

Especially dangerous were the "Russian Bear

and the British Lion" who hungered "to dismember the crippled and

helpless Chinese Empire."^
Rumors persisted in the United States that China stood on the

brink of rebellion.

As early as the middle of September, Consul Sheridan

powerful Dowager
P. Read reported power struggles between Li and the
other for
Empress on one side and the Emperor and his clique on the

control of China's government.

"I pass on these facts as serving to

precipitate to
throw light upon future events, it being not altogether
serious
forecast the downfall of the present dynasty, or at least
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intei-nal disruptions.

l-ieanv/hile,

Chinese-Americans had organized an

anti-Manchu Society called the Gee^Hin g and allegedly conspired to
overthx"Ov; the

Chinese

Eiriperor.

Reports that the Society's leaders had

held a secret meeting in the basement of an Omaha, Nebraska, laundry
stimulated speculation concerning plots by enlightened, Americanized
Chinese.

Hiough Kost commentators expected China's eventual defeat and
collapse, they did not predict a partition of China.

Charles Denby Jr.

admitted the "remote contingency of dissolution of the empire."

But

he doubted that China V70uld completely collapse and believed the

V7ar

vjould benefit that nation by forcing it to enter "the path of western

civilisation."

China's humiliation, others agreed, would pronipt reform

£nd the request for western assistance.

W. Rockhill hoped China

would recognise the need for a "n ationa l system of defense" and a
complete financial reorganization.

Lafcadio Kearn accepted China's

defeat as part of the cyclical tradition of Chinese history in which
periods of corruption and disaster preceded periods of reform.

"It

Is not impossible that after such a humiliation, China niight irainediately

set to work developing and expanding all her latent and now useless

power- -building railroads, forming armies of really efficient troops,

purifying her offices, en^ploying and ejnpoijering the best foreign teachers
that money could engage."

20

Critics of Japan, much fewer in nuraber than the pro-Japanese
advocating
Americans, also threatened the policy of strict neutrality by
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that the United States halt Japanese aggression.

They V7arned against

Japan's ambitions in Asia and indicated that the United States should
strengthen its position in the Pacific at the very least and possibly

block Japanese expansion as a last resort.

v;ork to

They believed that

strict neutrality would lead to a dangerous Japanese-American competition
in post-war Asia.

insure

a

Critics also objected to a policy which seemed to

Japanese victory since it would lead, as they claimed, not

to peace and stability in Asia, but to nulitarism and intense rivalries.

A Japanese victory might even prove a vehicle for the development of
China's latent

China's humiliation, one American

pov;e.r.

attack

V7ay

of thirsting for Arierican gore, they will promptly

Aia?-rlcan ships,

Coinp/iercial

officer

"If China ever

warnied, actually posed a threat to the United States.

gets into the

array

and American coast."

Therefore, as the Pacific

Advertiser suggested, "every shotted gun, fired in this

v?ar,

is a signal gun to the United States, of the coming events," since it
.
would wake Chinese militarism from its centuries of sleep.
,
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Events on the battlefield also inspired American warnings of

Japanese ainbitions.

For exaniple, Augustine Heard, former minister to

Korea, deplored the pro-Japanese bias, noting that Japan's adoption of

western learning had blinded Amaricans to the menace of Japan the
conqueror.

As a Boston merchant interested in American investment in

Asia, Heard insinuated that Japan's desire for commercial ascendancy
lay behind its facade of reform rhetoric and should be "a fair subject
for criticism" in the United States.

Japan, Heard complained, aime.d at

a total, monopoly of Korean transportation, fishing industry and gold
min^is, hencs closing this lucrative field to foreign investment.

"Her
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present attitude toward Korea, irresistibly reminds one of the wolf and
22

the lamb in the fable."

Heard disagreed vith those vho claimed China had stirred up the

Tonghak insurrection in Korea.

He accused the Japanese of "manu-

facturing excitement" as "a pretext to interfere by force in Korea,"

perhaps even fostering and fomenting the v/hole rebellion themselves.
China had an honorable and "voluntary" vassal relationship with Korea
and felt duty-bound to assist Korea in putting dovm the rebellion-

Korea traditionally adopted Chinese culture and respected Chinese ideas
and institutions vmile despising the aggressive and assertive Japanese.

The country needed reform. Heard adraitted, yet Japan, the object of

"undue partiality" in the United States, desired only conquest.

"If

23

Korea falls into the hands of Japan, God help her!"
The American Peace Society supported Heard ^s view.

IJhile admitting

noted that its
that Japan was progressive, the Boston-based organization
and religious
progress had not been "acco.T.panied by a corresponding moral

development."

of blood"
It had marched to civilization "through seas

and should be considered the aggressor in Korea.

Yet the pacifist

primarily the
group qualified its condemnation of Japan, blaining

Asians with modern
western "Christian" powers for having supplied the

weapons of destruction.

"It is England and the United States and

France and Germany and Italy that have taught

theia the

arts of modern

has led them to
warfare, and the exmnple of some of these nations

be acquired in no other
believe that national strength and gloiy can
slaughtering multitudes
way than by building up huge armaments and
of one's neighbors."

24
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For a very different reason Rev. Robert Stuart MacArthur, the

militant pastor of the Calvary Church of New York City, warned

Americans of Japan* s progress.

In a sermon delivered in October of

1894, HacArthur explained that "the United States is humbled in the

presence of this Japanese victory" particularly since "we could not

have placed in Eastern waters during the time since this war. began a
naval force at all adequate to contend with that of Japan-"

Reviewing

this sermon, the Pacific Confrere ial Advertiser ascertained that the

war would greatly influence Anierican attitudes toward Asia in the
future*

For the firfit time, the American people, are
They may not, for a while
eameatly looking westward
yet, fully take in the drift of events, but it is
something for us, that they must look at the Asiatics,
in a new light, and, very soon, must deal with them on
It
a new basis, that is, the military and naval basisa
means for us, the occupation of Pearl Harbor, and
strong policy, in the Pacific.
.

that the
The New Orj^sns Picayune echoed these fears, contending

Asiatic" military
Pacific Ocean would henceforth be dominated by "purely
and naval power-

wondered
This voice of Gulf Coast shipping interests

Japan's growing challenge.
.what the United States planned to do about
Tlie

and closer commercial
Picayune suggested not only military preparation
25

canal.
ties but also construction of an interoceanic
Am.erican missionaries
Additional criticism of Japan emanated from

in

Jap.'.n

Japanese attitudes and
who were intimately acquainted with

from Asian scholar and diplomat W. W. RockhiU.

The latter, while

would be "the only tonic
predicting that "a good thrashing" of China
feared Japanese victories.
vhich seems to suit that queer country,"
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"The Lord only knows where they will stop," Rockhill wrote to a friend
in China.

"Tlie

Japanese are going to occupy Korea, for the same

reason and in the same \my as the British did Egypt."

26

The missionaries,

perhaps mindful that they were losing their prestige and positions to

aggressive Japanese Christians, took a similar

vie;?.

The

Rev.

Dwight

Leanted observed from Kyoto that Japan believed it had humbled a

pov/er

that England and France feared to attack and had accepted "a heaven

given mission to lead this part of the world if not all Asia."
"ccairnon

The

people" behaved rudely toward Americans in Kyoto, Learned

said, and this rerainded him of the fate Americans V70uld face if they

ever tried to dominate Japan.
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Americans often discussed the impact of the war on trade with
East Asia within the context of the barbarism versus civilization
theaie.

"^Then this cruel v/ar in China is over," the Boston Globe argued,

"the United States are bound to realize the larger share of the new
and enlarged coniruerce with the east that can but be the result of

China's severe shaking up.

We have as yet seen hardly the dawning of

future."
the icimense cotumerce with China that is in store for us in the
llie

that
Globe was joined by various business spokesmen who claimed

manufacturing"
the war revealed the "wonderful progress of Japanese
benefit of
vhich would force open new Asian markets to the eventual

such AB^erican products as cotton.

Decrying American "co^Timercial serfdom

cotton to Asia through
to England" which forced the Couth to sell raw
interests renewed
"the great English metropolis," southern cotton
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pressure for the construction of a Nicaraguan Canal.
that some day "the coimnercial men of the world

my

They predicted

be surprised to see

fleets ox vessels carrying American cotton through the canal via
Havjaii to the Japanese factories."

28

American consular agents asserted that China's expected collapse
promised to create "enlarged business relations between the United
States and China,"

Consul-General Thomas Jernigan retnarked that the

people in Shanghai assumed that Japan's victories

V70uld force China to

undertake an extensive system of internal improvement.

TVie

United

States should strengthen its navy in Asiatic watei-s and be prepared to
take advantage of the opportunities afforded by a Japanese victory.

Suggesting A.marican intervention in post-war China, Consul Sheridan
Read expanded upon Jernigan'

s

advice:

It will be my aim that America whose hands are clean as
regards China, shall secure her fair share of the orders
to be placed, and shall come fon/ard as the best country
from which to draw men and material. It is in cur
country that moderTi civilization is at its best, as it
is untinged with the ideas of ancient Europe and Asia.

would "never
In closing. Read claimed that American trade in the East
through the
assume its correct proportions until a canal has been cut
29

Isthmus of Panama."
success
Less optimistic commentators believed that Japan's

portended not lucrative Asian markets for American

competition from Japan.

coiranerce

but severe

Japan possessed advanced machinery, inventive

undersell western
genius and cheap labor, they observed, and could
markets.
trader, not only domestically but in world

Careful students

into Korea was a step
of Asian affairs reasoned that Japan's drive
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toward economic domination of East Asia.

Japan's vigorous search for

markets vould block Araerican projects and investments.

Rockhill varned

thst the war would probably hinder American penetration of the China

market and would certainly lead to severe Japanese competition.
"Japan is bound to become a great

rrianuf acturing

and Great Britain and Germany also

.

,

.

country and will cut us,

out of the Chinese market,

or at least we will only supply Japan with raw materials which it will
..30

put in manufactured shape on the Chinesa market.'

Debates on the war also influenced Araerican attitudes toward

treaty revisions with China and Jspan.

The question of treaty relations

with China in 1894 still centered on immigration.

Aided by widespread

anti-Chinese prejudices, exclusionists worked diligently for co:nplete
deportation
restriction of Chinese irmnigration and the registration or

of Chinese already in the United States.
sentiment, for there

\.'ere

Tlie

war increased such

fears that Japanese victories might drive the

defeated Chinese to seek refuge in the United States.

Wa don't want

stated.
"these dirty folk" on California's shores, exclusionists

They

United States from having
de^ianded thaf iir^igration laws protect the
"the.

Chinese empire dumped on us.
pushing for a formal
Both China and the United States were

concerning Chinese-Americans.
treaty outlining restrictions and rights
a convention which was
In March of 1894 Gresham and Yang Yu had signed

by Cleveland.
ratified by the Senate in August and signed

Tne Gresham-

to the United States for a
Y^ng Treaty prohibited further i.mnlsration

123

period of ten years and clarified some of the questions left vague in
an early treaty signed In 1880.

The 1894 treaty was more restrictive

than the original Sino-Araerican Inanigration Treaty of November 17, 1880,
in which Article I had provided that the United States government might

"regulate, limit, or suspend" Chinese immigration "but

prohibit it."

iriay

not absolutely

Article I of the new treaty, however, prescribed that

the iranigration of Chinese laborers

".-^hall

be absolutely prohibited."

ratification
In September the Gresham-Yang Treaty arrived in China for
China,
and Gresham worried about war-induced public utterances against
detriraental to
as well as pro-Japanese sentimsnts, believing these

Chinese acceptance of the pact.

China, however, was in no position to

her.
She signed s treaty that was clearly an affront to

argue.

32

relations with
While the Secretary of State discussed treaty
successor Shinchiro
China, both Japanese Minister Go?:o Tateno and his
for a new treaty
Kurino belabore.d the State Department with requests
of their own with the United States.

Japan, unlike China, insisted

unequal treaties between
upon the removal of all vestiges of the early

jurisdiction.
the two countries, such as extraterritorial

Speaking

United States and of
often of current sympathy for Japan in the

bolder and pushed harder
Japanese militao' successes, Kurino became
for treaty revision.

feeling

a

Japanese "are
V^hitelaw Reid observed that the

little more like taking

a

strong tone with Mr. Gresham."

in winning revision of extraIndeed, Japan had already succeeded

now urged the United States to
territoriality from Great Britain and
,

33

follow the British example.
treaty with Japan also emanated
Pressure on Gresham to revise the
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from Republican critics of the Secretary's foreign policies.

Incensed

at British leadership in treaty revision with Japan when the United

States had supposedly become the foremost defender of Japanese rights
and equality, critics attacked Gresham.

They claimed that British

Minister Sir Julian Pauncefote had "duped" the sluggish mind of the
Secretary by promising him that Great Britain would not negotiate a
treaty with Japan until the United States had concluded a similar
pact.

"It is exceedingly unfortunate that the State Department in this

crisis in the Orient should be placed in the embarrassing position"
of ignoring Japan's requests for treaty revision while Japan's erstwhile

critic Great Britain had already concluded a friendly pact.
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Pushed by Kurino and sensitive to criticism, Gresham proceeded
to negotiate a

nei'?

ttecxy which eliminated American consular jurisdiction

over the affairs of its citizens in Japan and enumerated certain export
duties between the

t^^ro

nations.

Tne New York Herald declared that

important
Japan considered this abolition of extraterritorial rights more

than all her victories against China.

"Japan has made such progress in

pride
civilis^ation during the past two decades that her national
demanded in
revolts at a continuation of such authority which is only
/such as China/."
cur treaty negotiations with semi-barbarous nations

signed the new treaty
Finally on November 23, 1894, Kurino and Gresham

fulfilling Japatiese demands.

"The acceptance of thi^ treaty by the

and civili^.ation of
Senate will be a great cor.plim.ent to the progress

tantamount to a recognition
Japan," one editorial averred; "it will be
has earned by its
that the little island empire of the Far East

progressiveness and enlightenment

a

right to be ranked among the most
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civilized nations."
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No one could misinterpret the meaning of the two treaties of 1894

One offered a hu-Tiiliating slap to China and the other a bow to Japanese
prestige*

Gresham believed that he had concluded fair and impartial

treaties with both powers, yet the treaties themselves indicated
otherx-zise.

Tlie

building of Japan's reputation in the United States during

the war was due in part to natural preferences in an era vhich prized

progress, efficiency and the competitive spirit"-and in part to the

concerted efforts of Japanese propaganda.

prohibited American

V7ar

Initially the Japanese had

correspondents to accon^pany their armies and

bad been caught tampering vith and censoring the

mil

personnel sent from Japan to the United States.

But vith the arrival

of American naval

of Shinchiro Kurino as the new Japanese lainister to the United States
at the end of August 1894, Japan began to coordinate and cultivate a

program designed to win American approval.

American reporters were

Japanese
allowed to travel with Japanese units while Kurino improved the

profile in the United States.

"I have seen a good deal of the Jap

ex-graduate
Minister, Kurino, who is a good fellow-^very civiliscd-'-an
diplooiat
of Harvard and a great exploiter of the press," a British

residing in Washington during 1894 observed.
latest American tricks.

"He is 'up to all the

I. .36
*

cloae ties vith the
Tae new Japanese nunistcr countered Yang Yu's
of his own with the
Gresham family by cultivating friendly contacts
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American Secretary of State,

"Mr. Kurino told my son and myself,"

Mrs. Gresham later recalled, "that during the Chinese-Japanese War he

met Mr* Gresham almost daily, and received from him information as to

what vas going on in the diplomatic world."

Both the Chinese and

Japanese ministers arranged dinner parties for Gresham and sent the
ti

family trinkets and momentos of friendship.

Kurino offset Yang Yu's

warnings of Japan's "sinister designs" on Korea with his own assurances
to the Secretary of State that Japan only V7ished to reform that corrupt

and anarchic little country.
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The Harvard-trained Japanese minister supervised journalistic

exploitation of the

v;ar,

even contributing his own article on the

"Oriental VJar" in the North Ar.iorican Rqyiew.

A Forum article of

October 1894, inspired by Kurino, concluded that Japan should be
viewed as an American-styled republican goverrjnent in Asia.

Con-

currently, the Arena vigorously defended Japan with a wide spectrum
of those arguments employed by Japanese propagandists.

the Arena published an article by the Japanese scholar

traced the causes of the "War in the East."

In November
Kunia

Oishi which

He argued that China's

resistance to "social and political innovation" in Korea lay at the
root of the conflict.

Kuraa

testified further that Chinese-backed

influence of
Tonghak rebels, who were fanatics intent on blocking the

preserve law and
Western civilization, had forced Japan to intervene to
order.

determined and
Japan since 1868 "has been steadily pursuing a

recognize her
upright policy toward Corea," the object being to

independence and to secure her autonomy.

Tne Japanese propagandist

audience, because the
designed this approach especially for American
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United States and Japan, he pointed out, had shared first honors in

recognizing Korean independence by treaty.

China's policy of clandestine

and greedy machinations had left Korea "destitute and defenceless,"

which in turn invited foreign aggression and threatened Japan's
security.

Another approach designed to appeal to Americans pointed to the
"gradual encroachment and increasing supremacy in Asia of the European

powers."

This was the "most momentous cause of this war."

In order to

resist European invasion, Japanese propagandists argued, China and

Japan must "duly recognize the law of the survival of the fittest" and

attain the "highest possible degree of civilization in the shortest
possible length of time, using the word civilization here in its widest
sense, so as to include the development of material resources, of

military strexigth, of intellectual and moral qualities of the people."
China, unfortunately, had not understood these demands of history.
of
"Stupid and haughty," she had resisted the natural development

nations, thus threatening the peace and stability of Asia.

China had

and
refused to cooperate with Japan in a reforai program for Korea

for territorial
Japan had been forced to accept the challenge alone not

civilization.
gain, but because of a "moral obligation" to Korean
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Japan
Japanese writers also flattered Americans and identified

with standard /^,arican ideals.

Japan represented the "light of

prosperity," while
civilization and an unbroken era of tranquillity and
and of humanity" and
upholding "the cause of liberty, of civilization

defending all "lovers of justice and freedom."
stagnation, of the
If this struggle of progress against
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right against the i/rong, during its course, proves to some
extent, detrimental to the commercial interest of the West;
if it justly recalls to the rainds of the lovers of peace,
the vivid pictures of all the horrors and evils attendant
upon fire and courage, the enormous advantages which will
probably be derived after the close of the var must not
be forgotten.

Japanese scholar Julius

Kurrjpei

Matumoto, in his introduction to

Trumbull White's popular history of the Sino^Japanese War, told the

American reader that Japan was the "true standard-bearer of civilization and progress in the far east.

Her mission is to enlighten

darkened
the millions of slumbering souls in the Celestial Kingdom,

for generations."

Re urged Americans to recognize and accept Japan

as a powerful and "living force" in the world.

Japanese
The American intellectual climate was congenial to
"The Japanese

arguments and the propaganda reinforced these views.

have learned the lesson of lying gracefully

6c

persistently," the

1394.
American missionary William Scott Ament wrote in October

"The

the world 6 the
Chinese have no writers to present their cause before
,

.

used ic.
Jans have had their own way, and well they have
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CHAPTERVII
THE PORT ARTHUR MASSACRE

Pro-Japanese enthusiasm had reached its height by the end of
November 1894.

So far Japan had done little to harm such feeling.

Kowshing, affair was regarded as

s

The

regrettable mistake, hardly rememberad

amidst the glories and virtues of the Japanese cause.
Japanese
As the winter snows deepened in northern China, the
remnants
methodically and irresistibly pushed onward, scattering the
of enemy armies before them.

During the weeks after its victory at

its position and
Ping Yang, the Japanese First Army had consolidated
of October, It had
then advanced north where, during the latter part

crossed the Yalu River and invaded Manchuria.

Chinese forces retreated

laying waste to the land.
toward Manchuria's ancient capital at Mukden,
the Chinese stronghold
By December 13, Japanese soldiers had occupied
at Halcheng.

lines,
But with the overextension of Japan's supply

the onset of cold
Chinese resistance grew more stubborn; and with

entrenched at Haicheng.
weather and heavy snows, the First Army

campaign had originated
American knowledge of Japan's Manchurian
forwarded by commanders of the
from delayed and speculative dispatches

American naval vessels stationed at Chemulpo.

On October

9,

Commander

Concord reported "the Chinese,
Caspar Frederick Goodrich of the gunboat
the frontier (the Yalu
are thcugl't to be mostly, if not all, over

River)."

reports were not up to
Yet. he admitted that his intelligence
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primarily
the highest standards of the Navy Department, but were based
on sketchy information from Japanese sources.

Several days later

Goodrich cabled his commanding officer, Admiral Charles C. Carpenter,
advanced on
then in Nagasaki, that the Japanese supposedly had already
Formosa.
Mukden, Port Arthur, Weihaiwei, and perhaps even Peking and
failed to
Reliable information concerning Korean military operations

days after the
arrive at the State Department until October 27, three

Japanese actually crossed the Yalu River.

In a dispatch to Gresham,

Manchuria and added
Charles Denby Jr. verified the Japanese invasion of
av/are of China's
that Chinese leadership in Peking seemed suddenly

plight.
into Manchuria,
While Count Aritomo Yamagata's First Army advanced

good-natured" Field Marshal
the Japanese Second Army, under the "fat,
China.
Iwao Oyama, prepared to open another front against

strategists believed that as long as the

modem

Japanese

naval base at Port

a Chinese fleet,
Arthur guarded the Strait of Chihli and sheltered

be completely secure.
Japanese supply lines in Manchuria vould never
the Liaotung Peninsula,
Port Arthur, situated at the extremity of

enemy fortification.
presented the Japanese with their most formidable

von Hanneken of Kowshin^
Designed by German engineers, including Colonel
dry docks, shipyards and
fame, the walls of the forts guarding the
much as three hundred feet out
repair shops extended in some places as
of the sea.

of heavy naval rifles,
The forts contained a deadly array

and rifled mortars.
particularly forty and fifty-ton Krupp guns

Even

attack from the sea impossible.
the Japanese high coaimand considered
it
an army above the port, march
Thus it drew up a bold plan to land
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around behind the forts, and besiege them from the laud side.

3

Advance units of Oyaraa's Second Army landed on the Liaotung
Peninsula some eighty miles northeast of Port Arthur on October 23,
1894.

By November 4, the entire army, aided by willing Manchurian

peasants, had established a secure beachhead on the peninsula.

Two

days later the Japanese had overrun Kinchow, just thirty miles northeast of Port Arthur, and shortly thereafter had captured the Talienwan
forts V7ith little effort.

"Our army occupied Talienwan at the afternoon

adding
of the 8th instant," Kurino revealed to Gresham on November 14,

Arthur
that a complete chart of Chinese torpedo mine defenses at Port

had also been seized.

4

American press reports speculated, as early as November 10, that
the Japanese were "pushing the pigtails" out of Port Arthur.

Japan did not attack until November
assault on the fortifications.

21

when if launched

However,

a three-pronged

According to correspondent James

/had/ deliberately
Creelman, "cold, stoical, Asiatic" General Yamaji, "who
he was not
plucked out his own eye at school to show his comrades that
a coward," coordinated the Japanese advance.

Chinese resistance, with

attacked under the cover
few exceptions, collapsed as Japanese infantry
of their mountain artillery.

The Chinese abandoned Port Arthur, leaving

the dock yards and equipment intact.

5

fortification, Japanese
As they approached the walls of the last

captured comrades
soldiers discovered the m.utilated heads of their

hanging by strings from the m.in gate of the fort.

with Chinese mutilation of

a

This sight, combined

Japanese scouting party at Talienwan and

final assault, incen.ed
the savagery of some of the fighting before the
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Bent on revenge and finding all the combatants

the victorious army.

gone, Japanese soldiers and their baggage coolies turned viciously on

The Japanese "killed everything

the civilian inhabitants of Port Arthur.

they saw," American eyewitness James Creelman of the New York World

reported, "unarmed men, kneeling in the streets and begging for life,

vere shot, bayoneted, or beheaded

.

.

.

the town was sacked from end

to end, and the inhabitants were butchered in their own homes."

Another eyewitness, Anglo-American gunrunner James Allan, claimed that
"the dead lay thickly in nearly every street in the quarters we

traversed, where of every age, sex, and condition, they had been

promiscuously butchered by the hundred."^
News of Port Arthur's capture reached the United States almost

immediately. Colonel Danby cabling Gresham on November 24.

Reports of

for several
the massacre, however, remained rumors in the United States

weeks.

recent
In fact, the initial response to Port Arthur reflected

American approval of Japan's civilizing mission.

The New York Tribune,

of the Far East
for example, editorialized that: "Out of the darkness

evolved from
a light shines and it is the light of civilization

conditions of native progress."

A London dispatch arriving in New York

perpetrated by both sides
on November 29th, which alluded to atrocities

on the Liaotung Peninsula, received little publicity.
source on December

8

Another London

capture
reported that during the night after the

entered the town and slaughtered
of Port Arthur Japanese army laborers had

Chinese civilians in their homes.

Yet it was not unti] James Creelman's

York oa December 11
eyewitness account of the massacre arrived in New
national sensation.
that the atrocities at Port Arthur became a

7
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James Creelman, immaculately dressed and groomed even in

Manchuria, was determined to win journalistic fame, a goal in part
inspired by earlier frustrations experienced V7hile on the staff of

James Gordon Bennett's New York Herald

.

Bennett's policies had pre-

vented Creelman' s signature from appearing on his articles, and the
ambitious reporter, chafing under this restriction, had left Bennett's
staff in 1890.

By 1893 he had become manager of the British edition

as
of Cosmopolitan Magazine and the next year he accepted an assigmnent

special correspondent for the New York World to cover the Sino-Japanese
War.

Creelman, it was said, would go anywhere and do anything for

news scoop.

a

At Ping Yang he pitched his tent among rotting corpses to

cover the battle.

In order to catch Oyama's forces before Port Arthur,

at the
Creelman rode a Japanese military pony all night, arriving

had not
Japanese camp on the verge of collapse yet thankful that he

missed the opening shots.

Several times Creelman narrov.'ly escaped

as close to
capture by Chinese soldiers because he insisted on getting
•V,
the action as possible.

8

Everywhere Creelman worked he stirred up controversy.

As the

writer tended to
American minister in Seoul reported to Gresham, the
the Korean king
"over-dramatize" and in the case of his interview with

he wished to say."
"doubtless put into the king's mouth what he thought
from Asia.
Creelman had praised Japan in his early articles

Ha wrote

that Japanese soldiers
after Ping Yang (where atrocities had occurred)

he cabled the opinion
were "brave and humane," and in early September

admiration of the world.
that the "patriotism of Japan must comitiand the

Then for about

a

with the Morld.
month Creelman failed to communicate
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The nev;spaper became concerned for his safety, meanwhile filling the
news void by hiring E. H. House of Tokyo to send dispatches concerning
the war to New York.

The World cabled House, instructing him to

investigate rumors that a foreign correspondent had been killed in the

war zone.

10

During this time Creelman was aboard a Japanese troopship bound
for his biggest story.

His first sensational letter describing the

Port Arthur massacre appeared in the New York World on December 11.

For the next month the World fully exploited the story, elaborating on
the slaughter and mutilation of men, women and children in the streets
of Port Arthur-

According to Creelman and the

Isew

York Worl^, Japanese

officers did nothing to stop the slaughter of non-combatants, while

Japanese soldiers laughed as their comrades hunted down every living
thing in the city-'-even the personnel in the town's only hospital.
wrote,
"Just below me was a hospital flying the Red Cross flag," Creelman
the
"but the Japanese fired upon the unarmed men who came out of

doorway."
tv70

After three days of butchery and the slaughter of "at least

coolies
thousand helpless people," Creelman noted that only Chinese

needed to bury their countrymen survived the massacre.

11

government would
The World, editorially wondering how the Japanese
to elicit an
defend this "lapse into barbarism," instructed House

official explanation.

Minister
House reported that the Japanese Foreign

when he adMutsu Hunemltsu had in effect verified Creelman' s story
part of Japanese
mitted that some excesses may have occurred on the

soldiers at Port Arthur.

Yet when the American minister, Edwin Dun,

official called
interviewed Mutsu several days later, the Japanese
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Creelman's account "a gross exaggeration of the truth, sensational in
the extreme and tending to work great injury and injustice to Japan
in the eyes of the civilised world."

Kutsu admitted, however, that

Japanese troops, "inaddened by the atrocities committed upon their
comrades who had fallen into the hands of the Chinese,"

more Chinese than necessary for a military victory.

rriay

have killed

12

Visiting other eyewitnesses, Dun attempted to reconstruct the Port
Ax^thur story for the State Department.

Re learned from the French

military attache in Tokyo, Viscount de Labry, who had entered Port

Arthur with the first wave of Japanese soldiers, that Creelman's letter
over-'dramatiEed the effects of Japanese attacks with bayonet and sword.

At the same time Lieutenant O'Brien, the American military attache in

Tokyo who

i;as

also present at Port Arthur, admitted that there were

needless deaths but not enough to be called a massacre.

Tne American

commander of a Japanese transport, George W. Conner, maintained that
Japanese action never approached the horrors reported by Creclmsn.

Dun

concluded in his report to Gresham: "It is clear that the slaughter of

Chinese soldiers at Port Arthur cannot be justified by any rules
governing the usages of modern civilized warfare

.

.

•

but that the

account sent to 'The World' by Mr. Crcelman is sensational in the
extreme and a gross exaggeration of what occurred.
There were attempts to discount Creelman's observations at Port

Arthur.

Led by the strongly pro-Japanese New York Tribune, a bitter

rival of the World, war conmjentators criticized Creelman's exploitation

of too incident.

"These stories bore upon their face the brand of

"so-called
reckless sensationalism," the Tribune argued, and Japanese
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excesses, while regrettable, vere excusable" because of Chinese

barbarism in mutilating Japanese captives.
Frank

G.

Free-lance correspondent

Carpenter observed that vhen Japanese troops entered Port

Arthur they found that "archways of Japanese heads, vith the noses and
ears missing, had been built over the streets."

Carpenter doubted

whether highly-trained and disciplined American soldiers would act any
differently under similar circumstances.

"After all, war is war,"

Colonel E. F, Gregory of the United States Anny observed, pointing out
that no one had objected to the atrocities committed during the

American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War or the
and Russia.

VJar

between Turkey

"To say that the Japanese have relapsed to barbarisn,

or have come down to the savage level of their foes, is an absurd
misstaten'.ent

The Port Arthur debate prompted an examination of past American

barbarity.

"Have all memories faded of the manner in which American

soldiers avenged the massacre of the garrison of the Alamo by Santa

Anna?" the Pliiladelphia Record inquired.

American defenders of the

Japanese reminded that "in recent times our own troops have done

precisely what the Japanese soldiers at Port Arthur did."

They discussed

in detail the massacre of Indian men, women and children near Wounded

Knee Creek on the Pine Ridge Reservation by units of the Seventh Cavalry

avenging General Custer's death.

Just as the Seventh Cavalry had

Indians,
responded to memories of their comrades slaughtered by barbaric
"of
the Japanese, according to this argument, had sought retribution
of their
the almost justifiable sort" in punishing the barbaric excesses

uncivilised, savage enemy.
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Nevertheless, Creelman's articles caused new doubts*

Nev7spapers

V7hich only just days before had extolled the virtuef; of Japanese

progress and civilisation now castigated the "other Asian barbarian,"
The Kansas City Jou-rnal noted that "the barbarities perpetrated by the
civilized Japanese at Port Arthur are just as revolting as if they had

been committed by the uncivilized Chinese*"

The influence of Christian

teaching and western morality appeared to these critics "only a thin
varnish, scratch it, and the barbarian is revealed."

Americans

suggested that if Japanese cruelty and slaughter continued, the

civilised nations of the West would be forced to interv^ene "in the
interest of humanity-"

American Board missionary Franklin M. Chapin

indicated to Judson Smith in Boston that American sympathies should be

vith the helpless Chinese.

"The time must coine vfaen the proud little

.
nation will be punished for the slaughter of a defenceless people.

„16

Revelation of the Port Arthur massacre threatened to undo the
sentiment
carefully woven fabric of Japanese propaganda and pro-Japanese
and
Almost overnight Japan's claim as the torchbearer of civilization

moderation in Asia becam.e suspect.

"Scratch a 'Jap' and you have a

savage notwithstanding his pretensions to civilization."

The Japanese

development of
were "mere children" when it came to the historical
tiankind.

of
They had civilized too rapidly, imitating the facade

civilization but not the moral commitraents

.

"Civilization cannot be

grov up to it."
put on like a cloak, and Japan may, after all, never

A letter to rhe editor of the

.^Tew

York VJorld signed "Ignite Man" warned:

sly little figures,
"any one who -would place absolute trust in those

much longer course of
almond cyec and catlike 'politeness' without a
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probation than Japan has yet endured would be very foolish."

Always

eager arbiters of moral issues, American copiraentators in Boston,

New York, Cincinnati

,

Minneapol is

,

Philadelphia, St

.

Louis

,

Washington

D«C., Fort Worth and San Francisco agreed that Port Arthur constituted

an ineradicable stain upon Japan's "vaunted progress and civilization.
yoj^ World

,

"^'^

having discovered that its Port Arthur stories

had increased circulation, continued to exploit the massacre.

"No

other American nex^spaper had a correspondent on the scene," the World
boasted.

Other papers sneered at the ex^^ose, then suffered through

Mutsu's confessions, British war artist Frederic Villiers' confirmations,
editorials in the London Times and London Standard and other verifi-

cations of Creelman's story.

As the World proclaimed, Creelman had now

become the world's foremost jov.rnalist.

The New York daily expanded

on its coup by printing sketches by Villiers which showed piles of
mutilated Chinese corpses in the streets cf Port Arthur, as well as a

poignant drawing of a puppy curled up beside the body of his fallen
Chinese master.

Pulitzer's paper, the first of the so-called "yellow

journals," accused Japan of trying to bribe Creelman with preferential
treatment if he would keep the Port Arthur affair quiet, at least until

after the ratification of a new Japanese-American treaty.

The American

turned
public soon tired of the atrocity story, however, and the World
t
request.
to new fields of excitement and recalled Creelman at Japan s

1^

Weihaiwei, tempered
Several factors, including news of operations at

American criticism of Japanese behavior at Port Arthur.

Across the Chihli
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Strait from Port Arthur lay the fortifications and naval station of
Weihaiv7ei.

In some respects Wei was a replica of Port Arthur--heavily

fortified by western engineers, armed with modern weaponry and equipped

with dockyards, repair stations and auxiliary services.

Tliis

port

remained the only obstacle to Japanese control of the Gulf of Chihli
and the Yellow Sea, for the Chinese fleet had sought refuge at Wei

after the fall of Port Arthur.

Tiie

Japanese command outlined a plan

similar to its earlier campaign across the Gulf.

This time it proposed

the landing of an array on the Shantung Peninsula behind the fortifi-

cations and an attack from the rear.

On January 10, a little more than a month after Port Arthur, a
Japanese army landed thirty-seven miles below Weihaiwei.

The command

of this expedition rested with Port Arthur hero Count Iwao Cyama and

included many of the same officers and units involved in the previous
operation.

Oyama's Third Army moved in

tv70

columns up the Shantung

Peninsula toward Wei's outer forts, while the Japanese
coastal positions and bottled up the Chines^, fleet.

nav>'

shelled

For two weeks the

Japanese advanced, storming Chinese earthworks and positions as they
moved.

At times Chinese resistance proved stubborn, particularly at

the Motienling fort, and Japanese casualties were unusually heavy— much
19

heavier than they had been around Port Arthur.
The main forts, island forts and Chinese \;arships concentrated
hea\'y fire on Japanese forces, preventing penetration of the inner

defenses.

In response,

the Japanese employed small torpedo boats in

night raids to cripple some of the Chinese fleet.

By February 7th most

of the Chinese resistance had collapsed and several days later,
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Admiral Ting, coinraander of the Chinese fleet at Wei, offered to

surrender the ships, forts and arms, provided that the Japanese would

spare the lives of his

crev;s,

soldiers and foreign advisers.

20

In contrast to the Port Arthur capture, the Japanese displayed

restraint at Weihaiwei.

supply of food.
Admiral Ting,

Chinese prisoners vere released vith two day*s

The Japanese provided a steamer to carry the body of

\^h^

had committed suicide, as

and advisers back to Tientsin.

v^ell

as his surviving staff

American observers, permitted

iiraiediate

access to the battle area, found no evidence of Japanese atrocities,

although the intensity of the fighting had surpassed that of Port
Arthur.

Perhaps influenced by the presence of foreign advisers through-

out the VJeihaiwei defense system, as well as by the observation of

foreign warships

— including

the American cruiser C harleston

,

accorded

special favor by the wTapanese-"the victors took precautions against a

repeat of the Port Arthur massacre.

21

Increasing attention paid Japan* s military medicine and Red Cro5S

activity also helped diminish criticism of Port Arthur.

Reading of

Japan's modern hospital system and humane treatment of v/ounded Chinese

prisoners, Americans could believe that this, "rather than the action
of a body of men in the heat of battle, where death threatens them on

every hand," displayed the "true spirit of any nation."

The Journal

of the Ame rican Medical Asso ciatio n proclaimed that the Japanese had

demonstrated the best in medical treatment, the newest antiseptics and
the latest training, and concluded: "truly the Japanese

is a wonderful

man.'*

Despite Japan's aberration at Port Arthur, the Springfield

Republican pointed out, "nothing more emphatically

sho\vs the

vast

progress of Japan out of the barbarism of the Asian nations" than her

adoption and employment of the Red Cross Society in the war with China.
The fact that the Japanese Red Cross Society had sent six physicians
and twelve nurses with each troop transport bound for Korea and China

was widely noted.

Rev. J. R. DeForest wrote in the Missionary H erald

that the employment of the Red Cross Society "has helped to give Japan

power to wage war on a higher plane of humanitarian spirit than has
ever been reached before, even in Christian nations*"

22

On the other hand the Chinese rejected the help of the Red Cross
and refused to form a Society of their own.

They left their wounded

to freeze and starve on the battlefield, and they mutilated and

murdered Japanese wounded.

As Rev. Charles A. Stanley noted from

Tientsin, "The Chinese are making no hospital or ambulance arrangoraents."

Other Americans regretted China's lack of an organized medical department
Chinese officers of rank and wealth employed their own personal doctors
but soldiers received no aid.

Allegedly, the Chinese even failed to

bury their dead.^^
Chinese officials refused to guarantee protection for Red Cross
nurses who requested transportation to the front to aid wounded Chinese
soldiers.

'*^/e

don't want to save

aiiy

wounded Chinese," the Governor

of Tientsin informed one Red Cross worker.

Even worse, the American

Medical Association revealed that Chinese fired on ambulances, killed

attendants and attacked surgeons wearing the Geneva cross, a symbol of

Christian humanity and compassion.

It was recalled that early efforts
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by westerners to form a Chinese Red Cross Society had met with repeated
failure.

Under pressure from the Western community, Li Hung-chang

placed the steamer Toonan at the disposal of an Independent Red Cross
Society at Tientsin to bring back wounded Chinese from around Port

Arthur.

Four American medical missionaries accompanied four British

doctors on the trip.

When the Toonan was refused permission to carry

the wounded to hospitals at Tientsin, the mercy ship returned empty-

handed.

This appeared to be further evidence of China's barbarism*

Hoping to improve American military medicine and treatment of
wounded, the American government expressed interest in Japan's modern
techniques-

Greshara requested copies of pamphlets issued by the Medical

Division of the Japanese Department of War.

The United States

V/ar

Department asked Dun to ship items of eqtiipment from the Japanese
Medical Corps for study in Washington, D.C.

Ai'my

At the same time, the

l^avy

Department dispatched navy surgeon C. U. Gravatt of the Charl eston to
visit field hospitals at Port Arthur.

25

Gravatt 's investigation reinforced the image of a humane and

modern Japanese medical corps.

He discovered immaculate hospital

facilities, as well as typhoid fever patients treated with the latest

technique--"hydro"chloric acid."

He observed highly-trained nurses

busily bandaging wounds (of both Japanese and Chinese personnel) with
bags of "mercuric gauze," and feeding the wounded fresh food.

Everything

was carefully organised, Gravatt reported, from the dressing stations
at the
Tl>e

froii'.

down to the main field hospitals at command headquarters.

navy surgeon paid particular attention to sanitary measures

instituted by Japanese military officials upon entering a captured
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Chinese town^ such as employing Chinese labor to clean the filthy
streets and houses.

"Closets have been constructed at many of the

corners," Gravatt explained, "and Chinamen are fined when detected in

committing nuisances."

The New York Wo rl d

^

s

exposure of the brutality at Port Arthur had

threatened to dcotroy an American impression of the Japanese as the
"Yankees of the Orient."

One American newspaper, hov/ever, could not

reverse the current of public attitudes.

Americans reminded themselves

that they had coimnitted similar atrocities during the formative stages
of their own civilisation and Japan* s example only seemed to reinforce

the similarity of two national experiences.

The World

'

impact

diminished as reports of Japanese humanitarianism at Weihaiwei reached
the United States, and respect for Japan actually increased through the

attention given its medical technology and Red Cross Society-

The

press theme of "^barbarism versu s civilization" had been altered little,
if at all, by the end of the year.

But the fighting grew heavier and moved toward the major cities.
In the weeks ahead, a new concern—for the lives of Americans rather

than Asians---began to affect the American response to the Sino-Japanese
War.

CHAPTER VIII
THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EAST ASIA

Tlie

capture of the

maatnioth

fortifications at Port Arthur and

Weihaiwei, combined with the Japanese offensive in Manchuria, threw
thousands of Chinese soldiers into disorganized retreat.

Cutting

swaths of pillage and destruction, bands of defeated troops terrorized the Chinese population as well as the foreign coimiiunities of

northern China.

Chinese soldiery had become "a lawless mob, v/ithout

discipline/* missionary Franklin K. Chapin observed from his station
at Linching.

"They collected in bodies especially at night, and

attacked the villages, and even towns, looted and murdered," Speck

von Sternburg advised Teddy Roosevelt.
across

"The poor traveller, who came

was stripped and left naked at the roadside in the

theruj

terrible cold

.

.

.

."^

Foreign residents throughout the norlh daily expected to fall
"victira to the rage of the bi£2^^^ pagans of the celestial empire" v/ho

were believed ready to attack mission stations and settlements.
Alludin,2 to the earlier murder of James V7ylie, a Scotch Presbyterian
iJilssionary

,

medical missionary Willis C. Noble reported from

Forctlagfu that anti-foreign rabble had almost created "another Wylie
affair'* at his station V7hen they tormented and threatened violence to

the Christian con;munity.

Even the missionaries at the treaty ports

would not be safe, asserted tha Rev.

144

R.

0, Hayden, unless they could
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find refuge aboard foreign gunboats.

2

Foreigners in China, from the outset of hostilities , had urged
the V7estem powers to send more naval protection to China's treaty

ports.

Grover Cleveland, always sympathetic to American missionary

requests, had been among the first to respond to such pressures by

ordering the strengthening of the Asiatic squadron.

The President

told Congress that the V7ar had "rendered it necessary or expedient to

dispatch eight vessels to those waters."

Secretary of State Greshara,

influenced by the "great number of communications" from American

missionaries in Asia and their friends in the United States, advised
Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert to send "some small ships > able to
run up the rivers" for the protection of Amaricans in the interior.

3

By the end of August, American naval reinforcements began to
arrive on the Asiatic station, joining the Honocacy and the Baltimore.
The first on the scene, gunboats

I?^etrel

and Concord, were soon joined

by the Charleston, the Yorktovm and later by the Detroit and the Machias^.
Yhe additions to his fleet increased Admiral C. C. Carpenter's ability
to respond to requests for gunboats, yet he realized that even the

larger fleet would provide insufficient strength to guard all of the
scattered American missionary groups.

To derive maximum effectiveness

from his fleet, Carpenter devised a tv/o-fold strategy.

First, he

deployed several vessels at what the Navy Department considered key
points and usad the rest to maintain a continual patrol, visiting
potential trouble spots to "show the flag."
toward

e.n

Second, Carpenter worked

agreement with the other naval coircnanders to cooperate in

deploying their ships for the protection of all foreigners.

The
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Admiral particularly desired the cooperation of the
nineteen-ship
British Asiatic Squadron.
E.

He coznraunicated regularly with Vice-Admiral

R. Frenantle, cona-nander-in-chief of the British
naval forces in

China.

Carpenter revealed vhere each American ship would be stationed

in order to facilitate British protection of Americans in areas
where
the United States Navy was absent.

In a private conversation v/ith

Fre.mantle on November 4th, Carpenter learned that the British
would

cooperate.

Fremantle, however, cautioned that the entire arrangement

must remain informal and he carefully stated that the British agreement

constituted only a general expression of cooperation to protect each
other's subjects.

Several days later the American commander reached

a similar understanding with Ad;Tiiral Dupuis of the French China fleet.
Geinnan gunboat coiraiianders also indicated that they v;ould protect
A

.

Ar^ierxcan

citizens in China if absolutely necessary.

4

Carpenter's first concern was to free the Baltimore from its
guard duty on the Korean station.

American naval forces, as well as a

legation guard, had been stationed in Korea since July.

But with the

imposition of Jspanese military law Carpenter believed that Americans
in Korea needed little protection.

Nevertheless, Minister Sill insisted

that his guat'd be maintained, even though its members were often drunk

and did little more than stand watch at the legation gates.

Hopefully,

Sill arr^^nged for the construction of winter barracks for the marines

who were still quartered in leaky tents around the compound's courtyard.
Confiding to Car^pcnter that "in the pre??ent condition of communications
I

cavroot wait for instruction," Sill cabled, "I have taken it for

granted that the

Us-vy

Department will supply stoves and fuel

.

.

.

and
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fit it up vith bunks and blankets."

reduced the guard.

Hie Admiral complied but also

When the gunboat Concord arrived the latter
part of

September, Carpenter replaced the galtimore^s
guard with a smaller

continscnt from the gunboat and assured a worried
Sill that the flagship

would be close at hand if needed,^

After another month of calm in Korea, Carpenter
inquired whether
Sill still considered a legation guard essential.

Tbie

minister replied

that, while the Chinese no longer threatened Seoul,
"the whole kingdom

/hadj never been in a more complete state of anarchy
and confusion."

Although he was undoubtedly concerned for the lives of
the eighty
Americans in Seoul, Sill also had become interested in maintaining
an
Arr.£rican

military presence in Korea as a post-vzar wedge for a larger

American role in that country.

Evidently influenced by advice from

legation socret>ary and missionary Horace Allen, Sill closed his letter to
Car-pentcr indicating that the United States should retain its guard

for the present because both Russia and Great Britain had left their

guards"-and net because Americans confronted immediate danger.^

At the

same time, the minister dashed off a cable to a skeptical Gresham to
tell him that troops should remain because rumors of assassinations and

plots continued unabated.

Again in December Sill infomied his chief

that Japanese reforms had been largely unsuccessful and had left the

kingdom in disorder.

He also reminded the State Department of Korea's

commercial potential, noting, "It is expected that Japanese influences
will soon open and develop the rich gold and coal mines of the country."^
Sill perpetuated the image of near anarchy in Seoul as a basis
for the continued presence of American soldiers in Korea.

He bombarded
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all listeners with tales of unrest and disorder.

l-Jhen

the Charle ston

replaced the Con cord as the watch ship at Chemulpo, the minister
revealed to its captain, George W» Coffin, that the factional struggle
in Seoul had become more and more bitter and might forecast an insurSill continued to insist on a guard even after foreign forces

rection.

had been withdrawn,

''In

this city American citizens outnumber all other

caucassian /.sic/ nationalities combined and these are largely women and
children," he informed Gresham.

"My responsibilities are greater than

those of any European Representative, hence

I

cannot consent to follow

blindly any example of v/ithdrawal of guards that any of them may set."

g

Despite Sill*s pleas for retention of the guard, American marines

had become somewhat of an embarrassment, though they provided the only
excitement experienced in Seoul's otherwise secure American

coiiimunity.

The first incident occurred when a drunken marine allegedly entered the

house of a Korean Christian^ frightening the woman and seizing
perfectly useless article of clothing."

"a

Mistakenly assuming that the

voman was in the clothing when the trooper grasped

it, a female American
9

inissionary reported the outrage to the Navy Department.

No sooner had

the furor quieted when word of another incident reached the desk of

Acting Secretary of the Navy William

IfcAdoo, who ordered "a searching

investigation" of American military conduct in Korea,

received

a

McAdoo had

letter from a friend of Rose Ely Moore, another American

missionary' in Korea.

and
"We have to blush for our American soldiers

had reportedly
some of the officers from the Baltimore," Mrs, Moore

written.

streets in a
"They get beastly drunk and carouse about the

the Japs and
most disgraceful manner, frightening and surprising
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Koreans."
probably
city or

The letter alleged that the soldiers "v;ere so drunk they
v,'ould

trie

have not been of any use" had the Tonghaks attacked the

legation.

In response to McAdoo's order. Carpenter called for statements

from the officers of the BaUirnqre and also requested Sill's cooperation
In the investigation.

drunkenness.

The officers denied any knowledge of excessive

Assistant Surgeon Lex^is Morris asserted that "some of the

promptly
men, at times, were under the influence of liquor but V7ere

punished by the officer in conunand."

Concurrently, paymaster's clerk

of
Jamas Schon assured his superiors that he possessed no knowledge

the affair.

who
Sill discovered the identity of the letter writer,

admitted that she had based her report upon rumors.

"My husband's

in the streets,
Korean teacher said ha saw soldiers drunk and carousing
in a shop dead
and Dr. 0. R. Anison told me he had seen a soldier
"I did hear

'Beastly drunk'," Mrs. Moore said whan questioned.

drunk,

had to be brought home,
that the officers got drunk at the club, and

but

I

cannot recall who my informant was."

Sill was relieved.

Intent

that the legation had
upon retaining his gu.rd, he assured Carpenter
in Mrs. Moore
no information to sustain the charges made

Ben Franklin

D?.y

,

11

,

letter.

s

the
captain of the Baltimore, concluded that

of his officers and men.
accusations had exaggerated the misbehavior

not in accordance with the usual
"It would have been surprising, and
not been some drunkeness
experience with landing parties had there

amongst

th-^m as

monthly
they were supplied with money

.

most potent kind."
was plenty of liquor for sale of the

.

.

and there

Day admitted

"Men who do not get drunk are
confidentially to navy veteran Carpenter,
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not plentiful in the Navy and Marine Corps."

Concurring with Day's

conclusions, the Admiral urged the Navy Department to drop the case.

With the Korean station secure under Japanese occupation, the
American
Gulf of Chihli patrol assumed the primary attention o£ the
Since the Gulf was bordered by the Liaotung Peninsula

Asiatic squadron.

tip of the
and Port Arthur to the north, Weihaivei and Chefoo at the

Forts to the
Shantung Peninsula to the south and Tientsin and the Taku

Sino-Japanesc hostilitie
west, patrols cruised near the areas of current

Charleston and

^'he

Wet own. were

mainly responsible for patrolling the

remained stuck in a
open Gulf, while throughout the winter the Petrel,
River.
mud dock at Newchwang on the mouth of the Liao

Although he

to maintain his
occasionally joined the patrol, Carpenter preferred

center rather than
flagship Bal_ti!v^ at Nagasaki as a communications
the Gulf.
toss about on the rough winter seas of

arrived at Yokohama on December

7,

Vlhen the Yorkt^onn

Carpenter inunediately assigned her

to the arduous Chihli station.
captain, Connnander William Mayhew Folger,
established Chefoo as its watch
By late December the Yorktown had
"

snowstorms r,ade operations at
station, where ice, gales and blinding
sea almost in,possible.

Nevertheless, Folger responded to every

crew drilled in landing and
n.issionary's plea for help, keeping his

rescue operations.

warships, ignoring
On January 18. three Japanese

shelled the port city of 1X>ngchow.
a white flag raised by .missionaries,

west c£ Chefoo.

Folger investigated,

ruissionaxy leader.

coiror.unicating

with the American

that Folger infom.
The Rev. Calvin Hateer requested
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the Japanese of the mlssi-onaries

'

presence in the city.

that the Japanese had a right to fire on Tungchow.

Folger replied

"A state of

war exists, and, legally all foreigners that remain in the country do
so at their own risk."

Several days later the missionaries decided to

leave and Folger sailed up from Chefoo in a heavy snowstorm to rescue
them.

ladies

He picked up sixteen women and children, but "six men and three
.

.

.

all Americans," Folger cabled Herbert, insisted upon

staying "to protect their property, and to aid the Chinese, their pupils
and converts, with their counsel."

14

The Americans still at Tungchow made another effort to enlist the

United States Navy as an intermediary betvreen themselves and the

Japanese command, offering to surrender the city if it would mean less
bloodshed.

Admiral Carpenter considered such action "inadvisable and

dangerous," even if the missionaries approached the Japanese directly
and did not involve the Navy.
part, the idea was absurd.

As to any intervention on Carpenter's

"I am not authorized by the United States

Government to act as a mediator for the belligerent Japanese and
an
Chinese, and cannot, in consequence, be a party to forwarding
to use his
unauthorized communication from an American citizen offering
to the forces of
best efforts to have a city of one country surrender

another.

'

the Admiral
No sooner had the Ttmgchow matter quieted when

somewhere near San
received a telegram from a Baptist group stranded

San Saddle on the Shantung Peninsula.

Without charts to guide him.

Carpenter on the rescue
Captain Coffin of the C harles ton, dispatched by

mission, attempted to locate the missionaries.

At last successful in
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his search. Coffin rammed his cruiser through foot-thick ice in the San

San Channel until he reached a point three miles from land.

He then

used the ship's steam-launch, towing a whale boat, to traverse a narrow

ice-free channel to shore, vhere he rescued fourteen Araerican, British
and Swedish missionaries and their families.

Ch^r Le s^ton

>

Upon returning to the

the party found the cruiser frozen in the ice, and, as

Coffin later reported to Carpenter, only "by raimaing the ice and going
astern and then ahead with full speed," was the

shi.p

able to break

16

itself free.
At the same time the York tow n arrived at Ichowfu on the southeast

coast of the Shantung Peninsula to keep an appointment with some

beleaguered missionaries.

But the group had failed to reach the point

of rescue due to heavy snow, bad roads and the Chinese seizure of all

means of transportation.

Folger received a note from another missionary

ashore pleading "please do not go off vrithout them."

For two days the

captain maintained position, even when a violent storm threatened to
drive his ship onto the rocks.

He departed only after receiving word

that one of the missionaries. Miss Anna Larson, had contracted pneumonia

ou a mountain road and the others refused to leave her<

"We believe

therefore that God has something further for us to do here," the message
17

to Folger related, "and that he will take care of us."

with
Folger, Coffin and Carpenter became increasingly impatient
the missionaries.

The Admiral communicated that "as a class they are

precautions are
thoroughly helpless and irresponsible as far as taking
the best
concerned and by their lack cf unanimity of action would defeat

laid plans for their rescue."

In January Carpenter had ordered a
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fifteen-man guard for the Araerican consulate at Chefoo and urged
missionaries to go into the city "as it will be impossible to afford

protection to those that insist upon remaining in the outlying
dwellings,"

He repeatedly explained that his marines would not be

sent to protect the missionaries "individually and collectively" in

their own homes •

Yet they refused to seek refuge in Chefoo.

Exasperated,

the admiral expressed his dismay in a lengthy cable to Secretary of the

Navy Herbert
The missionaries appear to have no conception of a
state of war, as long as the danger appears to theia remote
they disregard all advice, preferring to remain to care for
their worldly possessions, rather than to prepare for possible
contingencies. Ifnen it becomes almost too late, and they find
themselves confronted vith dangerous conditions, they appeal
with pitiful energy for assistance, and start aimlessly for
the coast hoping for aid and succor. To them the presence of
ice along the shore and the absence of soundings on the chart
mean nothing, as long as they reach the seaboard at any time
they apparently think their responsibility ended.

The missionaries continued to trouble the Navy with unneutral
requests.

Mateer at Tungchov; urged Carpenter to forward a letter to

the Japanese general in command of the forces nearest his city.
"liave no

disclosed that eight Americans, who

He

connection whatever with

the Chinese Government or with the defense of the city," would "exert

ourselves to have

it-

surrendered by a flag of truce" if the Chinese

proved unable to defend it.
tlsie

Carpenter of course refused.

At the same

some missionaries just to the south of Chefoo requested help.

thick fog,
After stopping at a number of villages along the shore in a

Folger finally located and rescued

a

number of missionary f^imilies.

a decrease
After several hectic months of rescue work, the na^y recorded

seemed tranquil
in requests for aid and by the end of March conditions
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on the Chihli station

19

While the Yorktovm, Charleston and Baltimore steamed through
the seas on their patrols, the tiny Petrel sailed up the Liao River
to the north.

Carpenter had assigned this gunboat to protect

missionaries at Mewchv/ang.

Opened to foreign commerce in 1860, this

port on the Gulf of Liaotung had become an important trading nexus
for the Liao River plain.

As the

Fej: r€i]L

churned up the brown waters

of the Liao and approached the city, only the tile roofs of a few

temples and the v/hite tower of the Chinese Imperial Customs building

appeared over the high mudbanlcs bordering the river.

The gunboat

passed reed beds in stagnant water infested with mosquito larvae and

hundreds of trading junks heav>' with produce from the interior.

To this

city of mud, mosquitoes and fat cockroaches, the foreign missionaries
had fled, es^caping the Chinese armies who swarmed through the neighboring countr>-'side on their way to the war zone.

The Petrel had been sent

to protect them.

Unaware that the Navy Department had revoked orders to proceed
to Newchwang, Lieutenant-Cominander William Hensley Emory forced the

twelve-foot-draf t Petrel into an eleven-foot mud dock next to a smaller

British gunboat, the Firebrand

Petrel

^O'^l*^

for removal.

,

Inextricably mired in the mud, the

remain until spring rains could provide sufficient flotation
The crews of the two gunboats, preparing for an extended

duty station, constructed mud barricades around their ships and mounted

gatling guns at key positions.

Emory arranged accommodations for the
"
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foreign community if it

v;as

He drilled his crew daily

forced to seek asylum aboard his gunboat*

V7ith

bayonets, revolvers and gatling guns,

warning them all the while to avoid trouble in the port town, par21

ticularly since the streets swarmed with Chinese soldiery.
In view of the Petrel's immobility, it was fortunate that nothing

occurred to prompt the fulfillment of her mission, v;hich was to aid the
escape of Americans from Kewchwang,

There was only one minor incident

between a member of the crew and a Chinese mob, and no foreigners
requested assistance, except for the Rev. John Mclntyre, who borrowed
some Colt revolvers.
post.

Even so, Emory's ship was valuable as a listening

Closer to the actual battlefield than any other vessel, the

Petrel's intelligence people not only relied on Chinese informers but
could themselves count the troops and equipment passing through
Newchwang.

During January and early February of 1895, Chinese units

marched north and not much later, drubbed again by the Japanese,
swarmed back along the same roads.

Emory carefully recorded all

movements and kept the Department informed of war news-

On March

6

Nodzu of the
the Japanese occupied the city and General Michitsura
would be maintained
First Army called on Emory to assure him that order
of its mud dock and
With the spring floods, the Petrel floated free
22

left for Shanghai.
the Concord
While the Petrel was wintering in the north,

responsibility for the protection of

River region.

Air.erican interests

assuir.ed

in the Yangtze

placards
Anti-Manchu signs accompanied by anti-foreign

at the mouth of the river,
had appeared at the treaty port of Chinkiang

request a gunboac.
prompting the American convmunity there to

The
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Concord steamed as far as Wuhu on the Yangtze, exercising, according
to her commander, "a restraining and wholesome effect'* on this part of
the river-

Commanding officer Caspar F. Goodrich also made arrangements

with the captain of the German gunboat

II tis for cooperation in the

event of anti-foreign activity at Chinkiang.

Both vessels v?ould land

arxoed parties and gatling guns to close off the western settlement and

the Customs Residence,

23

In addition to his contingency plan with the litis

cooperated freely with the British along the YangtJ^e.
1894 he received a request from British Consul W,

R.

,

Goodrich

In December

Carles to assist

the Municipal Police at Chinkiang in clearing Chinese gun sampans away

from the landing pontoon of Jardine, Matheson & Company.
of arnied Americans went ashore.

Two boatloads

Goodrich justified this intervention

under his general mandate to preserve order and protect property.

Yet,

Concordes action in behalf of a British commercial house was of

little aid to the State Department's continuing attempts to convince

China that the United States was neutral.

Shortly after the favor to

Carles, the British consul at Wuhu requested a gunboat to settle some

reported unrest.
quiet.

Goodrich hurried to the spot, where he found everything

"My trip to Wuhu is justified," Goodrich informed Carpenter,

"in the confidence

it

has brought to the foreign community, which

includes a number of American missionaries.
Caspar
In January 1895 Cominander Joseph Edgar Craig replaced
same
Goodrich as captain of the Con cord and was soon pursuing the

energetic tactics as had his predecessor.

Upon learning that the

foreign meu^of-war
Taotai (Governor) at Ningpo had refused pemission for
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to visit his city and that the American missionaries in the treaty

port feared attack, Craig secretly arranged a plan with Consul "General

Jeraigan at Shanghai to force his

v;ay

into the harbor*

"I believe

that the situation demands that the flag of the United States be shown

on board a man-of-var at Ningpo," Craig asserted.

Without v/aiting for

orders from Carpenter, he steamed into Ningpo despite vehement Chinese
protests.

The Concord'

visit passed without incident and Craig

received the thanks of American Consul Fowler for strengthening his

hand in dealing with Chinese authorities.
'^^^

25

ashore to
Q2J}£9lA proceeded to Chinkiang V7here officers went

hunt game.

Chinese boy.

Instead they accidentally shot and slightly V70unded a

During the race back to the ship a Chiiiese mob managed

to seir.e one of the Air.ericans.

News of the incident reached the

American press which, for a time, threatened to exaggerate the affair.
As one editorialist raved: "Great fears are felt for the safety of the
entire party, as the Chinese are wrought up to an extreme pitch of

resentment."

Long before the first editorial, the incident had been

amicably and quickly settled by "the payment of twenty Mexican
wound by
dollars" to the boy's father and treatment of the superficial
the Concord's surgeon.

Jernigan, worried over the "graphic account"

pains to announce
of the Chinkiang shooting in American newspapers, took

that no one had been seriously hurt and no

one.

should be blamed for the

have resisted
affair, since even the President himself could not

hunting in Chinkiang, were he in China.

"Probably he is a better

officers appear to
marksman," Jernigan joked, "than some of our naval
be."^^^
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The Concord remained at Chinkiang without further incident,

suffering only

frorn its

own poor deck caulking which admitted a

dangerous amount of water during the torrential spring rains.

The

gunboat's patrol on the Yangtze had been an abrasive one, but fortunately,

matters here were not so sensitive as in the main

v^ar

theater farther

to the north.

The Tientsin station, protected by the decrepit, unscaworthy
Early

Hono cacy , became the center of American governmental concern.

in the war reports had circulated that Tientsin and Peking would be

attacked by Japanese forces.

"Pekin is Panic Striken,'^ the New York

H erald's European edition announced in late September 1894.

A^nerican

Board missionary Williara Scott Anient v^rote from Peking that foreigners
of
fear "Pandemonium" may break loose among the "unsavory elements"

the city at any time.

The British evacuated their women and children

them to
and American Laissionaries met with Charles Denby Jr. who urged

follow the British,
-to

Mews that Great Britain would employ Sepoy troops

and outrage
protect the lives of foreigners from brigandage, murder

hardly soothed the fears of Americans in Tientsin.

Unable to decide

greater danger
whether the Chinese mob or the Sepoy troops posed the
Sepoys were "no better
in China, one American commented that England's
turned loose upon us in
than the Hessians and the red savages who were
..27

the revolution."

the Chinese government
Under pressure from the foreign community,
m.aking it a crime
placed huge posters on mission compound walls
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punishable by death to harass foreign residents in the city.

Young

Denby, in a press release, assured Americans that reports of danger

in Peking had been greatly exaggerated.
his concern over false dispatches,

The acting minister told of

'^^atever their object, whether

to justify foreign interf erencej or to serve other purposes," he

cabled Gresham, "they

America."

V7ill

cause groundless anxiety in Europe and

Peking remained quiet and fears of riots decreased.

28

The bogey of anti-foreign violence reappeared shortly after the
On October 31 he

return of the senior Denby to his ministerial post.

wrote to Gresham of his concern for the lives of the sixty Americans
in Peking if the Japanese rnarched on the capital.

abandon

r.y

"I do not wish to

post, therefore I have written to Rear Admiral Carpenter,"

suggesting that the crew of the Moriocacy at Tientsin be increased by

fifty men and that the officer commanding be itistructed to send them to
Peking "upon my request."

Carpenter envisaged a recurrence of the

gunboat
Korean problem and objected to sending reinforcements to the old
Monoca^^. could
Re argued that the draf ty and cramped quarters aboard the

additional
not adequately support the existing crew, never mind fifty

men.

Further suggesting that fifty

n^en

would be insufficient to force

the Intertheir way inland to Peking, the Adirlral testified that

emergencies and
national Force at Tientsin would be able to meet all

refused to approve Denby's request.

Even Gresham quietly prompted

at the nearest treaty
Denby to advise the missionaries to seek asylum

station could protect them.
port where naval officers on the Asiatic

At the same time Denby's interpreter,

F. D- Cheshire,

Third Secretary Rockhill that "everything

is quiet

privately assured

here in spite of
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the news at home to the con trar}'-- there is no danger." 29
Yet Denby persevered.

In a dispatch to Gresham, he bypassed

Carpenter and requested the strengthening of the Monocacy'

crev?.

Denby succeeded in winning Gresharn's approval, who in turn convinced
Secretary of the Navy Herbert.

When the Bal timore arrived in Nagasaki

on November 29, Carpenter found orders directing the assignment of the
additional force to the Monocac y.

Reluctantly, Carpenter steamed to

Chetoo, where three officers and forty-two marines boarded a British

steamer bound for Tientsin.

The steamer arrived off the Taku Bar and

v/aitcd for earlier vessels to transfer passengers to landing lighters.

Facing a severe shortage of rations and the possibility of river freeze,
the coainander of the marine guard, Captain George Elliott, decided to
land his troops without perraission and shuttle them to Tientsin by
"I v;as well aware I had no right to land an armed force v/ithout

rail.

permission in a foreign country, but it was impossible for me to get
this permit within necessary time, so

on a tug/' Elliott later recalled.
"motley

crov;d'*

I

embarked the men and baggage

He marched his men through a

of coolies and soldiers, instructing the American marines

to apply "vicious; blows with the butts of their pieces" in order to

reach the train.

After an hour-and-a-half ride to Tientsin on an open

car in freezing wli^ds, the contingent enjoyed the relative warmth of
the leaky Mojiocacx.*

I'hey

purchased long sheepskin coats, fur caps and

gloves and settled down to ax^ait marching orders for Peking.

30

An Imperial Edict had forbidden the passage and entry of foreign
the commander
soldiers into Peking, but Admiral Carpenter had instructed

advisability of
of the Monocacj^ to use his own discretion as to the
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sending men there.

The Admiral reminded the commander of agreements

with foreign naval representatives which might make it necessary to
send an allied force to Peking and stressed Herbert's order to avoid

offense, "if possible," to either the Japanese or the Chinese,

Carpenter added his own warning.

"Although arms and ammunition

be provided, it is not expected that any occasion

v/ill

vjill

arise for their

use, and recourse to arms shall take place in an extreme emergency only

such as self defense, or the defense of the Legation against attack by
31

an irresponsible mob."
Even after the capitulation of Port Arthur and Danby's request
for reinforcements at Tientsin, Peking remained relatively calm.

Ament,

writing from the capital in December, noted that the Imperial Rescript
and the patrols of K^nchu bannemion at Christian chapels had proved
"The people are so

effective in curbing anti-foreign outbreaks.

overawed by these mult3.plied indications of care for us on the part of
the authorities that they hardly lift their eyes to a foreigner as he

goes along the street for fear they will be immediately decapitated,"

Denby advised the missionaries to remain in Peking if they felt secure
and appeared to believe that the Monocacy's reinforcements would not

be needed after all.

Then, without consulting other foreign repre-

sentatives, the Russian minister called his marines to Peking.

Denby cabled that he might act soon.

32

Herbert opposed rending the

dispatch
troops, but the Cleveland administration had authorized the
"other
of a guard if China failed to protect foreigners or if the

Powers send Marines to Peking."

The action of other western nations

assumed a central role in Denby's ruminations.

"If the other nations
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bring their marines hither and we bring none, and anarchy supervenes,
and mob violence breaks out, and my own people who are more numerous

than any, perhaps all others, are left without protection,
feel that I have not done my full duty."

I should

33

Gresham began to doubt the wisdom of sending troops to Peking.

Yang Yu voiced his government's opposition to the dispatcli of American
soldiers through Chinese territory.

Requesting that Gresham not

insist on sending troops, the Chinese minister assured the Secretary
of State that the Chinese government would protect the American

legation and the "presence of foreign troops as you request would
Gresham promised Yang that the United States

aggravate the situation."

would not insist upon sending troops "unless the other Representatives
ma'Ke similar requests of the Chinese Government."

stepped up the pressure from Peking.

Meanwhile Denby

He cabled news of his meeting

insisted on
with the foreign diplomatic representatives in which all
capital.
the right to convey armed guards into the Chinese Imperial

bring troops,"
"It is likely that Russia, France, /and/ Italy /will/
,34

Denby warned.

"England has now fifteen here and will bring more."

China as a
President Cleveland, regarding American marines in

violation of neutrality, shared Gresham' s reservations.

Tlie

latter

Carpenter's opposition
cabled Denby on January 1: "President thinks
that in no event will you
to sending marines reasonable and expects

do."
insist upon marines, unless other legations

Once again the final

of western powers rather
decision seemed to revolve around the actions

than the Chinese.

an alternative
At the same time. Carpenter suggested

to the transportation of

a

whether
marine guard to Peking, inquiring
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the American community might not seek the safety of heavily-guarded
Tientsin.

3^

In February 1895, reports of dic-turbances and mutinies by Chinese

soldiers increased.

Consul Read called missionaries of the American

Board and the Methodist Episcopal church to the refuge of Tientsin.
In conjunction v.dth Cormnander Robert E. Impey of the Konocacy , he

cabled Denby requesting one hundred more

at Chefoo.

Inipey

irien

from the American force

ordered Captain Elliott to visit Peking and

raake

ari'angeinents for the housing of his marines in the abandoned Dutch

legation.

Meanwhile, Denby informed Admiral Carpenter on February 21

that he V70uld request the fifty marines "in pursuance of the cooperation

policy which prevails in the East."

Aware that Denby was finally

prepared to call for American armed intervention, the Secretary of
State sent a last warning.

Legally the United States had no right

to bring up troops, Gresham cabled on February 28th.

"I do not find in

any of the treaties with China provisions authorising the protection of
the legations by foreign troops, but if other powers bring up marines you
ii36
arc autnorized to do the same."
,

_

After months of tension and false expectations, mob disorders
failed to materialize and Denby never made the final request.

By early

May the Monocac^ls reinforcements had returned to the Baltimore ^
Circunistance allox/ed the United States to avoid yet another situation

which could easily have compromised the policy of neutrality.

The

whether
American government had been extremely sensitive to the perils,
real or imagined, faced by missionaries in East Asia.

Troops had been

protective duties.
landed in Korea, a siseable fleet had been engaged in
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the administration had permitted the deployment of troops in China and

had almost consented to marching these troops to Peking against the
vishes of the Chinese government.
instructions derived more

existing conditions.

front

Once again State Department

principle than from comprehension of

Typically vague and sometiines self-contradictory,

such iiistructions virtually invited American diplomatic and naval

representatives in East Asia to interpret them loosely or even disobey
them.

Early 1895 brought peace feelers, providing the United States

with yet additional tasks to undertake in its role as a conscientious
and energetic neutral.

CHAPTER

IX

THE AMERICAN ROLE IN PEACE PRELIMINARIES

From the beginning of hostilities in Korea, European nations
had pressured the United States to join

vention between China and Japan.

thera in

nmltilateral inter-

As early as July 1894 Cleveland had

indicated that the United States wuld not participate in such an
arrangeKient

.

Yet rumors persisted that the United States would serve

in a mediatory capacity, or would at least offer unilateral arbitration.

In fact,

soHiO

Americans desired early mediation of the conflict.

In

September 1894 the American Review of Reviews insisted that the United
States

Thad a

duty to end the war on her o^n tenvs.

"VJe

believe that

any solution of existing Asiatic difficulties that the United States
should declare to be just and right would be promptly accepted by

Russia and England, as well as by the Asiatic powers theiaselves."
Ar^ericau pacifists agreed, suggesting immediate mediation.

The American

Peace Society even alluded to American participation in an interand reform
national police force which would guarantee the independence

of the Korean governiaent.

Leading pacifist Belva Lockwood was not so

patriotic about peacemaking.

She believed that the American branch of

worked as secretaiT,
the International Peace Bureau, for ^7hich she
or some other European
should submit a plan of arbitration to the Pope
1

leader

»

rather than to President Cleveland.

multilateral
Reports of possible Aiwerican partnership in a
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intervention increased in early October.

A New York Hera ld reporter

hastened to Assistant Secretar>^ of State Uhl's home on the evening of

October

5

determined to discover whether the United Str.tes contean-

plated involvement in Asian politics.

Uhl insisted that the State

Department had never received an official request for cooperation in
a program of joint intervention, but he refused to cormr.ent further on

the subject.

Pushed to discuss

^v^hat

the United States might do in the

event such a request should be received, another "official source"

revealed that the United States V7ould follov7 the traditional policy of

"absolute non«intervcntion in the East" and would not cooperate with

any power to effect a settlement of the war "except from a humanitarian
point of view."

Possible limitations en humanitarian action were not

2

discussed

On the following day Uhl received a

fornial

note

frOiH Mr. \L

E.

Goshen of the British Embassy inquiring whether the United States v/ould
participate in a projected joint intervention.

Uhl sent the note to

President Cleveland, then vacationixig at Buzzards Bay.

For alraost a

week the State Department waited for the President's reply.

Remarkins

chief on
that the British expected a prompt answer, Gresham cabled his

October 12: "Shall

I

say in reply to Goshen's note copy of which was

China and Japan
sent you that while the President earnestly desires that
to both nations
shall speedily agree upon terms of peace alike honorable

Germany Russia and
and not humiliating to Korc.a he cannot join England

France in an intervention as roquasted?"

Leaving the policy statement

replied, "Tnat is exactly
coiTipletely u? to the Secretary, Cleveland

what

I

was going to suggest in reply to Nr. Goshen

...

it is exactly
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right."

The President returned to the New England woods for more

hunting, and further pleadings from Goshen--£ssuring that any inter-

vention v;ould be limited to diplomatic axtion at
ignored by the State Department.

s

suitable time-»w£re

3

Pressure for American mediation came next from China.

On October

23 young Denby had learned that the Chinese Foreign Office would concede

Korean independence and pay a war indemnity to Japan, although at this
point China had not yet requested American mediation.

Later the Tsungli

Yamen called for the employment of American good offices under the first
article of the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin.

This article provided for good

offices to bring about an amicable arrangement of a dispute between

China and another nation, acting "oppressively or unjustly toward
China."

llie

senior Denby, now in Peking, immediately warned Gresham

that this would be a violation of American neutrality, since under this

arrangement the United States vzould in effect be recognizing Japan as
Furthermore, since

the aggressor and China as the innocent victim.

China had requested similar mediation from other powers, acceptance

would entangle the United States in a multilateral understanding
designed to protect China.

4
»

Yang Yu, using his friendship with Gresham to good advantage, had

already convinced the Secretary of State to extend an offer of
good offices for mediation to China.

him to make such an offer.

Araericaix

Gresham cabled Denby and instructed

China's request and Gresham'

s

instructions

to Denby each formulated without the knowledge of the other, arrived
at their respective destinations coincidentally

,

reinforcing China's

opinion that the United States had accepted the role of mediator under
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the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin,

Explaining that Denby's cable,

fon-7arding China's request and v^arning against its acceptance, had

arrived after the American offer of mediation, Gresham asserted that
"China's similar request addressed to the great European Powers may

somewhat embarrass the President's freedom of action/'

President

Cleveland would serve as an impartial arbiter only if China and Japan
accepted the United States as the sole mediatory agent*

As Gresham

announced, "He will gladly aid them by conference at this capital, or
in any other practicable way."

Washington further complicated the

situation when Cleveland hinted that he might cooperate

v/ith

other

pov/ers "simply in determining amount of indemnity if Japan's consent

obtained," thus opening the door to possible American involvement in
the post-war settlenent.

5

Gresham realized that he must attempt to clarify the American
position.

"It was not until China through her minister here, had

repeatedly requested it, that the President expressed his willingness
to act as peacemaker," the Secretary assured Denby.

At the same time

he explained American policy to the Japanese minister in Washington,
Shinchiro Kurino.
Atiiarica v?as

Ihe offer of mediation had been made not because

opposed to the war but because continued warfare might

Motivated by "sentiments of friendship

force European intervention.
toward Japan" and

iiot

by the desire to hinder Japanese military progress,

Gresham suggested that Japan express its willingness to initiate peace
talks which would prevent outside interference.

Therefore, Japan as

efforts
well as China was allowed to understand that American mediation
6

would aid its

cv;n

interests.
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News of the American offer reached the press about a v/eek after
it had arrived in Peking and Tokyo.

The usually-critical New York

Tribune, believing that American mediation vjould benefit Japan,

supported the latest American move.

This policy differed from the

Cleveland administration's "earlier diplomatic fiasco" (warning Japan
had been designed
to preserve Korean integrity) which the Tribune said

State Department's
to "dazzle the public and distract attention from the

other lamentable and disastrous ventures" in Hawaii.

Pro-mediation

because
spokesmen argued over whether to support the American policy
commercial
"it would materially advance this country's growing

mediate "v;ithout
interests" in Asia or because the United States should

personal interests or prejudice to warp her decision."

Others believed

be both commerciallythat the United States could at the same time,

oriented and impartial.

Selfish interests could not hurt the nation's

Japan or China would be
role as an "ideal mediator," since neither
favored in future Asian trade.

"The one possible objection to the

remembrance of Mr. Gresham's
acceptance of its friendly offices is the
the war," the Tribune
scandalous indiscretion at the beginning of

concluded.

and resorting to
Unaware of Gresham's assurances to Kurino

asserted that "Japan might veil
earlier form, the Republican newspaper
of
hesitate to submit her case to the judgement

a

Goverment whose

foreign policy was in such hands as his."
public opinion, most opponents
In line with existing patterns of

American efforts would be more
of American mediation assumed that
beneficial to China than Japan.

Ihey wondered why the United States

in what they called entangling
had m.anifested such a sudden interest
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alliances and suggested that Yang had manipulated the American
Secretary of State.

These critics asserted that the war had progressad

nicely for "the friends of progress and Christian civilization" and
By trying to stop the

should be allowed to take its natural course.

var, the United States allegedly played England's game, on grounds
that British commercial supremacy vms being threatened by continued

Tnese analysts ignored V7ell-publici2ed fears that continued

warfare.^

warfare might lead to European intervention against Japan.
VJIiile AiTiericans

silent.

debated possible mediation efforts, Japan remained

Not until November 15 could Dun report that the Imperial

Cabinet had decided to discuss the proposal.

On the next day the

Japanese "politely'^ refused to accept American mediation,

Gresham

not achieve
learned that while Japan appreciated the kind offer it could

directly
"the just and reasonable results of the war" unless China

approached Japan on the subject of peace negotiations.

China must humble herself.

In other words,

Japan indicated that it would accept the

American legation
Chinese proposals if they were transmitted through the

in Peking.

John G.
Gresham, accompanied by Secretary of Treasury

Georgetown retreat, Woodley,
Carlisle, drove out to Cleveland's suburban

and presented Japan* s reply to the President.

9

with earlier
Public response to Japan's rejection coincided

attitudes toward American mediation.

Generally, those who had favored

than a hint of criticism.
it accepted the rebuff with little more
States in this deliberate
"There is nothing offensive to the United
of a benevolent peacemaker."
refusal to take advantage of the good offices
.

After all, American diplomats could still

fu:K-.tion as

messengers, if
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not formal mediators, between the two belligerents.

The San Francisco

project the
Examiner predicted that even this limited role would

negotiations and enormously
United States into the center of the peace

increase its prestige in Asia.

The Louisville Courier-Journal

from its treaty role
maintained that the United States would now benefit

mediator."
without assuming the "thankless office of
praised the administration's humanitarianism.

Other newspapers

"The spectacle of the

referred to without question
United States as the friend of all peoples,

quarrels of nations, is one of which
as an unprejudiced mediator in the

Philadelph^
Americans should be proud." extolled the

Led^.

not

"IJe

trusted peacemakers in all
only keep the peace ourselves, but we are

parts of the world.

"^^

Japanese rejection as
Critics of American mediation cited the
evidence of more bungling,

another
"the Administration has received

India^apoli^
humiliation at the hands of Japan," the

Jc^

deserved the "snub" because of
Detroit News claimed the govermaent
had
contended that American mediation
its inept diplomacy. Detractors
with Japan's civilizing crusade
been refused since it would interfere

l-he

in Asia.

in the way of commercial
"China is such a stumbling block

thoroughly
a good thing for Japan to
be
will
it
that
East
the
in
progress
and
them of their unprogressiveness
shake up the Celestials and cure
of the advantages of
exclusiveness by a practical demonstration
business"
The war was "none of our
civilized and enlightened methods."

"an officious piece of meddling."
and Gresham's offer constituted
attack came from the
The most virulent anti-administration
accused
opponent of Cleveland. The PreNew York Vy^, a Republican
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the British

oi;

using Americans to preserve their trading supremacy in

Asia vhich was based on the infamous Indian opium trade.

Ttie

United

States by offering mediation had become the "tool of England in the

East" in supporting a decadent and detestable Manchu dynasty.

"For

the sake of the national honor and the American name, it is to be

hoped that this blunder will prove the last: that Messrs. Cleveland
and Gresham will cease to act as flunkeys to Lord Rosebery, and that

the President of the United States will conclude to adopt a foreign

policy that will no longer bring shame upon the country and confusion
upon himself*"

12

Despite the Japanese rejection, they had helped pave the way
themselves
for American participation in any peace preliminaries between

and China.

In the good offices agreements both Asian countries hnd

to keep
accepted American diplomatic representatives as messengers

lines of communications open between them.
such a role.

No European nation played

Minister Dun in Tokyo, Consul -General Abercrombie in

in Peking served
•Nagasaki, Consul Read in Tientsin and Minister Denby
the belligerents.
as the only means of official communication between

influence the future
Denby particularly relished this opportunity to

presence in Asia.
course of Chinese history, as well as the American
on the brink of
Denby told his friend Gresham that China appeared

a

that he wanted the
profound and historic transformation and indicated
a new China.
Ur.itcd States to be in on the shaping of

Believing that

with Japan according to
only he could assist China in its negotiations
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that the
accepted standards of western diplomacy, Denby suggested
to coir^unicate
Tsungli Yamen invest him in writing with the power

China's overtures of peace to Japan
Li Hung-chang
But before Dcnby could assume the role he desired,

attempted to deal directly with Japan.

The Viceroy, without the

his private agent,
knowledge of the Chinese Foreign Office, dispatched
to Japan with a personal
Custoius Con-^issioner G. Detring, a German,

letter to

Priir.e

Minir.ter Viscount Ito Hirobumi.

The Japanese government

that he was not properly
refused even to receive Detring. stating

discuss peace and would not be
accredited by the Chinese government to

recognized in any capacity.

Kurino

inforrr.ed

the American press that

not from Japan's desire to
Japan's rejection of Detring stemioed.
the success of any peace
prolong war, but from its atte.npt to insure

fully-accredited envoy.
negotiations by forcing China to send a

Japan without meeting Ito.
Shortly thereafter Detring left

Denby took

telling Gresham. "When I
personal advantage of Datring's failure,
the
of China to bring about peace
undertook to negotiate on the part
Mr. Detring.
Chinese Govenxment inunediately recalled

important enough even without
At the moment Denby 's role was

his exaggerations.

implied that it would
Japan's treatment of Detring

"^is
An,erican legation in Peking,
the
through
only
China
talk with
all peace
to transmit and receive
left Denby in the key position
relied on the American minister
proposals. Furthermore, the Chinese
as to help the
diplomatic maneuvering, as well
to interpret Japanese
Although he never acted as an
responses.
appropriate
Ya.en forruulate
the Chinese Foreign
a key adviser for
as
served
Denby
Official mediator,
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Office on "non- substantive matters" during prelirainary negotiations
with Japan.

In fact he found it difficult, at times, to convince the

Tsungli Yamen that he could not act as a mediator and conduct all the

negotiations for China.

"They even asserted that their Minister at

Washington had wired that the President had consented that

should

I

to the
act for them as commissioner to make peace," Denby revealed

Secretary of State in Dcceuiber of 1894.
his
While insisting the Chinese Foreign Office understand that

continued as an
good offices role could not include mediation, Denby

intimate adviser for the Chinese in the peace preliminaries.

On

peace talks to
November 27, vhen Dun cabled Japan's terms for opening

Yamen and advised China
Denby. the minister showed the cable to the
a fully-accredited
either to decline Japan's terms or to appoint

for the purpose
AKbassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of negotiation.

cable
China procrastinated, requesting Denby to

representative until the
Japan that China would not designate a
two countries were to
Japanese governnient indicated exactly what the

discuss.

China to accept
Denby fonvarded this niessage but pressed

Japanese terms.

16

on December
Having received another cable from Dun

Denby

2.

debate advised China to follow
visited the Yamen and after a lengthy
envoy.
Japan's directions and designate a peace

"I pointed out that

expense of China, and while
the war would now go ca at the

I

wished to

on war or make peace still it w
leave the Yamen perfectly free to carry
adviser, to say that unless they
my duty, as they consulted me as an
make
future it would be better to
hoped to gain great successes in the
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peace."

Denby, apparently concerned about overstepping his role as a

neutral representative extending good offices to a belligerent, took

pains to defend his advice to Greshara.

"Understanding that my Government

favors peace my effort has been to bring about that result, but I

ara

always confronted with the assertion of the excessive friendliness of
the United States, and V7ith a piteous and helpless reliance which makes

me an adviser when in truth
Governments."

VJiiether

anything but impartial.

I

am only an intermediary between the

tv;o

he realized it or not, Denby 's advice was
The Japanese would have been grateful had they

to
known how diligently Denby was working to promote Chinese surrender

17

their harsh terms.
China, apparently prepared to follovj Denby'

s

advice, agreed to

appoint a minister with full povrer to negotiate peace.

After rejecting

that it would
China's offer to hold the talks in Shanghai, Tokyo stated

ambassador arrived
appoint Its plenipotentiary only after China's peace
in Japan and presented his credentials.

These arrangements humiliated

outside of China.
the Chinese, who had never negotiated with foreigners

Denby told his advisees to surrender to this demand.

He patiently

nation to accept
explained that international law required a defeated
and he assured the Yamsn that
the site of negotiations from the victor,

Japan.
its plenipotentiaries would be safe in

Apparently convinced,

peace coiranissioners on
the Chinese Foreign Office appointed two

December 20th.
face.

game of saving
But China could also play the subtle

for the pui-pose of affronting
The two officials, chosen expressly

them. Shao Yu-lien, previously
Japan, were minor officials and one of

while Governor of Formosa.
had ordered pris.es for Japanese heads
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Nevertheless, as Dun cabled, Japan feared European intervention,
desired peace and would meet the Chinese plenipotentiaries at
18

Hiroshima.

Although Denby considered the Japanese terms "schocking /.sic/,"

he expressed relief that China had finally decided to negotiate peace.
of inducing
"I have, alone, done the troublesome and difficult work

China to sue for peace,

.

.

.

jealousy, distrust, ill feeling in and

out of the Yamen had to be overcome."

Believing his good offices

that "I have
duties finished, Danby assured Gresham on December 29th

done all

I

to
can to bring the two nations together and now it is up

19

them."

former Secretary
During this interval another prominent American,
involved in the Sino-Japanese
of State John Uatson Foster, became

peace preliminaries.

where
Foster had visited China the previous year,

the ICaiping mines and railroad
Li Hung-chang had taken him on a tour of

be exploited by American
Foster, hoping that China's resources could
schemes to introduce American
capital, had become enmeshed in several

investment into China.

Wilson,
He was involved with James Harrison

enterprises in China, and his
Delaware entrepreneur and promoter of
"infernal machine" plots early in
name had also been linked with the

the war.

appeared at the State
Now. in December of 1894, Foster

had requested his assistance
Department and informed Gresham that China
,

20

in the peace talks.
Department assign a clerk to
Foster requested that the State
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accompany him to Asia.

Gresham refused.

The Secretary of State

believed Foster's interest in the peace negotiations was purely
financial.

Besides, Foster was a Republican who had contributed to

the e>:pansionist activity during the last months of the Harrison

administration.

The Secretary wrote Thomas Francis Bayard, the

American minister to England, that Foster and

a Mr. Holcouibe of New

"You

York City had raised a large loan for China in the United States.
can readily see that if Foster is not already a very rich man his

prospects for becoming a millionaire are flattering."

Several days

later Gresham suggested the same to Denby, writing that "Foster's
trip will not injure him financially."

Ttie

New York World reinforced

in
Judge Gresham' s suspicions when it revealed Foster's complicity

raising a Chini loan with George Flint and Chaster Holcombe of

York.

Nev;

21

China.
Foster vigorously denied all allegations, then departed for

State
Whatever Foster's motives, Gresham carefully divorced the

Department from his mission.

Tne Secretary hastened to assure Kurino

to help the
and the Japanese government that Foster's intention
of the United
Chinese had originated "entirely without the sanction

States Gov't."

inquiry,
The following week, in response to a Senate

asserted that
administration spokesman Senator Morgan of Alabama

with any official act.
General Foster "has no connection in the world

Government."
or recognia^ance even, of the United States

Gresham was

anti-administration attacks by
determined not to open new avenues for
act in behalf of China.
an unneutral act"-espe.cially an unneutral

public servant's alleged
n.e Secretary also resented the former

mission on moral as well as
financial machinaticns and opposed the

178
22

diplomatic grounds.
Denby, meanwhile, continued as unofficial adviser and inter-

mediary.

He fonv'arded China's request for the names of Japan's

plenipotentiaries and inquired as to the exact spot for their landing.
Realizing that everything he had done had worked out in Japan's favor,

he informed Dun that Japan's treatment of China was embarrassing him.
Dun answered that Foreign Minister Kaitsu regretted that he could not
relieve Dcnby's embarrassment.

At this point, Denby further expanded

the authority vested in him under good offices.

Sending a message

directly to Mutsu, he advised Japan to treat China more gently.
influence in
Furthenr.ore, he pressed Washington for increased American

determining the outcome of peace talks.

"It would be advisable for the

the treaty
Department to consider whether supervision should be had of

friendly suggestions
making process, and whether good results might follow

made in the interest of the treaty powers."

He argued that the proven

it to act in
impartiality and friendship of the United States permitted

arousing the animosity of
a supervisory role, if it so decided, without

either belligerent.

Denby advocated American assistance in shaping

the settlement "for the benefit of humanity."

He added that he was

was only seeking to increase
not presentitng a case for either side but
commercial benefits
American influence in order to gain post-war

clause."
derived from the "most favored nations

He did not mention

role" for the United States.
Japan's earlier rejection of a "supervisory
for the Chinese peace
Denby had prepared a draft of credentials
that he had included the words
envoys, and he assured Dun and Gresh.m

"plenipotentiaries with full powers."

Supposedly equipped with these
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credentials, the Chinese negotiators left Shanghai on January 26th
aboard a French mail steamer and arrived in Kobe, Japan, on the 30th.
Foster, already in Japan, met the Chinese envoys at the dock and

examined their credentials.

As he later recorded in his memoirs, the

letters were "not in the usual form among nations" and he expected the

Japanese to refuse them.

Ito and Mutsu, after unleashing a propaganda

tirade against Chinese duplicity, refused the "defective and unsatisfactory" credentials.

returned to China.

The Chinese party, accompanied by Foster,

As one American editorial suggested, "even the

ornate whiskers of our own John W. Foster couldn't persuade the
from
Japan-se authorities to accept the credentials of those envoys

China.
too quickly.
Denby, almost as embarrassed as the Chinese, reacted

credentials but
He insisted that he had prepared standard diplomatic
for his, striking out
that the Chinese had substituted their own letter

treaty.
any reference to "full powers" for signing a peace

The

his work.
minister angrily castigated the Yamen for revising

"I

prepared by the Yamen should
demanded that any new letters of credence
they agreed to this demand."
be submitted to me before transmission and

victory at Weihaiwei, combined
Then Denby heard reports that the Japanese
Diet for "whatever amount
with the passage of a bill by the Japanese
the purpose of military
of appropriations may be necessary for

the Japanese refusal.
expenditure," had been the real cause of

This

as his anger toward the Yamen.
eased Denby's own embarrassment as well

everything before sending it to
Yet, in demanding that China show him
25
J- .
mediator.
a
of
authority
the
Japan, Denby had assumed
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Gresham iramediately recognized the rainister's assumption of new
powers.

He warned: "Wliile acting as intermediary do nothing that

v;ill

even appear to compromise in any degree this government's position of
impartial ne^xtrality between China and Japan."

Gradually Denby had

assumed an increased role in influencing China's peace preliminaries.

He had opened the door for American participation in the post-var
settlement but Greshaiu and Cleveland refused to enter.

pressure from Washington, Denby

Now, under

attesr.pted to raake amends.

Calling his

contribution to China simply "an unofficial act of kindness," he told
Gresham that he had done nothing to compromise American neutrality.
Yet he said that he would "severely heed the admonition."

Gresham

assured his friend that his efforts had not been "inconsistent with

our attitudes of impartial neutrality.
advice
At last China surrendered to Japanese demands and Denby 's
sole
by appointing Li Hung-chang, all his honors restored, as the

plenipotentiary with full powers to treat for peace.

At the same time,

United States to
the Yamen begged Denby to urge the President of the

request an armistice.

"I told

thei.i

that our position of strict

could not be
neutrality forbade such action and that their request
a telegram that
granted, but they begged me so strenuously to send

agreed to do so,"

I

would
Once again Dun warned Denby that the Japanese

powers to recognize the
not accept Li's mission unless he had full
of territory, an agreement
complete independence of Korea, the cession

further demands Japan might make.
for the regulation of trade and any
to make certain China understood
The Japanese govemm.ent i^str^lcted Dun

comply with them before dispatching
these conditions and was prepared to
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any more emissaries.

Japan assumed this

tougVi

position, German

military attache Speck von Sternburg wrote Theodore Roosevelt from
Peking, because the Japanese public was in a mood to accept only ens of
tv?o

alternatives, "some extraordinary bargain" or the capture of

Peking.

Wily Li Hung-chang delayed answering Japan, hoping in the meantime
to involve some western powers in the peace negotiations, thereby

substituting complexities for the frightening clarity of the Japanese
dcinands.

He visited Denby on February 21 and requested Aiiisrican

assistance in persuading Japan to discuss an armistice.

Li urged the

American minister to use his influence with Japan "to befriend" China.
no wise
Denby replied "flatly and firmly that my Government would in

nations"
intervene in the war, nor interfere in any way between the two

accept Japan's
and if Li really desired peace he should immediately

tenr.s

responses from certain
The able Chinese diplomat received more favorable

Russian ministers
European representatives, particularly the French and

later tripartite interin Peking and thus laid the groundwork for the
vention.

he
When Denby reported Li's machination to Washington,

assurances from the
indicated that the Viceroy had received no
28

Europeans
other powers, he certainly
If Li had wrung any comir.itments from
did not tell Denby.
in contrast

v.o

aid.
Yet he persistently requested American

Denby,

refused to
his earlier attitude, just as vehemently

compromise American neutrality.

"as
He drew the elder statesman aside

"unofficially and personally."
an old friend" and expressed his views
would only lead to the
Denby intimated that European intervention

182

with
dismemberment of China and that China should cooperate instead

Japan as a fellow oriental power.

He held out the prospect of China,

progressive, modern
Japan and the United States cooperating to build a
interference.
and enlightened post-war East Asia without European

China agreed to surrender
Xhis great end could be accomplished only if
to Japan.

29

Foster, Pcthick and
Noting that Li would include the Americans

wondered whether the
Dennison as legal advisers in his party, Denby
service.
United States might still benefit from this

Throughout his

prospect of increased
dealings the minister had kept in mind the
Ai^erican investraent in China.

Now, as he prepared to travel to Japan,

Li stopped once more to see Denby.

The minister suggested that Li

China's railroads, mining enterprises.
should achieve the power to refonn
guidance of such a program "in
banks and other resources, leaving the

people."
the hands of English speaking

In frankness Denby admitted

could officially arrange for
that neither he nor his goverx^cnt
was
rcforras, but he hoped that he
AB^ericans to participate in these
30

sowing seeds for future events.
in
and attendants, travelling
Accon,panied by over 150 officials

si.e and
impress the Japanese with the
tvo stealers. Li expected to
commented,
An.erican missionary in Japan
splendor of his retinue. An
in a canoe, he would
in hand and set out alone
grip
his
taken
had
he
nf
not likely
impression, as the Japanese are
an
strong
as
.uite
made
Kavo
up in the way of
a Chinaman can now get
anything
by
overawed
to be
indemnity
money left toward paying the
more
have
would
he
and
display,

that Japan will exact."

1895, Li and his
In any event, on March 20.
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troupe arrived at Shimonoseki , the site selected by the Japanese for
31

the conference v/hich V70uld open on the following day.

Though American interest in foreign policy had for some weeks

been distracted by troubles with the British in Nicaragua and in
Venezuela, news of the impending peace conference drew public attention

back to Asia.

Tlie

New York World competed with rivals to scoop the

House to
conference, assigning former Tok^o Times editor Edward Howard

cover the great event.

The Horld praised House for his cable on the

everybody."
peace preliminaries which made the daily "a day ahead of

focusing on several
Other newspapers discussed the prelimii-^ary teras,
Japan's terms and
major issues^-Chinn' s apparent peace "trickery,"

powers in the
motives and the disquieting interest of the European

peace negotiations.

in
Though critical of China's alleged duplicity

delaying the negotiations . press

cciranent

in the United States seemed

of European intervention.
far more concerned with the possibility
the villain of the East, would
Many believed that Russia, portrayed as

cause the most trouble.

aims,
If Russia blocked Japan's legitimate

"would have the moral sympathy
the New Yor>: Tribune threatened, Japan
aid of some rival of the Czar."
of the world, and perhaps the physical
shot.
that Li Hung-chang had been
Then, on March 26. Americans read

CHAPTERX
JAPANESE -AtSRICAN FRIENDSHIP

On

tlarch 24,

1895, Li Hung-chang was being carried in his open

sedan chair along the narrow streets of Shimonoseki

.

A young Japanese

a
fanatic, dressed as a laboring man, rushed from the crowd and fired

pistol point blank at the face of the Chinese Viceroy.

Ihe bullet

cheek bone.
entered just below Li's left eye and lodged deeply in his
foreign surgeons
The elder statesman was rushed to his residence where

examined him.

One surgeon expressed grave concern for the Viceroy's

further news.
life and observers, expecting the worst, axwited

Gresham

States "has heard
informed Yang Yu that the President of the United

occurrence and earnestly
with profound regret of this most deplorable
speedily recover from the
hopes that the distinguished sufferer nay

effects of his wound."

with
American newspapers, at last syrapathizing
1

headlines.
Li, carried the story under prominent
and his peace convnission
Several days earlier, when Li Kung^-chang

had imposed tight security
had arrived at Shirionoseki, the Japanese

along the route to the
precautions around Chinese quarters and

conferences.

Yet thousands of curious Japanese

in hope of seeing the enemy leader.

ja,T«ned

the roadside

For several days the Chinese

incident.
travelled back and forth without

On the first day the Japane

an
yet rejected his request for
accepted the Viceroy's credentials,

inMcdiate armistice.

Mutsu. the
Viscount Ito and Foreign Minister
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Japanese peace plenipotentiaries

»

indicated they might consider an

amiistice if China first agreed to surrender Shanhailc^^an, the Taku
Forts, Tientsin and all war munitions, as veil as paying the e:cpenses

The Yamen asked Denby's opinion of the

of the peace negotiations.

American minister offered some "unofficial

armistice

terras and the

advice."

Re, in effect, urged China's complete surrender.

"I said

this was severe but if they thought China could not defend these

places they should accept."

Ihis time, perhaps at last disenchanted

with American impartiality, the Chinese government ignored Denby's
advice.

refuse the
It resisted Japan's demands and ordered Li to

defenseless.
armistice terms vmich V70uld have rendered Peking utterly

where he had
Li Hung-chang was returning from this third session,
rejected the armistice proposals, when the

atterr.pt

on his life was

2

made.
at the wounded
Colonel Foster, Li's chief legal adviser, arrived
the embedded bullet.
envoy's apartment as the surgeons probed for

grasped the American's hand and asked

hixo.

Li

to return in the evaning.

held a private conversation
That evening a rouch-strengthened Viceroy

with Foster.

He told the

fortr.er

Secretary of State that Denby had

the slightest danger" of assassiassured hin that there 'Vould not be

nation in Japan.

and perhaps in the
Li had lost confidence in Denby

American government.

on Foster,
Now he began to rely more heavily

American good offices.
thus practically ending official

Foster regained

attack
his anger at Japan for the
constantly beside the Viceroy, calling
perpe^
and advice had prevented the
He clain^ed later that his presence
commission.
by the Chinese peace
tratlon of '^some grave indiscretion"
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In fact he promised Li that the attack "would turn out for the benefit
of China, as Japan would be less exacting in its terms.

„3

Foster asserted that Li's vound "was the most effective shedding
of blood on the Chinese side during the entire war, as it brought to

him the sympathy of the whole world, and made the Japanese plenipotentiaries more considerate of him, if not less exacting in the terms
of peace."

There was some agreement.

One American missionary in

been preferable"
Japan feared that "a defeat in a great battle would have
position. -Others
to this blow to Japan's prestige and bargaining

would have a profound
echoed the belief that the assassination attempt

effect on the peace negotiations.

"This is an almost unheard of event

the JourrSi 2L
in the histor>' of modern peace conclaves,"

of Labor reflected.

^

^nisilts

would
One American newspaper suggested that Li

favorable terms from the
take advantage of the incident to win more

Japanese.

terms than would
"He will probably be able to secure better

made upon
have been possible prior to the attack

him."

Some even

negotiations if the Japanese failed
suggested? that Li would break off
China as a result of this grievous
to grant a suitable concession to
&ct.

4

me

unconditional armistice on
Japanese government declared an

March 30, 1895.

April 20, 1895. met
This armistice, lasting until

probably
continuation of the peace talks .nd
a
for
terms
initial
China's
by the
for the embarrassment caused
except
granted
been
have
vould not
only
cessation of hostilities occurred
attempt on Li's life. Yet the
military activities
the anrdstice ignored
in the northern war ^one since
forward
In fact, the Japanese pressed
.hich continued around Formosa.
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in Formosa and the island eventually fell after a short-lived declaration of independence and pleas for French and British protection.

As one American observer noted, "It is now generally believed that

Japan vill demand the possession of Formosa as part of the war indemnity; but, anticipating probable objections by foreign pov7ers, the

Japanese authorities no doubt thought it wiser to capture the island
in advance, so as to have the advantage which actual possession

always gives."
The assassination attempt also propelled Li's two American legal

advisers into the main current of peace negotiations.

When Li Ching-

plenifong, Li Kung-chang's son, was appointed an additional peace

potentiary to assist his wounded father, the

yoting man's tutor and

his
intimate adviser Charles Pethick accompanied the new envoy in

conversations with the Japanese.
and intelligent American

.

.

.

According to Foster, this "cultivated

proved a valuable member of the Peace

guidance.
Embassy" since the younger Li heavily relied on his

In

from his bed, now
addition, Viceroy Li, directing peace negotiations

representative.
employed Foster almost exclusively as his

6

expert on international
John Watson Foster, seasoned diplomat and

national friend" of China.
law. Li later recalled, was "a great

"I

Foster the case might have gone
do not hesitate to say that but for
was by no means one-sided in his-on
more heavily against u., though he
taking the view of the Japanese."
several points in the dispute actually
of influence with both China and
Foster apparently had a certain amount
American missionaries
it himself.
Japan, although he may have magnified

claimed that when the

fomer Secretary

of State had arrived in Japan
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several months earlier, he had been influential enough to persuade the

Japanese government to curb anti-missionary writing by patriotic
Japanese intellectuals.

In any event, with Li confined to his bed and

as Li Hungthe armistice opening up the peace talks, Foster acted

chang

s

spokesman.

independence
On April 1, the Japanese submitted their terms— the

Liaotung Peninsula
of Korea, the cession of the southern part of the

million taels and
and of Formosa, an indemnity of three hundred
important trade concessions.

he was despondent.
were not final.

Wlien these terms reached Li's bedside,

But Foster assured the Viceroy that the terms

by no means
"I insisted to him that the case was

to several of the demands,
hopeless, that a good answer could be made

and that

I

of their ovm
believed we could force the Japanese, out

good opinion of the Chinese
sense of justice and their regard for the

nation, to make important modifications."

asked Denby's opinion of the terms.

Back in Peking the Yamen

But the minister, realizing that

refused to comment on them, even
he had lost the Yamen's confidence,
or Russia might intervene to
unofficially, despite hints that England

prevent the imposition of these terms.

8

for
stipulations and suggested answers
Foster examined the treaty

accepted these as the basis
According to Foster, the Viceroy
The Foster
to Japanese demands.
responses
Chinese
further
all
for
to accepted practices of
memorandum stated that Japan, contrary
occupied.
it had never actually
international law, demanded territory
each.

Japan's indemnity
the irresponsibility of
documented
Foster
Furtherxaore,
burdens _on the
indicating that excessive
deo.ands,
commercial
claims and
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Chinese government would create instability in Asia dangerous even to
Japan.

Li's adviser believed his memorandum influenced the final

Japanese decisions to relinquish some territory, as well as to revise
-the indemnity and commerce claims--al though it is more probable that

later pressure of European intervention played the key role in bringing

modification of the Japanese treaty

terras.

9

The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed April 17, 1895.

Edwin

Dun—

unlike Denby, Read or Jernigan— usually had avoided the long, editorial
type of dispatch, but this time he v/arned
Thus has ended one of the most remarkable v?ars of
It came upon the world as a
the nineteenth century.
surprise and its results have startled and bewildered
all but the very few who have closely observed and
studied the conditions existing in the East. With the
signing of the treaty of peace at Shimonoseki the
the
first chapter only of the history of the era in
East begun with war has been closed. The changed
conditions to ensue will be far reachiiig, not only
upon China and Japan, but upon the entire world as
veil. 10
on April 25th.
The details of the treaty reached Washington
all of Japan's earlier
Despite Foster's previous hopes, the treaty met
of territory on the
demands--tha independence of Korea; the cession

and the Pescadores; an
Liaotung Peninsula; the surrender of Formosa
^fatsu had always considered
indemnity of two hundred million taels

fifty million in six months and a
the indemnity negotiable), payable
thereafter at five percent interest
like amount every twelve months
and
ports to foreign manufacturing
annually; and the opening of treaty
Denby noted that Japan had already
machinery.
foreign
of
importation
the
China's final response. Perhaps
ratified the treaty and now awaited
acceptance
had contributed to China's
advices
earlier
his
that
concerned
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of a punitive and severe treaty, Denby sent a brooding dispatch to

Gresham.

He believed that the treaty terms were extremely harsh and

China was very unlucky, adding that Li's weakened condition prevented
his resistance for better terms and that the armistice, contrary to

popular belief, actually helped Japan capture Formosa,

"Tne cession

of territory is appalling," and it "makes Japan a continental power."

This bothered the minister mainly because Japanese "aggrandizement"

European
on the continent might upset the status quo and provide the

...

powers with an excuse for intervention in Asia.

11

Gresham,
\^hile Denby revealed his forebodings to

powers were already planning to intervene.

the European

German Under-Secretary of

former minister to China
State for Foreign Affairs, Max von Brandt, a
Hung-chang; and Count Cassini,
who had continued to communicate with Li
efforts to create a multithe Russian minister in Peking, coordinated

seizure of continental territory,
lateral European response to Japanese

von Brandt and Cassini gained the
l-hough rebuffed by Great Britain,
understanding designed to check
cooperation of France in a tripartite
continent.
Japanese ambitions on the Asian

On April 17, immediately

support
treaty. Russia requested the
after the signature of the peace
demarche," advising Japan to refrain
"friendly
a
in
Paris
and
Berlin
of

from occupying any mainland territory.

Ministers of the three powers

Japanese
and confidentially" to the
delivered their advice "verbally
of the
insisting that Japan.se occupation
23.
April
on
Office
Foreign
and
independence of Korea "illusory,"
Liaotung Peninsula rendered the
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would "constantly disturb the peace of the East."
sentative hinted that if Japan refused

t+ie

The Russian repre-

three might use their sea

power to isolate the Japanese armies in China.

12

The tripartite intervention evoked little surprise in the United
Throughout the war, Americans had predicted European inter-

States.

In fact, along with discussions of China's barbarism and

vention.

Japan's civilization, European intervention had persisted as one of the

more popular themes concerning the war. in the United States.

"Will

Europe Try to Save China?" a Springfield Republican leader inquired in
December of 1894^ and there had been attempts to learn the ansvjcr by
studying the European press.

For example, the European edition of the

New York Herald^ published comments from Europe alluding to possible
intervention.

One of these, from the English

MomiK^

Post,,

explained

China without
that it was "impossible to allow Japan to dictate terms to

world's
consulting the European powers," because "for the sake of the

peace

.

.

•

Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain must intervene.

Russia, often
The American press concentrated its resentment on
as a terminus for her
said to be coveting an ice-free port in Korea

great Siberian railroad.

"Russia is the one power that wants the earth,"

also have the sea."
and having got a vast area of it, she must

The

for the entire Korean crisis,
Russians seemed to have been responsible

peninsular politics.
"egging on" Japan and deftly mixing in

The

that Russia "has got a
Commercial and F_inancial Clvronicle warned

foothold on Corean soil.
all

;

claim it
The time will come when she will

independence or comes under Chinese
and whether Corea retains her

conceded.
rule, Russia's claim will be
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Despite current American opposition to British policies in

Venezuela and Nicaragua, Russia rather than England continued

main object of American criticism.

to be the

In March, Denby wrote Gresham to

keep his eye on Russia as the power most likely to disturb the future
He indicated that Great Britain and now Japan, as

peace in the East.

satisfied countries in Asia, would cooperate with the United States to

preserve the status quo in that area.
Department of Russian ambitions.

Sill also warned the State

He revealed that the King of Korea

believed Russia would assist him in ousting the Japanese conquerors
from his territory.

15

strengthened
Reports reached the United States that Russia had

Japan's fulfillment of her
its navy in Japanese waters and would block

treaty gains.

new
In addition, Russia had instigated the "curious

formed to deprive Japan
triple alliance." of Germany, France and Russia,

of its "legitimate" gains.

work
After Japan had completed the "noble"

of defeating barbaric China, the

York Tribune surmised

.

"these three

prowling around the scene of
great, chivalric. Christian Powers come
few
and whining and snarling for a
strife licking their hungry chops,

mouthfuls of prey."

"something not
Russian behavior toward Japan was

the
unparalleled in the histor-y of all
so
but
unjust
outrageously
only
in
that the other nations look on
past that one wonders not so much

gross
and France should abet such
Germany
as
Powers
such
that
silence as
It was only
Financial Chronicle added.
and
the
selfishness."

Cos^e^

to steal some of the territoxy
because "they each want an opportunity

the
of China without Just cause."

vould intervene.

Chro^^

continued

that Europeans
.

without outside assistance
Japan had won the victory
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of its triuznph.
and was entitled to the fruits

Japan had not exacted

"kept well
the spoils of war and^had
.ore than its fair share of

law and practice."
within bounds of international
in
that while Japan was justified
some editorials suggested
of Korea,"
to preserve the "integrity
Peninsula
Liaotung
the
taking

on the
quest for a warra water port
Russia's
blocking
also
it was
Asian power,
admitted that Russia, as an
News
Indiana^
Pacific. 0n.e
New
proposed interference." The
her
for
ground
had "so.e reasonable
would be .uch harder
Russia, however, that Japan
warned
Picavune
Orleans
.he Staunton W^ekl^ Ne^
in 1876.
been
had
^rkey
than
to discipline
fought
sympathize with Japan if it
would
Americans
.any
p.on.ised that
.ore civilised, the .ore
the
is
Japan
....
the
^.Kussia, because, "of
^t^^>
•
of eovernment
..^ n-r. her ton^i
form or
g
modern
more
the
progressive,
a "world..ide
Christianized." It would be
.ore
the
say,
.ake bold to
Japanese power
natural development of
the
blocked
Russia
misfortune" if
Japan should not
fact, no good reason why
in
is.
"Ihere
progress.
.

-3

.

see
States will rejoice to
United
the
of
people
interference, and the
fencing now in
in the diplomatic
victorious
victorious,
. off
.ff
come
the Japanese
j-

powers of Europe."
progress with the continental
more than
States might extend
united
..A
the
cne
that
Rumors persisted
•

eo„Une

...

^UUa.. cpacU.

.e.o...e.s Of

ana

,ro,..s~s

CM„a „o... P»3e..

a va..

.apan

»UH

.o^i.aM^ .a,Ha.
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to the ambitions of Europe, and

Orient complete and paramount."

V70vild

make Japanese domination in the

With the tripartite intervention,

some speculated that England and even the United States might join

with Japan in alliance systems to balance Russia, Germany and France
in the Far East.

The London correspondent of the New York Times

reported that England and the United States may have an understanding
to support Japan in its current crisis with the European powers,

although he revealed "it is impossible to hint at the sources of this
infonnation."

The Springfield Republ ican asked, "Have we a finger in

the pie?" and added that the United States should not become entangled

even as "a silent partner in the alliance."

But the Pica^mne insisted

that, while the United States must avoid entangling alliances, it

should realize that a policy of isolation might be obsolete.

Our

interests in the East were greater than those of any other country,

according to this argument, and appeared identical to those of Great

Britain and Japan.
Some disagreed that the United States should cooperate v?ith Japan

.

and Great Britain and instead advocated the exploitation of Japan's

involvement with the tripartite powers to the advantage of the United
States.

This view was based on speculations that a victorious Japan

Cleveland
would now covet the Hawaiian islands, the annexation of which the

administration had rejected.

The Fr ovidenc_e Journal noted that the

that during
Japanese had the largest male population on the islands and

the war these Japanese had daily drilled as militia.

"With the

turn their
Chinese war ended, the Mikado and his advisers may well
the
attention more seriously to other fields of conquest," and at
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present time the United States would be no match for Japanese expansion
into the Pacific,

Concurrently, the Cinc innati Commercial Gazette

predicted that Japan would sooa "sv7oop down on the islands

.

.

place them in subjection to what is called the light of Asia."

.

and
The

Sp ringfiel d Republ ican revealed that it would be easy for a force of

one thousand Japanese regulars to combine with the indigenous Japanese

population of 20,000 and seize the island republic for Japan*

Thus,

the United States should use Japan's probleras v^ith Europe to secure
"If we had an

assurances from Japan that it will leave Havaii alone.

Administration thoroughly American," the New York Tribune concluded,
and "if there were at Washington

a

statesman of sufficient breadth and

earnest patriotism to care for American interest in every emergency,

there can be no doubt that important advantages could be secured at
this juncture which Japan would most readily concede."

19

Americans in Asia also discussed the tripartite intervention and
its impact on Oriental politics.

Consul -General Jernigan indicated

possibility of
that the foreign community in China was obsessed by the
a world war over the peace terms.

"It is evident that Japan Intends to

dispute the ascendency of European nations for the

corrjnerce of

Asia

it may be
and that European nations will not yield without a struggle,

a struggle of force."

Jernigan observed that Russia would forcibly

view that less
oppose the cession of any part of Manchuria, "having In

neighbors than from the more
is to be apprehended from the Chinese as

warlike and restless Japanese."

He predicted that Great Britain then

Germany and perhaps
might oppose Russian policy by force, while France.
of Chinese bases
Spain, might suddenly discover the acquisition
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essential to their national interests.

"A great problem now confronts

State Department.
Europe and Asia," the consul-general warned the
of higher civilization
"Its solution may be in blood, or the agency
^20
peace."
of
interest
the
may be invoked to solve it in

Sheridan P. Read in
Meanwhile, both Lafcadio Hearn in Japan and
ships.
Chefoo observed the deployment of Russian

"The hea^o^ Russian

Hearn recorded.
battleships were stripped for fighting,"

Consul Read,

ratification conference, watched
arriving in Chefoo shortly before the
their ironclads.
the crews of Russian warships camouflage

He counted

and a merchantman leaded with
nine men-of-war, three torpedo boats
in front of the Japanese
munitions assembled in the harbor directly

waterfront residences.

watched
"Russia's movements are being keenly

Japan
that she will declare war against
as it is thought likely by all
a
comply with Russia's demands for
in the event that Japan refuses to
of Peace.
modification of certain terms in the Treaty

secretary F. D. Cheshire
On the other hand, Peking legation
idea of
"merely a bluff" and that the
was
action
Russian
that
believed
Board
was ridiculous. But American
French and German participation

hoped Russia would fight Japan.
missionary William Scott Ament

He

rescued
intervention quite righteously had
believed that the tripartite
the
Japan should not complain "if
domination.
Japanese
from
China
N. Allen, noting
is denied her." Horace
robber
highway
a
of
privilege
everything in Korea and remembering
controlling
were
Japanese
that the
at the
king, expressed excitement
Korean
the
with
influence
his days of
cheeky
off the shoulder of the
knocked
chip
"the
observing
prospect of
Department.
Allen's friend in the State
little Jap . . .
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William W. Rockhill, agreed.

"Like you I dislike to see the Japs so

Rockhill.
belauded for a parade campaign," a friend v/rote

"Perhaps

them on to complications
their vanity, which is stupendous will drag
if it does
with a European power-I don't care what one-and
.

.

rejoice.

I shall

.,22

Chinese.
The tripartite intervention delighted the

Denby

a delay in ratification
reported on May 1st that China had requested

another ten days to permit the three
of the peace treaty for at least

powers to discuss the issues with Japan,

Denby in Peking and Jernigan

hoped for European armed interin Shanghai both reported that China
Japan's terms. "This action makes
vention to prevent the imposition of
23

Gresham.
continuation of war probable," Denby informed

had learned that the Russian
In the meantime, John W. Foster

French and German representatives
minister. Count Cassini, supported by
in the Imperial Court to prevent
in Peking, had exerted his influence
treaty.
the Emperor's ratification of the

Foster, on the other hand.

treaty
the capital and defend the
urged Li Hung-chang to journey to
enemies
Li insisted that his many
before the Imperial Cabinet. But
the
begged the American to undertake
were too strong in Peking and
of State
hesitation, the fox-mer Secretary
mission himself. After some
Imperial city.
agreed and left for the Chinese
^

24

advice from the Viceroy's agents
Once in Peking, Foster accepted
"cheerfullyin favor of an interpreter
interpreter
Li's
discarded
and
made his
American legation. Also, he
the
and
Denby
by
supplied
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headquarters in the American compound.
his interview

v.'ith

Therefore, when he travelled to

the Cabinet (the "ten most influential men of the

Empire"), his mission appeared to be officially sanctioned by the

United States rather than by Li Kung-chang.
V7ho

Supported now by Denby,

had changed his mind several times on the subject of treaty terras,

Foster argued for ratification in front of the Cabinet, reminding
China's mandarins that the treaty was no longer Li's but the Emperor's,

because Li had been sent under Imperial rescript.

Ihe Emperor's

Foster's
advisers listened carefully and may have been influenced by
25

arguments since they urged their monarch to sign the treaty.

Japanese policy also contributed to China's decision.

Cognizant

strengthen the tripartite
that continued Chinese procrastination would
in ratifications
position, Japan refused the request for a ten day delay

immediate compliance with
On May 4 Denby recorded that Japan demanded
the treaty terms.

Several days later Dun reported that Japan "knew

of no reason to delay ratification."

Japan could take this hard line

with the tripartite
with China because it had reached an understanding
powers.

of ratifications of the
Still insisting on undelayed exchange

would "imrr.ediately aftenvards
original treaty, Japan indicated that it

Liaotung Peninsula, with the
renounce definitive possession of all the
provided the indemnity /was/
exception of Port Arthur and Talienwan,
relinquished.
increased to compensate Japan for territory

„26

praised Japan's
American Board missionary Devello Sheffield
on Asia by defying tripartite
"self-restraint" in not forcing warfare
the relief in Asia over Japan's
suggestions. Thomas Jernigan described
more thoughtful and circumspect
submission: "It is the opinion of the
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here that Japan made the better bargain in accepting the additional
indemnity, and leaving European nations the disputants over the

Manchurian territory."

Equipped vith Japan's assurance and increasingly

divided over the pux-pose of the three

pov-7er

arrangement, the ministers

of Russia, France and Germaiiy instructed China to exchange ratifications

of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Tnis China did at Chefoo on May 8, 1895,

^
,
thus bringing to an end na.ne months of var.
.

,
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No other v?estern power had been as intimately involved in peace

preliminaries and in the final treaty as had the United States,
^jserican diplo.^iatic representatives, empov7ered by their government to

offer good offices, had served as intermediaries rather than mediators.
Nevertheless, diplomats on the scene had enlarged upon their "messenger"
Apparently considering

role by acting as advisers.

Asia preferable to

a feared

strong Japan in

European partition of China, Americans had

China
taken Japan's side in the negotiations by consistently advising
to hasten the negotiations and to surrender to Japan's terms.
of
American support for Japanese treaty demands capped months

general admiration for Japan.

Throughout the war the American press

efficiency and
had praised Japan's progress, patriotism, industry,

spirit of aggressive competitiveness.

Japanese had seemed to represent
tarianism in Asia.

At the same time, somehow, the

deip.ocracy,

Christianity and humani-

true
They were "just like Americans" and the

"Yankees of the Orient."

Japanese propagandists had of course con-

task under the circumstances
tributed to the partisan enthusiasm, an easy
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China's wartime stereotype, on the other hand, had been repulsive.

Reinforced by Social Danvinian rhetoric and sensational journalism,

Americans criticized these backward, un-American people.

The Chinese

lacked patriotism, humanity and the drive for material progress.

They were lazy, heathenish and unintelligent.

Though awesome in sheer

numbers, they could not stand up and fight a much smaller opponent.

China represented superstition, stagnation, barbarism, evil and filth.
Thus, a majority of Ajaericans had felt that a victory for Japan would

be a victory for all mankind.
Yet, the Anserican government insisted that the United States

remain strictly neutral in the Asian war and that Americans display an

appropriate impartiality.

Cleveland and Greshara believed that

neutrality carried with it moral duties and responsibilities to foreign
nationals, American missionaries and the combatants themselves.

"Good

offices" meant more than a diplomatic technicality; it was a solemn

responsibility that had to be worked at diligently.

Tlie

more responsi-

bilities it undertook, the more vulnerable the United States became to
the play of circumstances.

The atrocity of a local warlord, the

rules
execution of a Japanese prisoner or any incident which could strain

in
too strictly applied, all threatened to enmesh the United States

foreign complications.

Ironically, the more intensely neutrality was

applied, the more it compromised itself.
based upon
Diplomats in the field often believed that policies

principle did not

m.ect

the needs of Asian complexities.

Washington's

made practical
formulas, sor.etimes too rigid and sometimes too vague,
iraplementation a virtual impossibility.

Yet, when ministers, consuls
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and naval personnel acted on their own the results v/ere usually further

perversions of their government's neutral policy.

Confusion and

unplanned partisanship were damaging to American prestige and hurt the
government's desire to increase its influence in East Asia.

If Denby

and others promoted Japanese interests in order to open Chinese markets

for American coimnerce or to strengthen the American position in Asia,
these hopes too proved illusory.

The "mysterious East" had fully

retained its mysterj' insofar as American diplomacy vas concerned.

Unintentionally American policies during the Sino-Japanese War
had obtained one valuable, if temporary, benef it--.the gratitude of
Japan.

that voiced
It was most satisfying to read statements such as

praised the
by a Japanese translator at the Chefoo conference which

American response to the war.

"American friendship to us has been

for same
consistent ever since its coinmencemant , and our appreciation
is daily increasi'ng."

Tlie

Emperor of Japan also sent his official

during the war which
thanks to Grovcr Cleveland for American policies

friendship and good
had "served to draw still closer the bonds of

neighborhood which happily united our two countries."

Reading such

their response to the
statements, Americans could well believe that

contribution to justice and
Sino-Japanese War had been an important
28

progress in East Asia.
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^^Skerrett to Herbert, June 8, 1894 and copy of a letter Sill
to Skerrett, June 8, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

^%orth China Herald, LII, June

15, 1894, p. 926.

NA,
^^Dun to Gresham, June 15, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 66,

RG 59.
NA,
to Gresham, June 18, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11,

^^SiU
RG 59.

Japan,
^^Tateno to Uhl, June 23, 1894, Notes from

5,

NA, RG 59.

Instructions, 1, NA,
^^Uhl to Sill, June 22, 1894, Korea,

RG 59.

l9.]^IL
S., Department of State, Papers MLSliilg. PS.
(yashington,D.C.
I
Vol.
Relations of the UniJ-lSl States 1894^,
cited as miS )
G5;;7i:r=tTri^Ii^^ Office. 1895), p. ix (hereafter
:

,

June 25. 1894, Korea.
2^Copy of joint note in Sill to Gresham.
edited out of
"Caucasian"
Dispatches 11. R^, RG 59 (the word
Area
Sill to Skerrett, June 25, 1894.
the printed docum.ent in mJS.) ;
10 File, NA, RG 45.
observers of international
27one of the more perceptive American
Consul Sheridan P. Read at
„nnric<, in Asia during 1894-1895 was
Tientsin, 4,
^1. June 26 and 30, 1894, Consul,
Jiei^sin. see^Read

L

NA, RG 59.

Instructions of
u
^„ n„r,
lojh, Diplomatic
TnnP zi^,
29 1894,
June
C4resham to Dun,
thereafter
Japan, Vol. 4, N-^ RG 59 (heieattei
the Department of State, 1801-1906:
New York Times, June 30. 1894.
.

c'lted

L

Japan, Instructions);
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Korean Minister to Gresham, July 5, 1894, Notes from the
Korean Legation in the United States to the Department of State,
Vol. 1, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes from Korea); China's
request in Read to Uhl July 7, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, Kk, RG 59.
,

Tateno's secretary kept complete notes of this conversation
typescript of Tateno-Gresham talks, July 7, 1894, Notes from Japan,
5, NA, RG 59.

^^Gresbam to Dun, July 7, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA,
China,
RG 59; also forwarded to American ministers in Korea and
Gresbsm to Sill, July 9, 1894, Korea, Instructions, 1, NA, RG 59
MA,
and Gresham to Denby Jr., July 9, 1894, China, Instructions, 5,
RG 59.
with
^^For the argument that the American refusal to cooperate
Iprei?^
Great Britain in Korea made war likely, see Philip Joseph,
^894-1900 (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1928),
^i£l$-J^:Z 12. 9hi^S.^
p.

71.

Francisco Fxaminer, July 18, 1894; New York Tribune,
Gazette, July 19,
July 19,T894; Kartford Pos.t July 20, 1894; Ensoria
1894.
^"^San

,

Philadelphia Lna.uirer quoted in Ne^.? York. Tribvine,, July 20,
Boston Globe. July 20,
1S94; S2lEEM±'E2}i^li£SIlr J"ly 20, 1894;
1894.
Gresham, July 24, 1894,
to Dun. July 19, 1894 and Sill to
note filed under date of
Korea, Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59; copy of
July 17, 1894, Cleveland MSS.

^^SiU

Sill, July 20, 1894,
to Day, July 23. 1894 and Day to
in Sill to Gresham,
Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; strict neutrality
U, Ni\, RG 59.
July 24 and 26, 1894, Korea, Dispatches.

Pill

Korea," Annual Re£ort of
^^G F. Elliott, "Marines in Seoul,
O^ashington, D.C. Government
the Secretary of the U. S. Nav^, 1.895
Deck Log Book of the
l7?nfg?§fTJc7: TS95), Fp."523-529. Also see
Navy Department National Archives,
USS Baltimore, Record Group 24.
File, NA, RG 45-.
Day ro"sITrrJuly 24. 1894. Area 10
:

to Sill, Aug. 3, 1894,
to Day, August 1, 1894 and Day
Area 10 File, liA. RG 45.

Pill
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CHAPTER II.

THE Ur?DECU^IlEB WAR

^New York Tribune, July 15, 1894.
2

Denby to Gresham, Mar. 16, 1894, China, Despatches, 94,

m,

RG 59.

^Gresham to Bayard, July 22, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS.
Biographical material on Denby in Richmond State, Aug. 9, 1894;
Charles Denby, China and Her People: Being the Observations, RemiVol. I (Boston:
niscences, ajid Conclu_sio^ns
Publishing
L.""C. Pa'ge & Company, 1 906,' reprinted by Ch'eng-wen
Company of Taipei, 1968), p. ix; John William Cassey, "The Mission
1885of Charles Denby aiid International Rivalries in the Far East,
Cali1908 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern
fornia, 1959).

criticism of Denby Jr. see Cheshire to Rockhill, June 16,
Howard,
1894 and Nov. 14, 1894, Rockhill MSS; also Gresham to D.
youth in Spr^Lt^^J ield_
Nov. 26, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS; callow
Republican, Sept. 6, 1894.

Sor

July 22, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59;
NA, RG 59;
Jernlgan to Uhl, July 23, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42,
NA, RG 59;
Sill to Gresham, July 26, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11,
Despatches, 95, MA,
Denby Jr. to Gresham, July 27, 1894, China,
RG 59.

\ead

to Uhl,

July 28, 1894
to Day, July 28, 1894, Day to Herbert,
RG 45.
File,
and Elliott to Day, July 28, 1894, Area 10

^SiU

Despatches, 95, NA,
to Gresham, July 31, 1894, China,
Letterbook, Gresham MSS.
RG 59; Gresham to Denby, Aug. 3, 1894,
Atlanta
York Tribune, July 3, Aug. 1 and 2, 1894;

\enby

See aUo New
Cons ti uition, July 31, 1894.

in Chicago l^Lbj^.
^Purchase of arms in New Haven reported
in S^^ngfield ReE.ybiican,
July 27. 1894; purchased in Hartford
94,
Bosto^, Gl^eV
1894 New England arms sales in
full 2
Conj^trtion. July 31, 1894.
war supplies in San Francisco in Atla?lta
,

Notes from the Chinese
\anc^ Yu to Gresham, July 30, 1894,
Department of State, Vol. 3,
Legation in the United States to the
from C.ina)
NA RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes
Tsungli
to Gresham, July .4, 189-.,
freedom of the seas in Denby Jr.
^
^Len to Denby Jr. July 28,
^f^l^'^sfr:

^^^^^^^^^

-^3/--L";o

L
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New Orleans Picayune, July 31, 1894; anLi-missionary threats
in Boston Globe, July 31, 1894; see also Read to Uhl July 28, 1894,
Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59.
,

^^Missionary women in Atlanta Cmistitutlon Aug. 1, 1894;
Greshan'c view of women in Matilda Gresham, yje. °i ^.^l^^^. ^^.^Xl%.iJl
Gresham, 1832-1895, Vol. II (Chicago: Rand HcNally, 1919), p. 741;
Writings, p. 355.
Cleveland's view in Parker, e.d
,

.

,

""^Gresham to Denby Jr., July 26, 1894, China, Instructions, 5,
NA, RG 59; also Gresham to Dun, July 26, 1894, Japan, Instructions,
4, NA, RG 59.

Yang Yu, July 31, 1894, Notes to Foreign Legations
China,
in the United States from the Department of State, 1834-1905:
to
Vol. 1, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes to China); Gresham
Dun,
Denby, Aug. 3, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS; also Gresham to
July 29, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59.

^^resham

tO-

^^Geography in Boston Globe July 27 and 28, 1894; for examples
and 29,
of illustrations and cartoons' see Chicago Tribune, July 26
185'^; t£XS^B~ Consecution, July 29, 1894.
,

Picayune,
Francisco Examiner, July 29, 1894; New Orleans
York Hera_ld quoted
July 28,18947 New York Times, July 28, 1894; New
^^S-^n

ii"!

P!Mi£

2£illi£a.'

(August 2, 1894), 417.

Tribur^e,
^^San Francisco Examin^^ July 22 and 24, 1894; gilcas.o
1894; also see
July 24 and 26, 1894; Chicago Inter:iOcean, July 24,
1894.
niidwesterm view reported in Boston Globe, July 26,

1894; Boston Glebe,
^Atlanta Co^tiJ:ution. July 24 and 26,
July 25, 1894.
July 25, 27 and 29, r894; New Ycn^ Tribune,
^

Pijinee| P££ss
^\3ew York Tribune, July 29, 1894; St. Paul
hearn.
XVII (August 2, 1894), 417; Lafcad.o
quoted
York.
New
(Boston and
21 ^J^I^Bese Inner Life
SiSoro:
Houghton, Mifflin, 1899), p. 9.

iTTuruFo^^,

nEElEd^

"Japan: Our Little Neighbor in th^J^^t,
July 29, 189^.
(January, 1895), 178; New York Tribune,

IWen
Arena, XI

It

H. Gardener,

225Japan," Arena, X (July, 1894),
20b. 0. Flower, "Justice for
236.
1894;
in San Francisco Exa^in^ July 2^,
^^Brigades and $10,000
Y
iT^. and New York Tribune, July 27,
^^fi ^^ff ^rrrr\„ fTe„
Atlanta Con^ajLuLiSn, July 27, 1894,
i"^*^
J^-" York
July 27, lb94,
Globe.,
Boston
in
Boston
T897~Ja7an^ in
anti-Chinese agitatxou xn San
sefN^ ?oymbunc. July 2571894;
Francisco' ExcHiuner, July 29, 1894.
.

m
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Julian Ralph, Alone in China and Other Stories (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1897), pp. 19-20.
28, 1894: New Orleans Picayune.
July 23, 1894.

^\tlanta Constitution. July
June 28, 1894; Chicago. Tribune
24

,

Boston Globe, July 21, 1894.

Julian Ralph, The Making of a J ournalist (New York: Harper
of China,"
& Brothers, 1903), p. 102; Frank G. Carpenter, "The Army
Atlanta Constituti on, Aug. 26, 1894.
X£Eli lines Aug. 1,
'''^SZliEgii^M 5£E3Mi££il' -^"ly 3*^'
LIX (August 4, 1894), 173;
1894; COTumercial an^
similar predictions in Brown, Mastery, p. 122,
'

China, II,
Ralph, Alone, p. 22. Other observations in Denby,
123.
p. 15; and Brown, Mastery,, p.

John W. Foster
^^Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 1887. p. 725 quoted from
Orient (Boston: Houghton Mifflm, 1903),
American Diplomacy:
p.

342.

July 29,
^^Discussion of Japanese army in Atlanta Constitution,
1894.

Power to Gen.
^°Vor armor plate and projectiles discussion see
Daniel S Lament Papers
Flager, Chief of Ordnance. Aug. 29, 1894,
as Lamont MSS)
^ ^"^1
Lib?-ar; of congress (hereafter cited
Chapter V, for
can be found
of the navies and individual ships
Aug. 3, 189-f.
Annapolis graduates see New York Tribune,

m

vere taken from an
^^Reports of the sinking of the KowsMnE
Constantin von H-neken who
eyewitness account by German mercenary
was attacked. Sill to Grcsham
was on board the transport when it
Aug. 13,
11; Denby Jr. to Gresham,
3, 1894, Korea, Dispatches,
RG 59.
1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA,

Zl

|lobj. Aug 2^ 1^
York TriK^ne,, Aug. 1. 1894; Boston
J^^y 29 and 31. 189-.,
other heIdTi^Ii~in Atlanta Consy_tuti£P-.
Boston Journal quoted in
Staunton Weekly Nev~TuT: 17^4;
xn Denby Jr. to
fSt"i?TbSkiurrT, 1894; Bovernment intelligence
95, hA, RG 59.
28, 1894, China, Despatches,

^\ew

^

cT^hl^J^y
1S94), 468i

Springjie^l d Republican

,

Au g

.

2

,

1894.
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Hearn to Chamberlain, June 8, 1894, Lafcadio Hearn Collection,
Clifton Waller Barrett Library, University of Virginia Library (hereafter cited as Hearn MSS)
36

Chicago Tribune, July 28, 1894.
37

Japan's lengthy statement in Atlanta Constitu tion July 29,
1894; Japanese consular comment in Chicag o Tribune, July 30, 1894;
New York Tribune, Aug. 1 and 3, 1894.
,

38

New York Tribune, Aug.

5,

1894.

39

Denby Jr. to Gresham, July 28, 1894, China, Despatches, 95,

NA, RG 59.

CHAPTER III-

UNEASY NEUTRALITY

Hiiyaoka to Greshara, Aug. 1, 2 and 4, 1894, Notes from Japan,
declaration of v/ar
5, NA, RG 59; for a translation of the Japanese
see Stead, ed., Ja^an by the Japanese, p. 10.
^China's official justification in Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 4,
Bayard,
1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59; Chang Yen Hoon to
Congress
of
Library
Aug. 12, 1894, Thomas Francis Bayard Papers,
(hereafter cited as Bayard MSS).
of cable companies found in New Yor^c Trabj^ Aug. 1,
Denby Jr. to
1894; for conditions of communications in Asia see
London
Gresham, Aug. 28, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, MA, RG 59;
York
dispatches discussed in Phil adelphia Times quoted in New

\ist

Tribune, Aug. 4, 1894.
Moore,
^Study of American neutrality laws in John Bassett
(Washington, D.C.: Government
A Dioest of Itite72^9I^
views of neutrality
PrintiT^ OffFce, 1906), pp. 859-1109; contemporary
Tribune, Aug. 7, 1894.
in Boston Globe, Aug. 1, 1894; New York
'

^San

Frang_is.9.Q

Ex aminer

,

Aug. 4, 1894.

7por example see Mclvor to Uhl

,

Aug. 13, 1894, Consul, Kanagawa,

NA, RG 59.

LIX (Aug. 6 1894);
^Commercial and Financial Ch_r^
Sept. 6, 189^.
Richmo:^d"stTr^Au£: 7, 1894; New YotOc Ti^bu
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United Mine Workers

^^

Journal

,

Aug. 2, 1894.

Journal of the Knights of Labor;. Aug. 9, 1894.

^^Ibid.

1894;

'

,

Aug. 2, 1894.

^^ltilHIL£9IL ISi^sMl. ^^.» ^^S- ^'
Advocat e of Peace, LVI (September,

Boston Globe, Aug. 13,
1894), p. 206.

^^Goods departing San Francisco in San Francisco Examiner,
^'
Aug. 6 and 9, 1894; pig lead in £p^J:nBliMl MEiiJzli^'
Tribune, Aug. 3,
View York Herald, Oct. 6, 1894; Armour in New York
18947 Hartley in New York Trinune, Aug. 5, 1894; Esmeralda and
Dec. 2 and 21, 1894; marine iniISi lorK Tribune
MillSeajHlis.
surance in New Yor^ Tribune, Aug. 28, 1894.
,

Ex^ri^^Gunrunners in James Allan, Under the Dragon Flag.:
1898);
Stokes,
A.
ences in the. giina-^^anesa War (New York: Frederick
1894,
SMth and"Cass case in Mors'e to Hart, Aug. 6, 1894 and Oct. 26,
College
Harvard
Collection, Houghton Library, by perraission of
Gresham, Sept. 8,
Library (hereafter cited as Morse MSS); Denby Jr. to
Japanese circular in New Yo^k
1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59;
in A^anta Consti^ion,
Sep*-. 24, 1894; Japanese Loyal Legion
Tribun<^
Richi?£nd Stat,^.
Au^'^eT 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 3, 4 and 6, 1894;
Examiner Aug. Id and 17,
Aug. 6, 1894; elite regiment in San Li^il2i?££
,

1894.

^\owacki in San Francisco
banker in New York T^Jsune

Ex^

Aug. 8, 1894; Altoona

Aug. 27, 1894.

Clarke see
see Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1894; for
con6,"l894. Wilde's infernal machine
Atlanta Constitution,
boats around an
iik^-orcW^Il^ined containers sown by torpedo called
^idalor explosions,
enemy fleet allegedly creating smoke
Despatches.
Dec. 7, 1894, Japan,
vave povcr" by Howie. Dun to Gresham,

^Sor Turpin

0^

68, NA, RG 59.

in Dun to Gresham,
^^Wilde to Tateno. July 3. 1894 enclosure
NA, RG 59.
Dec. 7, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 68,
to Chinese Minister, Aug.

^Vdrich

27,

1894. ibid.

Rockhill MSS.
^^.heshire to RockhiU, June 16, 1894,
Foster,
1894, Brazilian Minister to
some
was
There
KA.RG 59
68
_^
Sept. 5, 1894, Japan, Despatches,
confusion
adamantly denied that
heard of John
?:r;;i:L"i;L':n;thinra;oif the plot or had ever

^Vster
toscev

to
uu Moore, Sept. 5,
1.

,

f!-^^l^'^^l^]^:^^;:^r

Wilde,

Ne:H.

l2Sh

Ir.i^Hil£>

^'
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Moore to Wilde, Sept. 13, 1894 and Wilde to Moore, Sept. 17,
Japan,
Despatches, 68, tiA, RG 59.
1894,
22

Wilde to Moore, Sept. 20, 1894, ibid

,

"Letter of Guarantee" and "Terms of Sale of Secret," ibid.
The letters, at times, fit too neatly together and appear as though
the Japanese framed V7ilde and Howie. Yet, Japan tried to maintain
American friendship and almost immediately freed the tv;o westerners.
Thus it seemed unlikely that Japan v/ould go to such great lengths to
stir up controversy.

New York Times, Nov. 9, 1894; Gresham to Dun, Nov. 8, 1894,
Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59; also for impact of S^dnex affair
in Japan see Atkinson to Barton, Nov. 5, 1894, American Board of
Commissioners of Foreign Missions Collection, Japan Mission, Vol. 15,
Houghton Library, by permission of the Harvard College Library (hereafter cited as Japan Mission, ABCFM)

^^Gresham to Dun, Dec. 20, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA,
Read reported that they were procuring turpentine, gasoline
RG 59.
and explosives at Tientsin to be sent to Weihaiwei, Read to Uhl
Feb. 9', 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5, NA, RG 59; Howie's capture
reported in Carpenter to Herbert, Feb. 19, 1895, Area 10 File, NA,
RG 45.
Aug. 9,
^^Colt arms violation reported in San Franci^sc^^
and 18, 1894.
1894; Korean relief project in New York Tribune, Aug. 14
NA,
2'^Gresham to Dun, Aug. 30, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4,

RG 59.

^\errill

Vol.
to Hart, Aug. 25, 1894, Merrill Transcript,

Ill,

pp. 34-35, Morse MSS.

29pauncefote to Gresham, Aug.

7,

1894, Gresham MSS.

OA

New York Tribune, Aug. 5, 1894.

^Ipor exaraple San Francisco F^aminer, Aug. 22. 1894; Nfl X£rk
Pica Yune, Aug. 5. 1894.
Tribune. Aug. 6 and 15. 1894; New Orleans
Despatches. 95.
to Gresham. Aug. 10, 1894, China,
Aug. 10 1894. Denby Jr to Jern.gan,
NA. RG 59; Denby Jr. to Gresha.,
Ar..a lU
Jr., Aug. 1, 1894, all
Aug. 9. 1894 and Jernigan to Denby
File, NA. RG 45.

^henhy

Jr.

m

Sept. 17, 1894 and
33Gresham to Denby Jr.. Aug. 15, 1894.
5. MA. RG 59.
SeDt. 28. 1894. China. Instructions,
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Pixa^un^^ Aug. 8, 1894;
of naval resources in New Orleans
Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 20, 1894.

^\ack

Republican, Aug. 10, 1894.

^Senby

China, Despatches, 95,
Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 13, 1894,

NA, RG 59.

File NA^ RG 45;
to Gresha., Aug. 13. 1894, Area 10
China, Despatches. 95, NA, RG 59.
Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 18, 1894.

^Vnby

Jr.

File,
to Uhl, Aug. 15. 1894, Area 10

^\ead

N-A,

RG 45.

July 31, 1894.

"^^ClUca^o Int.er::Oce^^

40

Aug. 2,

Aug. 1, 1894; New Yo_rk Tribune

'Atlanta Constj^ut^^^

1894.
1-854;

in Oiicago Int.er::Ocean, Aug. 2.
^^Meeting
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Npt,7 York Tribune, Aug.
Atlanta Cm^sUtution, Aug. 3, 1894.
stu to Gresham.
Rev U. G. Unden.ooo
of
safety
concerning
Ur<^ies
^y.
11,
Sept, 26. 1894, Korea, Dispatches.
.

m

Japan, instructions, 4. NA,

^^Gresham to Dun. Aug. 15, 1894,
New^^ Aug. 30. 1894.
RG 59; bombarding in Staunton ^ieekl^
1894. China
Jr. to Gresha., Aug. ^4,

^\enby

95,
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25, lby4.

Tribjrne, Aug,
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Despatch
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„
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North
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Daniels,
of
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AF>CFH; Duryea Diary ^^Z- > '
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Virginia Library (hereafter
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quoted
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1894; Newark A^crtiser
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also see Boston Globe, Aug. 1,
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Aug.
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Aug. 2, 1894;
Philadelp hia Press quoted in New Y()rk Tribune,
£2^ill^:J°iiI^\'}''°^^'^
Atlanta Constitu tion, Aug. 8, 1894;
Aug. 15. 1894.
State
Richmoni.
1894;
iiriii York Tribmie, Aug. 4,

1^1^^.

,

Sketch of the
^°John Russell Young, "Li Hung Chang: A Character
386-395; also
Premier of China," Review of Reviews, X (October, 1894),
Re^niscences (New York
John Russell Young, Men and Meinories, Personal.
303-3:'.5; Read s evaluation
and London: F. TennylS^: Neely. 1901), pp.
Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59.
of Li in Read to Uhl Feb. 16, 1894, Consul,
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Also see Stanley Spector, Li Kun-Chana and the
of Washington
Nineteenth Century Regionalism (Seattle: University
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Press, 1964), p. ix.
Aug. 6, 1894 and
of Li as Bismarck in New York Tribune,
in Boston ^Lqbe,
Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 4, 1894; as Gladstone
Chron.icl^Iu7~i: r894r^niost able man in China see Pittsbura Li in
malevolent
Telegraoh in New York Tribune. Aug. 6, 1894;
York XriJ^n|, Aug. 15.
C^;^^nitr^'ion,'AirgT"lO. 1894; as modemizer in
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E2camiH^' ^ug. 19,

1894

^\alph

Lamont HSS.
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CHAPTER IV.

THE ORDEAL OF GOOD OFFICES

^Moore, International Law, VII, pp. 7-8.
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Despatches, 66, NA, RG 59.
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Greshara to Dun, June 30, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, KA,
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to Denby Jr., July 28, 1894, China, Despatches,
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^Allen to Rockhill, Sept. 14, 1894, Rockhill HSS; Carpenter to
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1895), 57;
Chines- War Ships," S^ientmc A^ierix^ LXXlI (Jan. 26,
LXXIII
American,
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Sept. 24, 1894, Area 10 File, NA,

Sino-Japanese
Later Herbert claimed he had used the
fleet in order to watch
War as an"^cuse to strengthen the Asiatic
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^Dodge, "Eastern War," p. 315; Sternburg to Roosevelt, July 30,
See also McClellan, "American Image," pp. 118,
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1894,
1894; China, Despatches, 96, N(\, RG 59; Ament to Smith, Dec. 17,
North China Mission, 17, ABCFM; for plots surrounding Li see Read to
Uhl, Nov. 14, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA., RG 59.
,

,

^^Boston Globe, Sept. 8, 1894; ditty on Li in New York Evening^
"frog" in
Sun quoted in Pacific Comnercial Advertiser, Nov. 1, 1894;
New O rleans Picayune , Oct. 8,. 18 94.

^^William Elliott Griff is, "American Relations with the Far East,"
also see
New England Marine IX, new series (Nov., 1894), 272;
XVIII (Feb., 1895), 137.
Missionai^ R^iew of
,

God in
^^New order in Foote, "War in Orient," 527; hand of
Nov.
24,
Richmond State, Nov. 28. 1894; and AU^ta Cons^U u^^^
18947 China worth preserving in Financial and ComiT^rcial_ Chromxle,
Ber.r in New
LIX (Nov. 10, 1894), 816; beasts of prey and Russian
^
Herald Oct. 3, 189^.
Prlear^ Pica:ffine, Nov. 15, 1894, and New York
.

^

York Ttxbxme^, Oct. 5, 1894; Read
of rebellion in
NA, RG 59.
to Uhl, Sept. 17, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4,

^%rink

^^Gee King in New York Tribune, Oct.
Nebraska rieeting in Pacifix Cor=merciai

5,

and Nov. 23, 1894;
Sept. 10, 18.-f.

Despatches, 96,
^°Denby Jr. to Gresham, Oct. 3, 1894, China,
1894, RockhiU MSS;
NA RG 59; Rockhill to Hippisley, Oct. 30,
also Nissionar^ Review
Hearn, Kob5 Chronicle, Oct- 15, 1894, p. 17;
29-30.
of the Worfd VIII (January, 1895),
_

,

1894; Pacific
21war scare in S^n Lr£Scisco Examiner. Oct. 14,
Oct. 1, 1894.
Coa-.ticrc ial Advertiser
,

and Japan," 300-301 James
^^Heard, Stevens and Martin. "China
correspondent visiting Korea in
Creeltnan, special New York florid
October {89?, also-^^^ted mining
World Nov. 28, 1894.
"Will Japan take them all?" New York
;

^Vf/'^r V^'^^'m^
.

^^Heard, Stevens and Martin,

ibid_.

,

305, 308.

Peace, LVI (Sepcember
^^"The War in Corea," Advocate of

,

1894).

204.

2Wrthur's

C£.^e rcial
sern,on and connnents on it in Zac ifi|
189^.
New Orleans Pixajmne, Nov. 12,

Advertiser, Oct. 19, 1894;
26

Rockhill MSS
Rockhill to Hippisley, Oct. 30. 1894,

Japan Mission 22, ABCFM.
^^-.rton to Learned. Nov. 24. 1894,
Vol. 14; Greene to
in Pcttee to Barton, Oct. 6, 1894,
Similar

vSs

223

sone, such as Rev. John L.
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York Tribune;
Times, Cincinnati Commercial Gazette New York Herald, New
Yamaji sketch in Creelman, Highway, pp. 94-95.
,

^Mutilations cited in Allan, Dragon Fla^, pp. 6&-67; Creelman,
Area 10
Highway, p. 109; see also Carpenter to Herbert, Nov. 29, 1894,
the Regent s
FilTTNA, RG 45; Notes on the War pp. 19-21; Inouye, "On
the Ja£an::Ch2jia. War,
Sword: Kinchow, Port Arthur, and Talienwan," in
,

pp. 1"12.
M^,
^D-nby to Gresham, Nov. 24, 1894, China, Despatches, 96,
in
dispatches
London
RG 59; K-w York Tribune, Nov. 24 and 25, 1894;
World Nov. 30, 1894
York"Tr^Sr^fo^29 and 30, 1894; New

]^

Ke^

and Dec'
8

9

,

and 11, 1894.

See Creelman, Hi ghway

,

pp. 80-114

alluded to Korean
^Creelman 's article from New York World, which
discussed in Sill to Gresham,
king^s "pitiful appeal" for U.S. aid,
NA, RG 59; Gresham derended
Feb! 20, 1895, Korea, Dispatches, 11,
Korea, Instructions, 1,
Creelman in Gresham to Sill, April 1. 1895,
NA, RG 59.
New

Xork
MSS;
to Rockhill, Jan. 26, 1895, RockhiU
ZJ,
Nov.
World to House,
World Sept 25 and 28, 1894; inquiries in
1894, Cle.ens-House
,
fir;afLVcol. Yaman^uchi to House. Dec. 1(hereafter
citea as
Collection. University of Virginia Library

^Vppisley

Kousa MSS).
^^New Yo_rk World

,

Dec. 11, 20, 23 and 24, 1894.

^

MSS;
HSlLl
to House, Dec. 13, 1894, House
Despatches.
Japan,
Dec. 20, 1894,
18, 1894; Dun to Gresham,
Dec. 17
68, NA, RG 59.

^^orld

Jan. 7, 1895, Japan,
to Gresham, Dec. 20, 1894 and
Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

^\un

Carpenter in Atlanta
York Tribune, Dec. 20. 1894;
New York World. Dec 22 1894,
ConstitulfeaT'jIn7Trr895; Gregory in
s reporting, ^J^^^S;
iS^^i^cTlna Herald questioned Creelman'
S ^.
notably American aiUes rev 1

^Vw

/

ertSlf-clI^fl^als.

(Jan. 4, 1895), p. 5.

Arthur," Public
in "Th.e Massacre at Port
l^Fhil.dclHhia
939-940
O pinion .l^mlB-ec. 27, 1894),

Staunton Weekly
l^Kansas Cit^ Journal quoted in

Ne:._s,

Dec. 20.
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Constitution Dec. 14, 1894;
1894J Port Arthur massacre, Atla nta
ABCFM.
Chapin to Smith. Jan. 18, 1895, North China Mission, 18,
,

^Scratch a Jap in New York World, Dec. 23, 1894; thin
Dec. 14, 1894;
veneer of civilization in Atl^njU C^nst^^
views in New
White Man in New York World Dec. 21, 1894. Similar
Arthur," Publi£
Orleans Picayiii,'l)ec 16,"l894; "The tessacre at Port
r^ll (Dec. 27, 1894), 939-940; Ljnc^r^-, ^ij^^
Repuhlican,
Jan 8 1895; also Sioux City Tribune, Bin^han^ton
Philadelphia Call.. IMlMeljehia Timej., St. I^uL^. f of.tj::Dispat£^,
Dec. 22, 1894,
W^'ilFton Star, Fort Worth Gazette in New York World.
Cincinnati
Jour^
Bosli^ Pplt, York Gazett e (Pa.), MirmeaDolis.
1894.
Co n-jr.ercial Gazette in New York World, Dec. 27,
,

.

Wu^

York World, Jan. 9, 1895; also Jan. 12 and 20, 1895^;
Truth About Port Arthur,
Feb. ll,"T895r'Frederic Villiers, "The
(March, 1895), 325-330.
^S£^ ^SliSSB. Mli^' "^^^

^Vw

Despatches, 68, Hk
to Gresham, Jan. 17, 1895. Japan,
in Ja£2iL-C.^liiia War, pp.
RG 59' Inouye, "The Fall of Weihaiwei,"
for the ^^P^f^ of the
"Motes on the Japan-China War," pp. 21-23;
Japanese troops near Wei, see New Yor^ Tribune,

^%un

landing of 25,000
Jan. 21, 1895.

Despatches, 68 NA, RG
to Greshan, Feb. 15, 1895, Japan,
Gyama
11--26; Copy of telegram from
59; Inouye, "Fall of Wei," pp.
N°tes from Japan 5 KA, RG 59,
reporting capture of Wei, Feb. 6, 1895;
Area 10 ^^1^
CaLenter to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 7, 1895,
Despatches,
97, R^.
to Gresham. Feb. 8, 1895. China,

rH?;

Deuby

RG 59.
Feb. 13, 1895, Area 10
^^Carpcnter to Secretary of the Navy,
and 27, 1895, Japan,
45; Dun to Gresham, Feb. 15,
i^^^^'
ISA, RG
Fi]e
File, 1<A
of the USS Charleston,
on Weihaiwei and
RG 24; Ust of foreigners found
1895
?:b'%7 2
by Captain Coffin
of capitulation of Wei forwarded
rc;py ; the
RG 45.
Area 10 File,
of thi Charleston . Feb. 22, 1895.

3^

*

tLf

.

22,

,,,3nity in Ne^ York Tribu^. Dec

7

18%;

Red Cross

see Nagao Arxga |he |£d £xp,
XCI (June, 1895), 232. Also
Exposition, 19C4), pp. 5 5.
Universal
Louis:
(St.
Jasan
of
^7,
1894, North China
23stanley to Bostwick, July 31,
f^^^^^'
brutal ty
medical service and Chinese
ABCFM;
ThirL^ YeaT^, PtTribune. Sept. 17, 1894; Christie,

Ucflf
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1

Cycle, p. 405; mutilation of Japanese wounded in A. B. de Guerville,
"Ihe Red Cross in the Far East/* Munsey^s Magaz ine, XIV (October, 18S;},
48.

View of Governor of Tientsin in Read to Uhl, Nov. 22, 1894 anf
Dec. 3, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59; Chinese firing on Red
Cross in Journal of^ the American Medical Association XXIII (JulyDec, 1894), 520; Toonan project in Uhl to Denby, Dec. 29, 1894, Chir=,
Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Nov. 24, 1894, China,
Despatches, 96, KA, RG 59; also see Staunton Wee_kly News, Nov. 22, l£r-.
,

^^Gresham's requests in Uhl to Dun, Kay 16, 1895, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59; VJar Department's requests in Dun to Greshar.
to Lamont, Feb. 28, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; also see
Colonel Dallas Bache, "Synopsis of a Report on the Medico-Military
Arrangements of the Japanese Army in the Field, 1894-1895, Proceedir.es
(^'^V^ 1896), 159-183; W. F.
Si^^jl Annua]^
Arnold, "Notes on Gunshot Wounds in Cases of Chinese Soldiers,"
(Washington, D.C.
IL.^- .^SXZ
^^HlHiL ^^^^1 £l
Governnient Printing Office, 1895), pp. 190-194.
^^Gravatt to Herbert, Mar. 30, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45;
Hospital
also C, U. Gravatt, "Method of Caring for Wounded in Field and
of Chinese and Japanese Arniies," Proceeding_5 Sixth Ajmual^ l^etin^
Surgeojis (May, 1896), 137-143.

CEfvPTER VIII.

THE PRQ-ECTION OF AflSRICAN CITIZENS IN
EAST ASIA

Mission,
to Smith, Sept., 18, 1894, North China
Sternburg to Roosevelt, Feb. 19, 1895, Roosevelt MSS.

^Chapin
ABCFM;

18,

fear
^Bigoted pagans in San F rajicisco E xam^^ Dec. 1, 1894;
plundering and brigandag
of unrest in New York Herald Oct. 3, 1894;
apprehensions and fears
reported in New York Tribune, Nov. 7, 1894;
breakup of missionary work
in New Or! ea'^JF'PLcVune', Dec. 28, 1894;
Noble to
preT^^^idT^^Ad^clte"f Peace, LVI (Sept. 1, 1894), 206;
AECFM; similar views
Lith,"jan. 11718917 North China Mission. 20,
China Mission, 18. A.CrM,
in Ev;ing to Smith, Jan. 21, 1895, North
Haydea in New York Her a_ld, Oct. 6, 1894.
,

great number of
^Cleveland in FRUS, 1894:i5. I, p. xxvii;
Oct. % 1894; river patrol
connnunications cited-IT^New York Hexajd,
1894, Cleveland Mc,S.
boats in Gresham to Cleveland, Oct. 2,

Vrbert

Reynolds Braiste;
directs cooperation cited in William
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The United States Navy in the Pacific. 1897- 1909 (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1958), p. 16; Carpenter to Frernantle, Nov. 7, 1894,
Carpenter to Herbert, Nov. 10, 1894, Commander-in-Chief of Centurion
(Frernantle) to Carpenter, Nov. 14, 1894, Pauncefote to Gresham, Dec. 14,
1894, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; public announcement of naval
cooperation in New York Herald Oct. 5, 1894.
,

^Sill to Carpenter, Sept. 17, 1894, Carpenter to Sill, Sept, 18,
1894, Carpenter to Sill, Sept, 25, 1894, all in Area 10 File, NA,
RG 45.

^Carpenter to Sill, Oct. 25, 1894, Sill to Carpenter, Oct. 26,
1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.
to Gresham, Nov. 2 and Dec. 4, 1894, Korea, Dispatches,
Jan, 17, 1895, Consul, Seoul, 1, NA, RG 59.
11, NA, RG 59; Sill to Uhl
''sill

,

^Sill to Coffin, Dec. 4, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Sill to
Folger, Mar. 13, 1895, Sill to Gresham, Mar. 16, 1895, Korea,
Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59.
to Coirananding Officer of Baltimore, Dec. 4, 1894,
Area 10 File, i^A, RG 45.

\lliott

"^cAdoo

to Carpenter, Nov, 19, 1894,

ibid

,

Carpenter
^^Day to Hayward, Macfarland, Newell, Schon, Morris in
Schon to Day,
to Sill, Jan. 11, 1894, Morris to Day, Jan. 12, 1895,
Horace N. Alien
Jan. 17, 1895, Statement of Rose Ely Moore signed by
Sill to
enclosed in Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Jan. 23, 1854,
Carpenter, Jan. 14, 1895, all in Area 10 File, RA, RG 45.
Secretary of the
^^Day to Carpenter, Jan. 12, 1895, forv7arded to
Navy, Jan. 23, 1895, ibid

^^Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 19 and 21, 1894,^
July 1. 1894Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Log Books of the Charleston,
1894-Mar. 28, 1895, NA, RG 24.
Dec. 31, 1894 and Baltimore Sept. 13,
,

1894, RA,
of the Yorktovm, July 1, 1894-Dec. 31
Secretary of the Navy, Jan. .2,
RG 24; Tungchow incident in Folger to
Navy, Jan. 29, 1895 Area 10 FUe.
1895. Carpenter to Secretary of the
Denby to Gresham,
NA "rg 45; see also New York Tribune, Jan. 8, 1895;
NA, RG 59; Noi_th China Mrald.
Jan. 21, ^895, ChinarDei^a'^'ches , 97,
LIV (Feb. 1, 1895), 156.

^\og Book

,

Carpenter to Donnelly,
to Carpenter, Feb. 2, 1895 and
1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

^\onnelly
Feb. 3,

^Sonnelly to Carpenter, Feb.
Feb. 8, 1895, Ibid.

6,

1895 and Coffin to Carpenter,
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Rev, Charles A. Killie to Commander American Warshi.p, Feb. 107
1895 and Killie to Commanding Officer Rescue Vessel, Feb. 12, 1895,
Area 10 File, KA, RG 45.

^^Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 13, 1895, Carpenter
to U.S. consular agents, Jan. 26, 1895, Folger to Carpenter, Feb. 5,
1895, Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 13, 1895, all in ibid

.

1

Matear to Donnelly arid Mateer to Gyama in Carpenter to
Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 13, 1895, Folger to Carpenter, Feb. 21,
1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Log Book of York town, Feb. 19, 1895,
K/i, RG 24; Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Mar. 13, 1895, Donnelly
to Coffin, Mar. 18, 1895, Griffin to Carpenter, Mar. 22, 1895, Carpenter
to Secretary of the Navy, l-Iar. 23, 1895, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG
45.
^^Newchxi-ang in Isabella L. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbours^:

Travel VJit_h an Ac count of the Recj;rit Vicissitudes and
Vol. I (London: John Murray, 1898),
o_f "t^^ C^
Pt^epFCond
'
pp. '216, 224-225.

A Narrative

cf_

^^Carpenter to Secretary of the Na\y, Nov. 29, 1894, Emory to
Log Book
Secretari' of the Navy, Nov. 21, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45;
of the Steamer Petrel Aug. 1, 1894-Fcb. 7, 1895, NA, RG 24.
,

^^Dun to Greshara, Mar. 9, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59;
Emory to Carpenter, Mar. 27, 1895, Area 10 File, I^iA, RG 45.

^^Goodrich to Carpenter, Nov. 8, 1894, Memorandum of Proposed
Event of Riot
P]an of Co-operation by the USS Concord and lUis. in the
Concord., Nov, 30,
at Chinkiang, Nov. 8, 1894, Carpenter to Captain of
Steamer Concord,
1894, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Log Book of
Oct. 12, 1894-April 30, 1895, NA, RG 24.
to Carpenter,
^^Carles to Goodrich, Dec. 6 and 7, 1894, Goodrich
RG 45.
Dec. 7 and 13, 1894, all in Area 10 File, m,
Cai-psnter. Jan. 21,
^-\raig to Carpenter, Dec. 31. 1894, Craig to
Jan. 25, 1895, Craig to
1895 Craig to Commander-in-Chief, Chefoo,
Jan. 30, 1895, all
Carpenter, Jan. 28, 1895 and Fo-.^ler to Carpenter,

m
^

ibid.
and 19, 1895,
^^Shooting incident in Craig to Carpenter, Feb. 9
1895, Consul
Area 10 File, m, RG 45; Jernigan to Uhl, Mar. 18,
Staujiton. Wea<<iy. Ne^^
Shanghai, 42, Wi, RG 59; newspajper account in
Feb. 4, 1895.
Feb."'?, 1895; New York Trib^

Smith, Oct.

1894,

2,
York Her^ad, Sept. 29. 1894; Arnent to
.ct.
Gresham,
3.
;894
to
North Ch'i:^ra MissTon, 17, ABCFM; Denby Jr.
Atlanta
England's Sepoy troops
China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59;

^Vw

m
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Constitution Oct. 8, 1894; a favorable view of Sepoys in New York
Tribune, Oct. 7, 1894.
,

oo

Denby Jr. to Greshani, Oct.
RG 59.

96,

8

and 15, 1894, China, Despatches,

29

Denby to Gresham, Oct. 31, 1894, ibid. ; Carpenter to Denby,
Nov. 19, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Gresham to Dsnby, Nov. 8,
1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Cheshire to Rockhill, Nov. 14,
1894, Rockhill KSS.
30

Denby to Gresham, Nov. 23, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA,
RG 59; Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 29, 1894 and Dec. 1,
1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Report of th_e Secretary of Navy, 1895--6
pp. 526-527.

,

^^Carpenter to Commander of the Monoc acy, Dec. 4, 1894, Area 10
File, NA, RG 45.
32

Ament to Smith, Dec. 17, 1894, North China Mission, 17,
ABCFM; Henry D. Porter, VJilliam Scott Anient: Missi onary of_ the Aj^^ri^an
Denby to
^93rd L2. ^i£S. C^^'^- "^o^-"^'^- Fleming H. Revell, 1911), p. 128;
Gresham, De'c 18, 1894, China, Despatches, 97, W^, RG 59.
.

^^Gresham to Denby, Dec. 19, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA,
RG 59; Denby to Carpenter, Dec. 22, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45;
Denby to Gresham, Dec. 22, 1894, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59.
NA,
^'^Grecham to Denby, Dec. 27, 1894, China, Instructions^ 5,
foivarded
RG 59; translation of cablegram from Tsungli Yamen to Yang Yu
to
Benby
to Gresham, Dec. 28, 1894, Notes from China, 3, NA, RG 59;
Gresham, Dec. 29, 1894, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59.
l^,
^^Gresham to Denby. Jan. 1, 1895, China, Instructions, 5,
NA,
RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Jan. 3, 1895, China, Despatches, 97,
File, NA, RG 45.
RG 59; Carpenter to Denby, Jan. 6, 1895, Area 10

NA,
^^Read to ITnl, Feb. 9 and 18, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5,
File, K\, RG ^5; Denby
RG 59; Impey to Elliott, Feb. 6, 1895, Area 10
NA, ^^^9; Elliott
to Gresham, Feb. 18, 1895, China, Despatches, 97,
1895, Area 10
Feb. 21
to Ir-pey, Feb. 19, 1895, Denby to Carpenter,
China, Instructions,
File, fLA, RG 45; Gresham to Denby, Feb. 28, 1895,
5, NA, RG 59.
,
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CHAPTER IX

•

AMERICAN ROLE IN PEACE PRELIMINARIES

TilE

Reviev; of Review s
X (September, 1894), 251; American Peace
Society in Advoca te of Peace > LVI (September, 1894), 206 and (November,
1894), 257; Belva Lockwood in San Francisco Examiner Oct. 20, 1894
fiichniond State
Oct. 4, 1894^

,

,

2
Nev7

York Herald, Oct,

6,

1894.

3

Gresham to Denby, Nov. 24, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA,
RG 59; Gresham to Cleveland, Oct. 12, 1894 and Cleveland to Gresham,
Oct- 12, 1894, Gresham MSS.
See also Joseph, Diplomacy, p. 73; Treat,
gnj,
Jgpgn^
492-493;
FRUS, 1894, I, p\ 70.
PPHil*
4

Denby Jr. to Gresham, Oct. 23, 1894, China, Despatches, 96,
KA, RG 59; Be^^l York Hei'ald, Oct. 6, 1894; V7arnings in Denby to Gresham,
Oct. 31 and No"v. 4, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59.

^Gresham to Denby, Nov. 24, 1894, conference in Nov. 6 and 8,
1894 and Doc. 26, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Denby to
Gresham, Nov. 19, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59.
\^arning acknowledged in Kurino to Gresham, Nov. 10, 1894,
Notes frora Japan, 5, NA, RG 59; Denby issued a similar warning to
China, Denby to Gresham, Nov, 16, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA,
RG 59; see also New York Tribune Nov, 11, 1894*
,

\ew

York Tribune, Nov, 13, 1894 and Boston Globe, Nov. 15,
1894; similar views in Literary Digest, X (Nov. 24, 1894), 9&-'97,
P

Sudden interest in New Orleans Picayune, Nov. 15, 1894; progress
and civilization in Atl anta Consti tution, Nov. 19, 1894; British
supremacy in New York Sun quoted in Literary Digest, X (Nov. 24, 1894),
96-97.
^Dun's note of November 15 confirmed in Gresham to Dun, Dec. 22,
1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59; Mutsu to Kurino to Gresham,
Nov. 17, 1894, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59; Gresham to Yang Yu,
Nov. 20, 189^, Notes to China, 1, NA, RG 59; trip to Woodley in New
York Tribu ne, Nov. 22, 1894.
22, 1894; San
Francisco Examiner, Nov. 24, 1894; Louisyj.Ile Cou rier-Journ al, Chicago
Opinion,
Reco7d, Philadelphia Lcdge_r and Ne}-; York Times quoted in Public
125-126.
XVil (Nov. 29, 1894), 839; Literary Digest, X (Dec. 1, 1894),

^\othing offensive in New York Tribune, Nov.

^^Indian apolis Journal and De.rroit News quoted in Fjibjlic Ooinion,
Naw Orleans Picayune,
X\^II (Nov. 29, 1894)"*, 839; stumbling block in
Nov. 22,
Nov. 20, 1894; officious meddling in AUanta Co nstitution
Heralcl,
York
New
1394; similar views expressed in Syracuse Post,
,

Philadelphia Press and Baltimore Araarlcan quoted in New York Tribune,
Nov. 23, 1894.

New York Press quoted in Literary Digest, X (Dec. 1, 1894),
125; a condemnation ot these "base partisan attacks" in Spring field
Republican, Dec. 8, 1894.

'\enby

m,

to Gresham,

Nov. 16 and 22, 1894, China, Despatches, 96,

RG 59.

^^Detring to Read to Uhl, Nov. 26, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4,
Springfield
NA, RG 59; also New Yo^rlc Tribune, Nov. 28 and 30, 1894;
Japan,
Republican, Dec. 9, 1894; Dun to Gresham, Dec. 7, 1894,
Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Jan. 14, 1895, China,
Despatches, 97, NA., RG 59.
Eiupir^
^^Denby in "non-substantive" role in Young, Rhetoric of
Dec. 1, 1894, China, Despatches, 97,
pp. 31-32, 241; Denby to Grashr-n,
NA, RG 59,

1894,
'•^Denby's advice to Yamen in Denby to Gresham, Nov. 30,
to Gresham,
Dec. 1, 1894, Chin?., Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; Denby
Dec. 2, 1894, China,
Dec. 5, 1894, Cleveland M3S; Gresham tc Denby,
Dun to
Instructions, 5, KA, RG 59; Dun to Gresham, Dec. 7, 1894,
all in Japan,
Denby, Dec. 18, 1894, Dun to Gresham, Dec. 20, 1894,
Despatches, 68, MA, RG 59.

Denby to Gresham,
^^Denby to Gresham. Dec. 8, 1894, enclosure
RG 59. Gresham also faced
Dec. 1, 1894, China, Despatches, 97, NA,
investigation into American Asian
the possibility of a Congressional
embarrassment, ££B£ressi£||l
policy and desired to avoid further
and 12, 1894, pp. 152, 2J/.
Record, 53 Cong., 3 sess., XXVII, Dec. 10

Despatches, 97. NA,
^^Denby to Gresham, Dec. 13, 1894, China,
1894.
Denby to Dun,
RG 59; Dun to Gresham, Dec. 20, 1894
J^.59, UenDy
Despatches, 68, NA, RG
Dun to Denby. Dec. 20. 1894, Japan,
1894, Denby to Grashara,
to Gresham Dec. 20, 1894, Dec. 21 and 24,
Dun to Gresha.
in Chinl, Despatches, 97 NA^ RG 59;
Despatches, 68, NA, RG j..
Dec. 25 and 28, 1894, Japan,

TJTTbCIu

^i^/'
3^''
l^Denby to Carpenter, Dec. 22, 1894, Area 10
RG 59.
NA, '^f
97,
Despatches,
China,
1894,
Denby to Gresham, Dec. 29,

f

^^Reports of Foster's early trip
Despatches, 94,
China, "'-'•^
jy^it, «-nina,
14 ?804
A.ril 14,
April
pr%QRG
59,
1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA,
Mifflin,
Memoirs, II (Boston: Houghton

found in Denby Jr. to Gresham,
NA, RG 59; Read to Uhl April
Diplomatic
roster, _j>
Tohn W Foster.
1910), p. 95.
.

^Icresham to Bayard, Dec. 24, 1894.
.6
and 30, .8
f ^J-?/^^;/^-^^
World , Dec. l9 ::;,'30
Yo_rk
New
MSS;
Gresham
1894,
Denby, Dec. 26,
.
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Kurino acknowledged and repeated the assurance in Kurino to
Gresham, Dec. 31, 1894, Gresham MSS; also Gresham to Dun, Jan. 15,
1895, Adee to Dun, Jan. 16, 1895, Japan, Instructions, 4, M, RG 59;
RG 59;
Dun to Gresham, Jan. 17, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68,
Cong res signal Record , 53 Cong., 3 sess., XXVII, Jan. 4, 1895, pp. 621622; Gresham, Gresham , p. 788,
23

Denby to Gresham, Dec. 31, 1894 and Jan. 2, 1895, China
Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; Dun to Gresham, Jan. 7, 1895, Japan, Despatches,
68, KA, RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Jan. 17, 1895, China, Despatches, 97,
KA, RG 59.
23, 1895, enclosure Denby to Yamen,
Jan. 23, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, MA, RG 59; Uhl' to Denby, Jan. 25,
1895, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Foster's view of Chinese
credentials in Foster, Ci£lomati£ Memoirs , II, p. 114; Japanese
*"Denby to Greshara, Jan.

rejection in Dun to
Despatches, 68, NA,
Despatches, 97, NA,
Despatches, 68, NA,
Nagasaki, 6, NA, RG

Gresham, Feb. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1895, Japan,
RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Feb. 5, 1895, China,
RG 59; Dun to Gresham, Feb- 15, 1895, Japan,
RG 59; Abercrombie to Uhl, Feb. 23, 1895, Consul,
59; Foster's whiskers in Bo ton Globe, Feb. 5, 1895.
5;

^^Denby to Gresham, Feb. 4, 1895, China Despatches, 97, NA,
RG 59; also see Dun to Gresham, Feb. 5, 1895, Japan, Despatches,
Despatches,
68, li^i RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Feb. 14, 1895, China,
97, NA, RG 59.
^*^Gresham to Denby, Feb. 7, 1895, China, Instructions, 5, NA,
RG 59; Denby to Greshaiii, Feb. 9, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59;
Gresham to Denby, Feb. 15, 1895, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59.
N^,
^'^Denby to Gresham, Feb. 16, 1895, China, Despatches, 97,
NA, RG 59;
RG 59; Read to Uhl, Feb. 18, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5,
Denby to Gresham, Feb. 17, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59;
NA, RG 59;
Gresham to Denby, Feb. 18, 1895, China, Instructions, 5,
RG 59;
Denby to Gresham, Feb. 20, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, N^^,
Sternburg to Roosevelt, Feb. 19, 1895, Roosevelt MSS.

^Vnby

to Gresham, Feb.

23 and 26,

1895, China, Despatches,

97, NA, RG 59.
NA,
to Gresham, Feb. 26, 1895, China, Despatches, 97,
and far-sighted
Denby's advice to Li appeared less ^/holescme
RG 59
face of selfish exchanges
advic-" and a "breath of fresh air'» in the
interpreted by Treat, 1^8. and
between the European chancelleries, as
to maintain American
Japan, II, p. 526, than the minister's desire
influence in China.

^Vnby

^%enby
RG 59.

to Gresham, ^^ar,

5,

1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA,

234

Read to Uhl, Mar, 12, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5, NA, RG 59;
Staunton V/eekly News Mar* 21, 1894.
,

32

World to House, Mar. 15, 1895; R. H- Lyman to House, Mar. 16,
1895, House MSS; New York Tribune Mar. 8, 1895; similar views found
in CojTCTercial and" Financial Chronicle, LIX (Dec. 22, 1894), 1081-1082;
Boston Globe , Jan. 22, 1895;' Nev; York Tribu ne, Jan. 31 1895; New
Orleans Picayune, Mar. 21, 1895; "A Dangerous Undertaking," Advocate
of Peace", LVI (December, 1894), 284.
,

,

CHAPTER X.

JAPANESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

Assassination attempt reported to State Department in Yang Yu
Dun to
to Gresbam, Mar. 29, 1895, Notes from China, 3, NA, RG 59;
Gresham, Mar. 28, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, N.\, RG 59. Li will
recover reported in Dun to Gresham, Mar. 25 and 28, 1895, Japan,
Yu,
Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; President's regrets in Gresham to Yang
in
headlines
Mar. 30, 1895, Notes to China, 1, NA, RG 59; newspaper
Mar. 25,
New York World Mar. 25, 26 and 27, 1895; New York Tij^une,
,

1895.
NA,
^Denby to Gresham, Mar. 23, 1895, China, Despatches, 98,

RG 59.
Foster, Diploraatic Memoir s, pp. 129-133.
Kar. 23,
^Ibid., p. 134; missionary view in Gordon to Barton,
of tl^e Kn^^l^
1895, Jipl^, Mission, 20, ABCFM; Journal
Picavmne, Mar. 25,
Orleans
Mar. 28, 1895, p. 1; better terras in New
predicted in Dun to
1895- break negotiations unless concessions,
RG 59.
Gresham, Mar. 25 and 28, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68,

Japan
^Possession wiser in Learned to Barton, Mar. 26, 1895,
Dun to Gresham, Mar. 29,
Mission, 22, ABCFM; armistice discussed in
NA, RG 59; New lork Iribune
30 and 31, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68,
1895, Notes from Japan, 5.
Mar. 30, 1895; Kurino to Gresham, April 1,
Denby to Gresham,
NA RG 59; New Orleans Ptcayun_e, Mar. 30, 1895;
Formosa JP-ode .n
RG 59
Ap^il 8, 18957 ChT^aTDilTatThes, 98, NA,
NA, RG 59, uutsu to
Kemper to Uhl. May 14, 1895. Consul, ^-moy, 14.
June 15 189^, ^^^^^^^
Kurino, June 12, 1895 and Kurino to Olney,
Morse to Hart, May 27, 1895 and
Olney Papers, Library of Congress;
June 3, 1895, Letterbook, Morse MSS.
_

Foster,

^i

DipT^!iat_ic

Memo^^

II, p- 137.

Mannix. cd
on Foster in Francis William

.

,

Memoirs of

Li.

235

intro. by John W. Foster (Boston and New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1913), p. 110; assistance to missionaries in Gordon to
Barton, Mar. 23, 1895, Japan Mission, 20, ABCFM; Atkinson to Barton,
Mar. 26, 1895, Japan Mission, 15, ABCFM. The missionaries objected
particularly to an article appearing in the Boston Congreg ational ist
claiming American missionaries were no longer needed in Japan, J. T.
Yokoi, "Ihe Religious Situation in Japan as Altered by the War,"
quoted in Christian Literature, XII (March, 1895), 265-267.

Hung. Chans

,

Dun to Gresham, April 14, 1895, Japan, Despatches,
68, KA, RG 59; Foster's advice in Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, II, p. 137;
Yamen asked Denby's advice in Denby to Gresham, April 4, 1895, China,
Despatches, 98, IJA, RG 59; see also New York Tribune, April 11, 1895;
Dun to Gresham, April 12, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, N.\, RG 59.
^Terras cited in

^Foster, piploroatic Memoirs

^%un
KA.,

,

II, p. 138.

to Gresham, April 16 and 18, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68,

RG 59.

^^Details sent in Denby to Gresham, April 25, 1895, China,
Dun to
Despatches, 98, NA RG 59; complete text of treaty sent in
RG 59; "Docu^.entary
Gresham, May 18, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68,
MarchHistory of the Peace Negotiations between China and Japan,
in Read
1-29
Ap-n 1895" (Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, 1895), p?.
Denby s views
to Uhl, June 13, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5, NA, RG 59;
98,
Despatches,
on treaty in Denby to Gresham, April 29, 1895, China,
NA., RG 59.
,

May 13, 1895,
^^Report of European policies in Denby to Gresham,
Diplomsci., pp. 124-.25;
China, Despatches, 98, FA, RG 59; also Joseph,
report on verbal demands
Treat U.S. and Japan, II, pp. 534, 538-539;
Japan, Despatches, 68, NA,
in Dun tS"Gr^ani. April 25 and 26, 1895,

RG 59.
^^Spri n^fiel d Republican, Dec. 24. 1894; Enzl^^d Y^SI^^^-^J^
inir^/Y^"Herald, Oct. 6, 1894; see also CoLojne G|?|ice

quoted
quoted in
Oct. 6, 1894.

l^^^~DiiE MY--.

^\ussia wants the earth

>

'''''

in Springfield

^^

Repi^c|H> Jfj^^'

July 30, 1894,
1894- egging on Japan in S£ring£i eL^ Rei^iyj^
Financial Chronicle^ ^^VIII
sc;ar;ble fo? Korea in Com^r7j1r_a.nd
(July 7, 1894), 10-11.

236

1

6

Curious new. triple alliance in New York Tribune, April 24,
1895; noble work and Japan's jackals in New York Trib^iHS.' April 27,
(^^y ^5,
1895; Russia unjust in Conunercial and Financi^ £l]X2Ili£l^>
1895), 907-908. For similar views see J ourna l. of_ th^e Knights of
Labor May 2, 1895; New Orleans Picaxiine, April 12, 1895.
,

^^Preserve integrity of Korea in Co mmerc ial and Financial
Chronicle, LX (May 4, 1895), 774-775; Indiana pol i_s_ News quoted in
"Russia and Japan," Public Opinion, XVIII (May 9, 1895), 501; New
April 19, 1895.
Orlean s Picayune April 27, 1895; Staunton
,

24, 1894 and Benign
in '*The
correspondent
Globe, April 20, 1895; New York Tirnes London
United States, England, and the Far East," Public 2?i£i2Jl' ^^^^^
April 27, 1895; New Orleans
(May 2, 1895), 470; Sp,rin£field, Rep^^^
Pi.cayune, April 17, 1895 and May 1, 1895.

^\umors in Lynchbura Paily Advance, Dec.

^^Providsncs Journal and Cincirmati Commej^ial. Gazette quoted
470;
in "KawaiTTiid' Jauan," VuhUc Opinion, XVIII (May 2, 1895),
1895.

^^Jernigan to

ITnl

,

May

2 and

11, 1895, Consul, Shanghai, 42,

KA, RG 59.

^^learn, Kokoro. p. 96; Read to Uhl
to Fnl, May 3, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5,

,

May 9, 1895 and Jeri^igan
RG 59.

MSS; Ament to
^^Cheshire to Rockhill, May 7, 1895, RockhiU
Smith. May 11. 1895. North China Mission, 17. ff^f '/^^f J^^^?''^'^'''
1895, RockaiU MSS.
M^v 2 1895 and Campbell to Rockhill. Mar. 2,
BouLll Greene. A New^EnglHidar
Juo
1927), p.
Greene (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin,

S

g J^^

iLts

and 2,
2\enby to Gresham, April 2.7, 1895 and May 1
May 11. 1895,
Despatched 98. NA. RG 59; Jernigan to Uhl,

1895, China,
Consul.

Shanghai. 42. NA, RG 59.
147-149.
^'Soster, 2l2i°E£Li£. MSlHilS.' Il> PP-

^^Ibid.
China. Despatches 98
26Denby to Greshara. May 4 and 6, 1895.
1895,
1895. Denby to Greshau,, M.y /.
KA. RG 59! dL to Gresha.. May 9.
Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

"Sheffield

North
to Smith, ftey 14. 1895,

ChiM Miasion.

U

21,

han^W «•
Consul
ABCPH; .'emisa. to ir„l , Hay U.
uenoy t
discussed in Denby to Dun. M_ay S, 18^5,
P'-chanpes ui-ov-uo
e.rt.cncingt;i>
to Gresham,
r)<?nbv
^
uenoy
68. NA, RG 59,
May 9, 1S95, Japan, Despatches,

May

8, 1895, China, Despatches,

98,

NA.,

RG 59.

See also Joseph,

Diplomacy', pp, 127-139.

28

Satoh to Griffis, (?), 1895, Griff is MSS; >iutsuhito to
Cleveland, June 18, 1895, Notes from Japan, 5, Wi, RG 59.

SOURCES CONSULTED
PRIMARY SOURCES

PERSONAL PAPERS AND MANUSCRIPTS
Foreign Missions.
Archives of the American Board of Commissioners for
Mass.
Houghton Library. Harvard University, Cambridge,
Bayard, Thom.as Francis.
Washington, D.C.

Correspondence.

Library of Congress,

Cleveland, Grover. General Correspondence.
Washington, D.C,

Library of Congress,

Barrett Collection.
Davis, Richard Harding. Clifton Waller
of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.

University

Japan Diary. Rev. Randolph Bryan Grinnan
Duryea, Martha Estelle.
Va.
University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville,
Papers.
Gresham, Walter Quintin.
Washington, D.C.

Letterbooks.

Library of Congress.

Rutgers University Library Special
Papers.
Griffis, William Elliot.
Collections, New Brunswick, N.J.
Hay, John.

Family Correspondence.

Library of Congress, Washington. D.C

Waller Barrett Library.
Hearn, Lafcadio. Collection. Clifton
Charlottesville, Va.
University of Virginia Library,
Southern Historical Collection of
Herbert, Hilary Abner. Papers.
Library. Chapel hill, N.C.
the University of North Carolina
Hobson, Richmond P.
D.C.

Correspondence.

Library of Congress. Washington.

Papers in the Samuel I^-i^J-/^--^
House, Edward Howard.
Charlottesville, Va.
University of Virginia Library,

Lamont, Daniel S.

Papers.

Collection.

D.C.
Library of Congress. Washington,

Special Correspondence.
Hahan, Alfred Thayer.
Washington, D.C,

238

Library of Congress,

239

to Sir Robert Hart
Merrill, Henry Ferdinand. Transcripts of Letters
Harvard University,
in the Morse Collection, Houghton Library.
Cambridge, Mass.

Michener, Louis Theodore.

Papers.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Lctterbooks.
Morse, Hosea Ballou. Transcripts of
Hairvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Olney, Richard. Letterbooks and Correspondence.
Washington, D.C.
Reid, Vniitelaw.

Outgoing Correspondence.

Houghton Library.

Library of Congress,

Library of Congress,

Washington, D.C.
Collection.
University, Cambridge, Mass.

RockhiU, William WoodviUe.

Houghton Library.

Harvard

Roosevelt, Theodore.
D.C.

Correspondence.

Library of Congress, Washington,

Young, John Russell.
D.C.

Correspondence.

Library of Congress, Washington,

UNPUBLISHED ARCHIVAL Rr,CORDS
Area 10. August, 1893Files of the Naval Records Collection:
Department Branch, National
Mirchri895. Record Group 45, Navy
Archives, Washington, DX.
r.

1

T

T^.^Vc

thP USS ^^^It^n-ore; USS Cbarle_s_toji

;

Steamer Concord;

Washington, D.C.
Branch, National Archives,

Department
Record Group 59.
of State
General Records of the Department
Archives, Washington, D.C.
of State Branch, National

Volume 13.
Consuls in Amoy
Despatches from United States
Volume 14. Jan. 1, 1895
August 10, 1891~Dec. 6, 1894.
Dec. 23, 1895.

Consuls in Canton.
Despatches from United States
Aug. 5, 1890-D3C. 29, 1897.

Volume 12.

Consuls in Chefoo,
Despatches from United States
Jan. 10, 1870-Nov. 26, 1897.

Volume 7.

240

Despatches from United States Consuls in Foochow.
Jan. 12, 1891-Nov. 27, 1896.

Volume

Despatches from United States Consuls in Hankow.
July 2, 1892-Dec. 30, 1899.

Volume 7.

8.

Despatches from United States Consuls in Kanagawa. Volume 20.
Sept. 3, 1894-June 30,
Jan. 13, 1893-Aug. 29, 1894. Volume 21.
1896.

Despatches from United States Consuls in Nagasaki.
Jan. 17, 1894-July 29, 1899.

6.

Volume 7.

Despatches from United States Consuls in ITingpo.
April 1, 1892-June 30, 1896.
Despatches from United States Consuls in Seoul.
July 3, 1886-Dec. 21, 1898.

Volume

Volume 1.

Despatches from United States Consuls in Shanghai.
April 1, 1893-July 31, 1895.

Volume 42.

Despatches from United States Consuls in Tientsin. Volume 4.
June 1, 1890-December 14, 1894. Volume 5. January 3, 1895June 5, 1896.
Despatches from United States Ministers to China. Volume 94.
Sept. 2, 1893-April 30, 1894. Volume 95. May 3, 1894-Aug. 31,
Sept. 1, 1894-Kov. 30, 1894. Volume 97.
1894. Volume 96.
Dec. 1, 1894-Kar. 16, 1895. Volume 98. Mar. 18, 1895-June 28,
1895.

Despatches from United States Ministers to Japan. Volume 66.
Dec. 7, 1894-July 31,
Sept. 2, 1893-June 30, 1894. Volume 68.
1895.

Despatches from United States Ministers to Korea.
June 1, 1894-June 30, 1895.

Volume 11.

Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906:
China. Volume 5. June 5, 1893-June 23, 1899.
1801-1906:
Diplomatic Instructions o£ the Department of State,
Japan. Volume 4. Dec. 5, 1890-Apr. 30, 1901.
to the
Notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States
1897.
Department of State. Volume 3. Jan. 25, 1892-Dec. 22,

to the
Notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States
1896.
Department of State. Volume 5. June 16, 1888-May 27,

241

to the
Kotes from the Korean Legation in the United States
1868-Jan.
4,
Department of State: China. Volume 1. June 3,
1899.

^he
Notes to Foreign Legations in the United States
Jan. 10, 188S'
Department of State: Korea, Persia, and Siam.
Aug. 11, 1906.

PUBLISHED DOClTKEfrrS AND REPORTS

Callahan, Edward William, ed.
CsmBiied
1775 to ^900. '^^ilei
United States and of the Marine Cotbs from
York.
New
^^~tM~0l^ciaj; Records of the Nav^ Department.
Haskell House, 1969.

^^f^^f^^

Paul Hibbert, ed

Civde

.

United

Stat^

LSil Loi^^

Policy. Tpj;7ard China: Di2_lomatic

Durham: Duke University Press,

1940.

C^

and Ja^an,
.be^weg^
Documeutari: Kistorv of the Peace Mg£ti^i2SS
The Tientsin Press, 1895.
ii25 . Tientsin:

""""liril-IiS
Lersen
Lensen

George Alexander, ed.
Geoi

o^^,^^,,i^^3

The DlAnethan Dis£at|n5S
Baron DlAnethan Belg^ian

^

Mipte|

Press, Tallahasee,
U;d7i?in^"i^rcooperation with the Diplomatic

Florida, 1967.

„
„_,c«ur«y^.oh^^
»

,

A
e..

Concerning.
-rd A^re-^nants with and
^gS^„^
-^JS^T^^y Press.
T^o-fipc;

1921.
of Int^rn^tio^^^^
Moore. John Bassett. A Mges t
Printing Office, 1.06.
Washington, D.C.: Govermr.ent
r
Palmer, ^pencer J.

,

ed

PerKorean-American Relatio_ns: Documents
,

TeStllfaSfl?rAnitajnI7ersity
Press, 1963.

of California

Sl/^^^^^^^ ^ ^

Meeting
Proceedings of the Fifth Annual
~'^^^-l^t-^:--^n7i^i: Earhart & Richardson, 18.6.

Sevena^

Aj^ai

Rfflort of the

miMS^ SSSSS^ 2i iil Methoai,^

242

Ep iscopal Church for the Year 1894

.

New York, 1895.

Missionary Society of the Methodist
Seventy -Seventh Annual, Revolt
Episcopal Church for the Year 1895. New York, 1896.
Military Information Division. K tp tes
U.S. Adjutant General's Office.
Series 3, No. 11. Washington,
on the War Between China and Japan
D.C.: Governi-nent Printing Office, 1898.
.

SurgeonU.S. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. Annual R eport of the
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
General., U.S. Navy
1895.
.

Cjontairnjng_ the
The Cojij^ressj^nal
U.S. Congress, Senate.
Third
|!Xoceedins3_ and Debates of the F if jty- Third Congress,
Session. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895.

of the
U.S. Department of the Navy. Annual Re2ort o_f the Secretary,
Printing
United Stat_es Navx, 1895. Washington, D.C.: Government
Office,' 1895.

Office of Naval Intelligence. No t es on th^ Yea^ls. Nava^
General Information Series, No. 14. Washington,
Progress,.
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895.
Papers Rel.atina to the Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.: Government
9l tlve ^ited States 1894^.
Printing Office, 1895.

U.S. Department of State.

,

MEMOIRS AND LETTERS

Allan, James.

>^ Experience IS.Jl^ ChinoNew York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1898.

Unde.r the Dragjon FlJ^:

Ja2.anese War .

A lferr|Live of T^av^l.
Bishop, Isabella L. Ko_rea. k Her Neighbours:
and Present Position
with an Accpun_t 'of the Recent Vicissitiides,
London: John Murray, 1898.
2 vols.
gFThe "country
.

of Lafcadio Hearn.
Bisland, Elizabeth. Tlie Lif_e and Letters
Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1906.

2 vols..

t^f^
^Du^

Manchu CaEit^I iH
Christie, Dugald. Thirty Years in the_
Rccoll_e_c.ti^ns of.
Moukden in Pel^Titd War: Beilia the
1914.
ChriiS'r C,^- New York: McBride, Nast,

The W_a|.d_erin£| pd Adventures
Creelman, James. On the Great Hi£hwaj.:
Boston: Lotnrop, lyui.
of. a. Special Corres2£Il^eTit
.

243

Denby, Charles. China and Her Peogl_e: Being, the Observations,
Reminiscences and Conclusions of an American Diplomat. 2 vols.
Boston: L. C. Page & Company, 1906. Reprinted Taipei: Cheng -wen
Publishing Company, 1968.
,

Foster, John W.
1910.

2 vols.

Diplomatic Memoir s.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

The Letters and Frie^^
Gwynn, Stephen, cd
Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin,
2 vols.
Rice: A Record.
1929.
,

Edited with
Hearn, Lafcadio. Editorials from the Kobe. Chronic le.
notes by Makoto Sangu. Tokyo: The Hokussido Press, 1960.
Sele ctions fr^ the C^orrespj>ndence of Theodore
Lodge, Henry Cabot.
New York:
Roosevelt and Henr^ Cabot L^dge, 188_^Lli2ii- 2 vols.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.
Chan^. With an
Mannix, William Francis, ed. Memoirs of Li Huna
Yor^:
introduction by Hon. John W. Foster. Boston and New
Houghton Mifflin, 1913.

^uth and North
Martin. W. A. P. A Cycle of Cathay, or China,
New York: Fleming H. Reveli,
'2nd ed.
'personal Remlnisc^^
1897.
Roo£|V£lt.
Morison, El ting E., ed . Letters of Theodore
1951-195-t.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

Kevins, Allan, ed. Letters of Grover
Mifflin, 1933.

^j^^^

8

vols.

Boston: Houghton

New York:

Cleveland.
Parker, George F. Recollections of Grover
The Century Co., 1909.

The Writinss and Speeches of Grover. CleXfliMCassell, 1892.

^ew York:

Hayashi.
The Secret Kexnoirs of Count Tadasu
ed
Pooley, A. M.
1915.
York and London: G. P. Putnara's Sons,
,

Ralph, Julian. Alo^^
Brothers, 1897.

^

Stories.

of a Journalist.
Brothe"rs, 1903.
Tl^e.

N'ew

.

mkin^

Tyler, William Ferdinand.
1929.

PuU..ija.

New York: Harper &

New York and London: Harper &

StrinsiL

ill

London: Constable,

244

Young, John Russell- Men and^ Memories Personal Reminiscenc es, Edited
by May D. Russell Young. 2 vols. New York and London: F. Tennyson
Neely, 1901.
:

NEWSPAPERS AND

JOURmS

Asterican Federationist ,

Atlanta Constitution

Boston Globe

.

.

Chicago Inter-Ocean .

Ch icago, Tribune

.

Eg:poria Gazette (Kansas)

.

Engineerijig. Nevs and America n

MilHSZ

^jSHSSSl*

Journal of the American Medical Association.
,

Jqutival of the Knio;hts of_ Labor.

L^mchbure, Daily Advance (Virginia).

Orleans Picayune.

Kev York Herald.

^ev York T ribune

.

Horth China Herald.
(Honolulu, Hawaii)

iSSJdlS. 9SSIlSI£Li^^

Ric hmon d State^.

gag Fi^an^isco Examine r.
^2IiPa.l}-.>'l^

Staunton

MHy!^ii£^^ (I-IaAsachusetts).

Ueeklj?:

Ne^

(Virginia).

245

United Mine Workers' Journal

.

contei-oporary article

Blodget, Rev. Henry. "After the War with Japan, What?"
Herald, XCI (December, 1895), 499-501.

"The War betv7een China and Japan."
"XCI (February, 1895), 51-55.
.

Davis,

Mission ary, Herald

"Two Years of Democratic Diplomacy."
American Review, CLX (March, 1895), 270-284.
Cushitian K.

Missionary

,

North

Davis, Rev. J. D. "The Vfer in Korea— Its Causes and the Present
Outlook." Missi.on^a£^ Kera]^ XC (October, 1894), 409-411.
in the
DeForest, Rev. J. R. "The Political Preparation for Christ
230-233.
Far East." Mi^ss^ionari Kera.Tj3^^ XCI (June, 1895),

"How Peace was Made between China and Japan."
Denby, Charles.
Foruin, XXIX (March, 1900), 713-719.

A Military
Dodge, Tneodore Ayrault. "The Eastern War, and After:
Study." Fonim, XT/III (November, 1894), 314-325.
"Marines in Seoul, Korea." Annual Rs£ort of the
Washington, D.C.
Secretary„ of the. Uiuted Stater. Navy^, 1895.
Government Printing Office, 1895, 523-529.

Elliott, G. F.

Flower, B. 0.

"Justice for Japan."

Are.na,

:

X (July, 1894), 225-236.

Ovet-land Monthly. XXIV,
Foote, Lucius R. "The War in the Orient."
2nd series (November, 1894), 524-528.

in the East."
Gardener, Helen H. "Japan: Our Little Neighbor
XI (January, 1895), 178-191.

Goto,

Arena,

the Japan-China
"The Military System of Quarantine during
War." Far Eas^, II (1897), 578-583.
S.

Far East."
"American Relations with
Griffis, William Elliot.
(November, 1894), 257 III.
New Er^lflid Magazine, XI, new series
Ham.:,

Margherita Arlina. "The Mongol Triad: -^^P-^'
130 \W.
1895), '.^S^iJ^'""'"
Cverland MontVOii, XXV, 2nd series (February,

Heard, Augustine; Stevens, Durham

TvT.ite;

and Martin, Howard.

"China

246

North Araertcan Review. CLIX (September,

and Japan in Korea."
1894), 300-320.

River."
Herbert, Hilary A. "The Fight off the Yalu
Review , CLIX (November, 1894), 513-528.

North toerican

"Military Lessons of the Chino-Japanese War."
~~Review, CLX (June, 1895), 685-698.

North American

the Japan-China War."
Hisa, Michitaro. "The Significance of
XVIII (October, 1894), 216-227.

Forum,

and China."
"International Law in the War Between Japan
74-75.
IJ^elLls Livi£& Age, CCVI (July 13, 1895),

Holland, T. E.

Present Shape?" C|5)|e|£ial anl
"Is China worth Preserving in Its
815-816.
jTnancial Chronic^^ LIX (November 10, 1894),
"Is Infanticide Practised in China?"
769-781.

"The Japanese Press on the War."
564-565.
Koxnatz. Midori.

Catholic World , LX (March, 1895),

Lit.erarz Dif^Sl

"Japan, Its Present and Future."

,

IX (September 8. 1894),

Ar^.

XII (March.

1895), 1-9.

War."
Kurino, Shinchiro. "Tt.e Oriental
(November, 1894), 529-536.

Nor th American Rev^^

CLIX

Japanese."
"Mental Characteristics of the
1895), 72-9i.
Scribnerjj. M^azine XVII (January.

Ladd, George Trumbull.

,

r ^1T3_vn^
Vain "
Yalu.
"The Lessons of the Battle of
(August 31, 1895), 130-131.

American. LXXIII
Scientific
^cLenLj^
v

Foreign Policy."
Lodge, Henry Cabot. "Our Blundering
(March, 1895). 8-17.

Forum. XIX

(August, 1895), 585
Magazine. L, XXVIII new series

Ma^

L,

PubUc Opinion. XVII (December

27,

the Yalu Fight " ^e^^tur^
^^han, A, T. "Lessons from
629-632.
XXVIII nev7 series (August, 1895),

"^e

Massacre at Port Arthur."
1894), 939-940.

"Naval Vivisection

336-337
Nation, LIX (Novem.ber 8, 1894),

247

War in the East."
Oisbi, Kuma. "The Causes Which Led to the
'x (November, 1894), 721-735.

"Peace in the Orient."

Arena,

108-109.
Adv££^IS. of Peacje, LVII (May, 1895),

China."
Perkins, Rev. H. P. "The Seat of War in
XCI (August, 1895), 318-320.

Mss.iopary_ Herald,

and
"Russia and the Situation in the East." Cor^rierciai
Chronicle LX (May 25, 1895). 907-908.

Fij]a^^

.

Refugees."
"Secretary Gresham's Surrender of Japanese
Digest, X (December 8, 1894), 151--152.
Seward, George Frederick. "China and Japan."
(April, 1895), 713-718.

Literary

CoiH12£2lLti!l.

War." Mssionarx Review
S-encer, Rev. David S. "The Chino-Japanese
(February, 1895), 325-330.
o_£ the World, XVIII

Port Arthur."
Villi^rs Frederic. "The Truth About
Review. CLX (1-Iarch, 1895). 325-330.

"I^e War in Corea."

North American

204Advocate of Pea^e, LVI (September, 1894),

205.

c;^----^^?/,;;^'^^^;^^^?"^ ^238Keinstock, Harris. "Influence of the
Da^. XIV (^^y, Ib^^;, ^-e
Future of the American People." Our
246.
v^'-n-i

T

T

as Altered by the
"The Religious Situation in Japan

C^Jl iiterat^^
o ..^11

"T-i

XII (^larch. 1895), 265-267.

Hnna Chans

:

A Character Sketch of the

395.

SECONDARY WORKS

THESES
UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS AND
.

u

TT-n.-.n,

and International
"The Mission of Charles Denby

Southern Cal.fcrnia. 195dissertation. University of
In
War ol 1894-95: A Study
Slno-Japanasa
"The
Ota.
Dotson. UUian

248

Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale

Asian Power Politics."
University, 1951.

Chinese in the United States,
Gardner, John Berdan. "The Image of the
University ot
1885-1915." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
Pennsylvania, 1961.
the Opening and the Closing
Rilldrun, W. Leroy. "Progress and Morals,
Randolph Bryan Grinnan, one of the_
of Japan: A Life of the Rev.
Unpublished manuscript
?lrst southern Presbyterian missionaries."
in the University of Virginia Library.

v^n^nan

China, 1890-1905."
Pobert F., Jr. "The American Image of
University, 1964.
PhlD. dissertation, Michigan State

BOOKS ME) ARTICLES

Aaron, Daniel, ed. An^rica in Cjisl^:
New York: Alfred A. Knopi, 19^2.
Ame:£i£an History.

^f^fJ^/-^'-^^"

Ari-

N-Fao.

~

Its Orsanization and
The Red Cross Socie^^ of Ja^an:

Exposition, 1904.
>
A
n
L
Ballard, Vice-Admiral G. A.
HistoiY Pi ^^P-^1

•

TV,A
Thf.

Tnfluer'-e
il^^i^l^
J>=^'n

rru^

PoUtical

Kurray, ly^l.

The.^Mod.ern^.ti^^ of
Becl^vnn, George H.
Harper & Row, 1962.
1

the
of the Sea on
~

An>o7-.'rAn

Chi.nj,

and Ja,.an.

New York:

S^rret^-ri ss of State and JlOSil

"""^I^S^'-ii vM.^^.lviif^i
Eland, J. 0. p.

lA

Hun^S. Chaii£.

London: Constable. 1917.

th^
and Backhouse, E. Chins.
1910.
"London: William Heinemann,

^p^a^.

;

in the Pacific
1^
Til-, ib-iited States Navy
Reynolds.
William
.2^^^
Braisted,
~~rp-7it.T958:
lexa.^ Press,
1597^09. Austin: University of

The Stor^ £i f^ISfil^
^f"--«T-/ of the Far East:
Brown, Arthur Judson.
i~the Orient. New
^^:-;Tri.
bU2^.,__Y. _„
!t S^sII^^em^
Ris_e
TraTislormation and. Ja£an_i,
Charles Scribnar's Sons, lyi^'.

^

Y^:

^f^^fff^My^^^ gft^S'

Callahan, James Morton.
EaiL. iZM_-L500
The Johns Hopkins
•^°^"^fP'^^^!^/"';:":ii,e:
L„.-imo.
Vol. XiX.
Science,
Political
and

249

Press, 1901.

IMS^lilO: A Stud^
Conroy, Hilary. The Ja2aTL_ese Seiziur^ of
Philadelphia:
of Realism and Idealism in International Relations.
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960.
Curzon, George N. Problems of the Far East
London: Longmans, Green, 1894.

:

Ja£an2Kor^ea::CMj^

Davis, Richard Harding. Real Soldiers of FortHie.
Scribner's Sons, 1919.

Kev7

York: Charles

A Critical Stud:^^ of t^
Dennett, Tyler. Americans in Eastern Asia:
and Korea in the
United States with Reference to China , ^ Ja2an
New York: Macmillan, 1922.
19th Century
.

Dulebohm, George Roscoe.

Cl^vy^

Admiji^^^

Princifiles of F^:ei^n PoUc^, MPil.^- the

Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania, 1941.
Americans. Role iJl
Dulles, Foster Kiea. Yankee and Saiirurai:
New York: Harper «
ERsrfiense of Modern Japan, 1791-1950
Row, 1965.
"

.

and Craig, Albert M. Ea^
Fairbank, John K. B.eischauer, Edwin 0.;
Boston: Houghton Mifflm,
Asia: The Modern TransfoiE^tion.
1965.
;

Boston: Houghton

Foster, John W, American. DiElomcx
Mifflin, 1903.

J^:

Cr o_sbx
A Ne;. Ensiander in
Greene, Evarts Boutell
Houghton Mifrlin, 192/.
Greene. Boston and New York:
.

and Young, George Berkeley.
in Foreign Pol^sx.
and American Diplomacy: Studies
Press, 19o6.
University
Ni^ Haven ^d London: Yale

GrenviUe, John A.

P^^'^^lff-^'
imzl^J-'

S.

I^fe of Walter fiuint^
Gresham.. R.tilda.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1919.

and K2ri^:::j:^:ifJlI££D- gj^l^tixons
oF"wisconsin Press, 1944.

ItoTTork:

-Hie

,

iooh iy<j^*

Columbia University Press, 19U5.

^vols.

250

Thought.
Hofstadter, Richard. Social Darwinism in American
Boston: The Beacon Press, 1963.

Rev. ed.

The Japan-ChinA War, CcnrpJlsd frorn Official, and
Singapore, n.d.
Other Sources.. Yokohama, Hongkong, Shanghai and

InouYC, JuVichi.

Jane, Fred T., ed.
Brown, 1899.

m

Boston: Little,

the World Is lighting

of ^ne|ican
Johnson, Allen; and Malone, Dumas, ^he Dicti.onatx
Sons,
Biography 20 vols. New York: Charles Scribi^er s
1928-1936.

Joseph, Philip. Foreign Di^on^cx in Cl^^^
Pqlitical and Economic ReUt^ons with China.
Allen & Unwin, 1928.

Kim

C

London: Geoige,

Folia£Ji o^
Eugene and Kim, Han-Kyo. Korea mid the
Angeles: linivers.ty
iHPeriaUsm, WJ^lim' Berkeley and Los
of California Press, 1967.
I.

Modern Jagan.
Knapp, Arthur ffeiy. Feudal an^
Boston: L. C. Page, 1897.

2

2nd ed.

vols.

Ea^:

An Inter£retation £f A|erLcjin
The New
LeFeber, Wal ter
Cornell University Press, 1963.
ElTansion. 1860-18987- Ithaca:
.

American Forei£.n Policy: A Kistori.
Leopold. Richard W. The Growth of
Kew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964.
li

I^^^.

Ingalls, Jeremy, rh^
Ch-Jen-nung; Teng, Ssu-Yu; and
Princeton: D. Van ^ostrand, 1956.
Ct^Iis.' 1840:11928.

Sllt^

Liu

k

Rwang-Ching.

^^cricans in Oii^^

U^SM^'"^^^^-'"'-

IJniversxty Press, 1963.

from

M|grd

American Mssionarie^ in China: L-JL?rs
1966.
"SemI^ :'"ci^b?rdirrHarvard University Press,
.

"A^-ican Expansion in China

McCorno-.ck, Tnomas J.

''

A^^

1970), 1393-1-iyo.
Eistori_cai Review, LXXV (June,

f^ Informal Empire. 1893China ^forket Ame_rlcals fiuest
Books, 19o/.
""l90U Chicago: Quadrangle
.

:

Principles ano Fxaccice
Littla, Bro%vn, 1911 •

Miller, Stuart Creighton.

IJie

tt^.-t.

imwei^^

^ —

i

.

251

of the Chinese, 1785-1S82
of California Press, 1969.
.

Berkeley and Los Angeles: University

the Chinese Em£ire.
Morse, Hosea Ballou. The International Relations of
Nev7 York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1910.
3 vols.

Mott, Frank Luther. A-merican J ournalism
New York: Macmillan, 1962.

:

A History, 16902l_960.

in Eastern Asia.
Nelson, M. Frederick. Korea and the Old Orders
1945.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,

Coura^.
Kevins, Allan. Grover Cleveland: A Stud^r in
Mead, 1966.

New York: Dodd,

New York: The New

1858-1968.
The New York Times Obituaries Index,
\ork Times, 1970.

Expenditure^ of the Si2£=JS£5B^
International
Universit7P?^ii~for the Carnegie EndowiTisnt for

Ono, Giichi.

Peace, 1922.

Treaty."
Paulsen, George E. "The Gresham-Yang
281-297.
Review, XXXVI (August, 1968),

Pacific Historicai

American
"Secretary Gresham, Senator Lodge, and
XXXVI
Offices in China, 1894." Pacific Historical Mvi.?:^'-.
(May, 1967), 123-142.
_

.

—Good

^ssi£aaj:x of

gl£
Porter, Henry D. William Scott Arnent
1911.
Revell,
Board to China. New York: Fleming H.
:

Rabe

Anerican

Book^ a^d
Arnerican-Chines^ Re]^tion,s inhlH^'Can,orxoge.
ExtBIIilSi^S^ Shelf of Widener Librarv.
Harvard University Press, 1950.
.

V.lentir H.

plSiL

Stru^

for

^^e^SESI^,

Rawlinson, John L. China.'^
1>67.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

A^Tnl^ilTrhr United
Spector, Stanley.

Li

1^:1^.'

States Naval Institute, 19^2.

Hung^h^

Mneje e^^ent uQi

ChL^ f^-^.f^^ ^ttle-^vifsity

Washington Press, 1984.
Stend. Alfred, ed.
Authorities.

i

SilE^London: William Heinemoun. 1-04.

J=I=S

fet

ife JaaH|«:

'-^^

of

i

252

the A^^ican Board: An J^count of
Strong. William E. Tlie Story of
of the A^ierican Board of Cosnis^on^rs
^ke First HundTii
Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1910.
for iiiiisn Missions
.

ani the llavaiian ^SS^: A ZSli|i£^
Tate, Mer^e. The United States
University Press, 1965.
History .-ie^THS^u and London: Yale

Treat

Japanese War, 1894,"
Payson J. "The Cause of the SinoVIII (1939), 149-157.
PSrifl£ Hi storied
Sta t|s and
Diplomatic Relations, between, the United
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963.
TaD^nn:853^1 8957^^13. Gloucester,
Stanford University
tpS^til frofl-932 edition by permission by

"

.

Press

Vare

The United States ard Ci^il^.
Press. 1968.
i89Ll9L27~ErsTTfniini:^ichigan State University
Paul A.

The Majcin^ of a

^21^^'- ^-^^f^^- Princeton
p.^^eeton:
in China. 1890;1952Movement
""~PrEtiiti^Mi:Ssiona^
Princeton "university Press, 1958.
.

Missiona_ries, CMjiese and

W. MsMiiLV
Door Diplomat: The Life of W.
The
Urbana:^^J^^"^'
XXXIII.
Vol.
.;..ul£l
Studies i^Thrfciir sTTences,
1952.
University of Illinois Press,
0-oen

/Venone Volpicelli
Vladimir.
Low, I'larston, 1896.

J

The

China^ War

London: S.mpson
.

Hug|rl!^ Hi^t^: of Korea
Weems, Clarence Norv^ood, ed.
1952.
New York: Hillary House,
.

Ti.-Ki

.

—

in the East: Ja2SE> ^hj^.>
u 11
•n.P War jji
White, Trumbull. Th e
18^5.
Published by Trumbull White,

^

£££^'

fmarican Empire.
Th- Root«; of ithe Modern
~-

T^^££££^
Williams, William Appleman.
lyoy.
New York: Random House,
I

2 vols.

Beings
-ina-pnhv of the Japsjiese Empire:

Kabushiki Kaisha, 1907.

»

.

I

\

I

\

\

